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Abstract
This thesis consists of three papers that belong to the broad realm of Applied
Economics.
The first chapter studies the causal connection between trade and development,
using one of the earliest massive trade expansions in prehistory: the first system-
atic crossing of open seas in the Mediterranean during the time of the Phoeni-
cians. For each point on the coast, we construct the ease with which other points
can be reached by crossing open water. We show that an association between
better connected locations and archaeological sites emerges during the Iron Age
when sailors routinely crossed open water. We corroborate these findings at the
world scale.
In the second chapter, we use oil discoveries in the US South between 1900 and
1940 to analyse whether male-biased demand shocks reduce women’s labour
force participation. We find that oil wealth has a zero net effect on female
labour force participation due to two opposing channels. Oil discoveries raise
male wages, which leads to an increased marriage rate of young women and thus
could have depressed female labour supply. But oil wealth also increases demand
for women in services, which counterbalances the marriage effect. Our findings
demonstrate that when the nontradable sector is open to women, male-biased
demand shocks in the tradable sector need not reduce female labour force par-
ticipation.
The third chapter analyses whether the German National Socialists used eco-
nomic policies to reward their voters after coming to power in 1933. Using
newly-collected data on public employment from the German censuses in 1925,
1933, and 1939 and addressing the potential endogeneity of the NSDAP vote
share in 1933 by way of an instrumental variables strategy based on a similar
party in Imperial Germany, I find that cities with higher NSDAP vote shares
experienced a relative increase in public employment: for every additional per-
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Introduction
This thesis consists of three papers that belong to the broad realm of Applied
Economics, with a particular focus on how natural advantages and politics can
shape the geographic distribution of economic activities. From a methodologi-
cal point of view, all three chapters also share the use of variation provided by
history in order to shed lights on economic questions.
In the first chapter, together with Jo¨rn-Steffen Pischke and Ferdinand Rauch,
we study the causal effect of trade opportunities on economic growth. Providing
clean evidence for this effect is very difficult due to reverse causality, path de-
pendence, the endogenous location of economic activities and omitted variables
such as institutions. Our solution is to combine fine geographic variation with
one of the earliest major trade expansions in human history: the first system-
atic crossing of the Mediterranean during the Iron Age. In particular, for each
point on a 10km ×10km grid of the Mediterranean coast, we calculate the num-
ber of other coastal points that can be reached over sea within given distances
(e.g. 500km). Using data on the locations of archaeological sites from various
sources, we then show that coastal points from which more other coastal points
can be reached over sea have a greater local density of human activity. However,
this relationship only emerges during the Iron Age, when open sea voyages were
common. Before, when sailors were mostly following the coast, our results are
weaker and less consistent. In essence, we use geographical connectedness as an
instrumental variable for trade, but due to the absence of trade data for the Iron
Age, we estimate a reduced form effect of connectedness on economic growth.
Our results indicate a positive effect of trade on growth, where trade should be
understood in a broad sense that also includes the spread of ideas or people.
In addition, our study also provides further evidence for the persistent role of
locational fundamentals in the spatial distribution of cities.
Thus, as chapter 1 shows, natural advantages can have important broad impli-
cations for growth. In addition, they can also have substantial distributional
effects, for example by favouring some workers more than others. In this vein,
the second chapter (joint with Andrei Potlogea) uses another geographic ad-
vantage - natural resources - to study the effect of male-biased labour demand
shocks on gender labour market differences. Between 1900 and 1940, many large
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oil fields were discovered in the US South. We provide a theoretical framework
that models oil discoveries as male-biased demand shocks in a small open econ-
omy. If women are allowed to work in services, they are subject to two opposing
labour demand effects: A demand reduction in the tradable sector, and a de-
mand increase in the nontradable sector. The more productive the oil industry,
the more likely it is that the latter effect will dominate. We then use data
on the location and discovery years of oil fields in the US South, coupled with
individual-level census data, to compare the evolution of female labour market
outcomes in oil-rich counties relative to control counties. We find that oil wealth
has a zero net effect on female labour force participation: Oil discoveries increase
demand for male labour in oil mining and manufacturing and consequentially
raise male wages. This leads to an increased marriage rate of young women,
which could have depressed female labour force participation. But consistent
with our model, oil wealth also increases demand for women in services, which
counterbalances the marriage effect and leaves women’s overall labour force par-
ticipation rate unchanged. Our findings demonstrate that when the nontradable
sector is open to women, male-biased demand shocks in the tradable sector need
not reduce female labour force participation.
In the third chapter, finally, I look at how politics can induce changes in the spa-
tial distribution of economic activity, with a particular focus on public employ-
ment. A sizeable literature has shown how firms (e.g. Fisman 2001) or regions
(e.g. Anderson and Tollison 1991) can benefit from being politically connected.
I add to this literature by analysing whether cities in Nazi Germany benefited
from having voted for the National Socialists before they came to power, using
newly-connected data on public employment from the German censuses in 1925,
1933, and 1939 as outcome measure. The vote share for the National Social-
ists is likely to be endogenous for a variety of reasons such as reverse causality
(Voigtla¨nder and Voth 2016) and differential impacts of the post-1929 economic
crisis (King et al 2008). To address this, I employ an instrumental variables
strategy based on the persistence of local political attitudes: I instrument the
1933 vote share of the National Socialist party (NSDAP) by way of the 1912
vote share of a smaller party in Imperial Germany that catered to similar voters
as the NSDAP later. Doing so, I find that cities with higher NSDAP vote shares
experienced a relative increase in public employment: for every additional per-
centage point in the vote share, the number of public employment jobs increased
by around 2.5 percent. The findings are robust to including or excluding cities
that underwent substantial changes in their population and territory during the
period of observation, to using the 1930 or 1932 elections instead of the 1933




Of Mice and Merchants: Trade
and Growth in the Iron Age1
1.1 Introduction
We investigate to what degree trading opportunities affected economic develop-
ment at an early juncture of human history. In addition to factor accumulation
and technical change, Smithian growth due to exchange and specialization is one
of the fundamental sources of growth. An emerging literature on the topic is
beginning to provide compelling empirical evidence for a causal link from trade
to growth. We contribute to this literature and focus on one of the earliest trade
expansions in pre-history: the systematic crossing of open seas in the Mediter-
ranean at the time of the Phoenicians from about 900 BC. We relate trading
opportunities, which we capture through the connectedness of points along the
coast, to early development as measured by the presence of archaeological sites.
We find that locational advantages for sea trade matter for the foundation of
Iron Age cities and settlements, and thus helped shape the development of the
Mediterranean region, and the world.
A location with more potential trading partners should have an advantage if
trade is important for development. The particular shape of a coast has little
influence over how many neighbouring points can be reached from a starting
location within a certain distance as long as ships sail mainly close to the coast.
However, once sailors begin to cross open seas, coastal geography becomes more
important: Some coastal points are in the reach of many neighbours while other
can reach only few. The general shape of the coast and the location of is-
1We thank Jan Bakker and Juan Pradera for excellent research assistance, and David Ab-
ulafia, Tim Besley, Andrew Bevan, Francesco Caselli, Jeremiah Dittmar, Avner Greif, Carl
Knappett, Andrea Matranga, Guy Michaels, Dennis Novy, Luigi Pascali, Dominic Rathbone,
Tanner Regan, Corinna Riva, Susan Sherratt, Pedro CL Souza, Peter Temin, John van Reenen,
Ruth Whitehouse, and participants at various seminars and conferences for their helpful com-
ments and suggestions.
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lands matters for this. We capture these geographic differences by dividing the
Mediterranean coast into grid cells, and calculating how many other cells can
be reached within a certain distance. Parts of the Mediterranean are highly
advantaged by their geography, e.g. the island-dotted Aegean and the “waist of
the Mediterranean” at southern Italy, Sicily, and modern Tunisia. Other areas
are less well connected, like most of the North African coast, parts of Iberia and
southern France, and the Levantine coast.
We relate our measure of connectivity to the number of archaeological sites
found near any particular coastal grid point. This is our proxy for economic
development. It is based on the assumption that more human economic activity
leads to more settlements and particularly towns and cities. While these expand
and multiply, there are more traces in the archaeological record. We find a pro-
nounced relationship between connectivity and development in our data set for
the Iron Age around 750 BC, when the Phoenicians had begun to systematically
traverse the open sea, using various different data sources for sites. We find a
weaker and less consistent relationship between connectivity and sites for earlier
periods. This is consistent with the idea that earlier voyages occurred, maybe at
intermediate distances, at some frequency already during the Bronze Age. Our
interpretation of the results suggests that the relationship between coastal geog-
raphy and settlement density, once established in the Iron Age, persists through
the classical period. This is consistent with a large literature in economic geog-
raphy on the persistence of city locations. While our main results pertain to the
Mediterranean, where we have good information on archaeological sites, we also
corroborate our findings at a world scale using population data for 1 AD from
McEvedy and Jones (1978) as outcome.
Humans have obtained goods from far away locations for many millennia. While
some of the early trade involved materials useful for tools (like the obsidian trade
studied by Dixon, Cann, and Renfrew 1968), as soon as societies became more
differentiated a large part of this early trade involved luxury goods doubtlessly
consumed by the elites. Such trade might have raised the utility of the beneficia-
ries but it is much less clear whether it affected productivity as well. Although
we are unable to measure trade directly, our work sheds some light on this ques-
tion. Since trade seems to have affected the growth of settlements even at an
early juncture this suggests that it was productivity enhancing. The view that
trade played an important role in early development has recently been gain-
ing ground among economic historians; see e.g. Temin (2006) for the Iron Age
Mediterranean, Algaze (2008) for Mesopotamia, and Temin (2013) for Ancient
Rome.
Our approach avoids issues of reverse causality and many confounders by using
a geography based instrument for trade. In fact, we do not observe trade itself
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but effectively estimate a reduced form relationship, relating opportunities for
trade directly to economic development. This means that we do not necessarily
isolate the effect of the exchange of goods per se. Our results could be driven
by migration or the spread of ideas as well, and when we talk about “trade” we
interpret it in this broad sense. We do believe that coastal connectivity captures
effects due to maritime connections. It is difficult to imagine any other channel
why geography would matter in this particular manner, and we show that our
results are not driven by a variety of other geographic conditions.
Since we do not use any trade data we avoid many of the measurement issues
related to trade. We measure trading opportunities and development at a fine
geographic scale, hence avoiding issues of aggregation to a coarse country level.
Both our measure of connectedness and our outcome variable are doubtlessly
extremely crude proxies of both trading opportunities and of economic develop-
ment. This will likely bias us against finding any relationship and hence makes
our results only more remarkable.
The periods we study, the Bronze and Iron Ages, were characterized by the
rise and decline of many cultures and local concentrations of economic activity.
Many settlements and cities rose during this period, only to often disappear
again. This means that there were ample opportunities for new locations to rise
to prominence while path dependence and hysteresis may have played less role
compared to later ages. The political organization of the Mediterranean world
prior to the Romans was mostly local. The Egyptian Kingdoms are the main
exception to this rule but Egypt was mostly focused on the Nile and less engaged
in the Mediterranean. As a result, institutional factors were less important dur-
ing the period we study.
There is a large literature on trade and growth. Canonical studies are the inves-
tigations by Frankel and Romer (1999) and Redding and Venables (2004). These
papers use distance from markets and connectivity as measured by gravity re-
lationships to capture the ease with which potential trading partners can be
reached. However, these measures do not rely purely on geography but conflate
economic outcomes like population and output, which are themselves affected
by the development process.
The more recent literature has circumvented this by analysing exogenous events
related to changes in trade. Most similar to our study are a series of papers
which also exploit new trade relationships arising from discoveries, the opening
of new trade routes, and technological change. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robin-
son (2005) link Atlantic trade starting around 1,500 AD to the ensuing shift in
the focus of economic activity in Europe from the south and centre of the conti-
nent to the Atlantic periphery. Redding and Sturm (2008) focus on the natural
experiment created by the division and reunification in Germany, which changed
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the access to other markets sharply for some locations but not others. Various
papers exploit the availability of new transport technologies; Feyrer (2009) uses
air transport, Donaldson (forthcoming) and Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016) use
railroads, and Pascali (forthcoming) steam ships. These papers generally find
that regions whose trading opportunities improved disproportionately saw larger
income growth. That we find similar results for a much earlier trade expansion
suggests that the productivity benefits of trade have been pervasive throughout
history.
Our paper also relates to a literature on how changes in locational fundamentals
shape the location of cities (Davis and Weinstein 2002, Bleakley and Lin 2012,
Bosker and Buringh 2017, Michaels and Rauch forthcoming). Our contribution
to this literature is to give evidence on one of the most important locational fun-
damentals, market access. In a world with multiple modes of transport for the
transportation of different goods, it is typically hard to measure market access
and changes of market access of a city. Our measure relates to a world where
much long distance trade took place on boats, which makes it easier to isolate
a measure of market access.
Also closely related is the paper by Ashraf and Galor (2011a). They relate
population density in various periods to the relative geographic isolation of a
particular area. Their interest is in the impact of cultural diversity on the devel-
opment process, and they view geographic isolation effectively as an instrument
for cultural homogeneity. Similar to our measure, their geographic isolation
measure is a measure of connectivity of various points around the world. They
find that better connected (i.e. less isolated) countries have lower population
densities for every period from 1 to 1,500 AD, which is the opposite of our re-
sult. Our approach differs from Ashraf and Galor (2011a) in that we only look
at coasts and not inland locations. They control for distance to waterways in
their regressions, a variable that is strongly positively correlated with popula-
tion density. Hence, our results are not in conflict with theirs.
Our paper is also related to a number of studies on pre-historic Mediterranean
connectivity and seafaring. McEvedy (1967) creates a measure of “littoral zones”
using coastal shapes. He produces a map which closely resembles the one we
obtain from our connectivity measure but does not relate geography directly
to seafaring. This is done by Broodbank (2006), who overlays the connectivity
map with archaeological evidence of the earliest sea-crossings up to the end of
the last Ice Age. He interprets the connections as nursery conditions for the
early development of nautical skills, rather than as market access, as we do for
the later Bronze and Iron Ages. Also related is a literature in archaeology using
network models connecting archaeological sites; Knappett, Evans, and Rivers
(2008) is an excellent example for the Bronze Age Aegean. None of these papers
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relate to the changes arising from open sea-crossings, which is the focus of our
analysis. Temin (2006) discusses the Iron Age Mediterranean through the lens
of comparative advantage trade but offers no quantitative evidence as we do.
1.2 Brief history of ancient seafaring in the Mediter-
ranean
The Mediterranean is a unique geographic space. The large inland sea is pro-
tected from the open oceans by the Strait of Gibraltar. The tectonics of the area,
the African plate descending under the Eurasian one, have created a rugged
northern coast in Europe and a much straighter one in North Africa. Volcanic
activity and the more than 3,000 islands also tend to be concentrated towards
the north. The climatic conditions in the Mediterranean are generally relatively
favourable to agriculture, particularly in the north. The Mediterranean is the
only large inland sea with such a climate (Broodbank 2013). Its east-west ori-
entation facilitated the spread of agriculture from the Levant (Diamond 1997).
Despite these common features, the size of the Mediterranean and an uneven
distribution of natural resources also implies great diversity. Modern writers
on the Mediterranean, most notably Horden and Purcell (2000) have stressed
that the area consists of many micro-regions. Geography and climate make the
Mediterranean prone to many risks, such as forest fires, earthquakes, plagues of
locusts, droughts, floods, and landslides. As a consequence, trade networks that
allow to moderate shocks are of great mutual interest in the region, and trade
has played a central role since its early history.2
Clear evidence of the first maritime activity of humans in the Mediterranean is
elusive. Crossings to islands close to the mainland were apparently undertaken
as far back as 30,000 BC (Fontana Nuova in Sicily). In a careful review of the
evidence, Broodbank (2006) dates more active seafaring to around 10,000 BC
based on the distribution of obsidian (a volcanic rock) at sites separated by wa-
ter (see Dixon, Cann, and Renfrew 1965, 1968). This points to the existence of
active sea-faring of hunter-gatherer societies, and suggests that boats must have
travelled distances of 20-35 kilometres around that time. We have no evidence
on the first boats but they were likely made from skin and frame or dugout
canoes.
The beginning of agriculture around the Mediterranean happened in the Levant
between 9,500 BC and 8,000 BC. From there it spread initially to Anatolia and
the Aegean. Signs of a fairly uniform Neolithic package of crops and domesti-
cated animals can be found throughout the Mediterranean. The distribution of
the earliest evidence of agriculture, which includes islands before reaching more
2The following discussion mainly draws on Abulafia (2011) and Broodbank (2013).
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peripheral parts of the mainland, suggests a maritime transmission channel.
The Neolithic revolution did not reach Iberia until around 5,500 BC. By that
time, many islands in the Aegean had been settled, there is evidence for grain
storage, and metal working began in the Balkans. Because of the uneven distri-
bution of ores, metals soon became part of long range transport. Uncertainty
must have been a reason for the formation of networks both for insurance and
exchange. The first archaeological evidence of a boat also stems from this pe-
riod: a dugout canoe, about 10m long, at La Marmotta north of Rome. A
replica proved seaworthy and allowed travel of 20 - 25km per day in a laden
boat.
The Levant, which was home to the first cities, remained a technological leader
in the region, yet there is little evidence of sea-faring even during the Copper
Age. This changed with the rise of large scale societies in Mesopotamia and
Egypt. Inequality in these first states led to rich elites, who soon wished to
trade with each other. Being at the cross-roads between these two societies, the
Levant quickly became a key intermediary.
Two important new transport technologies arrived in the Mediterranean around
3,000 BC: the donkey and the sail. The donkey was uniquely suited to the
climatic conditions and rugged terrain around the Mediterranean (better than
camels or horses). Donkeys are comparable in speed to canoes. Sailboats of that
period could be around 5-10 times faster in favourable conditions, ushering in a
cost advantage of water transport that would remain intact for many millennia
to come. The land route out of Egypt to the Levant (“The Way of Horus”) was
soon superseded by sea routes leading up the Levantine coast to new settlements
like Byblos, with Levantine traders facilitating much of Egypt’s Mediterranean
trade. Coastal communities began to emerge all the way from the Levant via
Anatolia to the Aegean and Greece.
There is no evidence of the sail spreading west of Greece at this time. Canoes,
though likely improved into high performance water craft, remained inferior to
sail boats but kept facilitating maritime transport in the central and western
Mediterranean. The major islands there were all settled by the early Bronze
Age. While not rivalling the maritime activity in the eastern Mediterranean, re-
gional trade networks arose also in the west. One example is the Beaker network
of the 3rd Millennium BC; most intense from southern France to Iberia, with
fewer beakers found in the western Maghreb, northern Italy, and Sardinia but
also stretching all the way into central Europe, the Baltic, and Britain. Land
routes probably dominated but sea trade must have played a role. The Cetina
culture of the late 3rd Millennium BC in the Adriatic is another example. Oc-
casional sea-crossings up to 250km were undertaken.
A drying spell around 2,200 BC and decline in Egypt disrupted the active mar-
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itime network in the eastern Mediterranean and the population it supported.
The oldest known shipwreck in the Mediterranean at the island of Dokos in
southern Greece dates from this period. The 15 metres long boat could carry
a maximum weight of 20 tons. The wreck contained largely pottery, which was
likely the cargo rather than carrying liquids, and also carried lead ingots. The
ship probably was engaged in local trade.
Decline in the eastern Mediterranean soon gave rise to new societies during
the 2nd millennium BC: palace cultures sprang up all over the eastern Mediter-
ranean. Minoan Crete and Mycenae in Greece were notable examples but similar
cities existed along the Anatolian coast and in the Levant. The palaces did not
simply hold political power, but were centres of religious, ceremonial, and eco-
nomic activity. At least initially, craftsmen and traders most likely worked for
the palace rather than as independent agents. Sail boats still constituted an
advanced technology, and only the concentration of resources in the hands of a
rich elite made their construction and operation possible. The political reach of
the palaces at coastal sites was local; larger polities remained confined to inland
areas as in the case of Egypt, Babylon, or the Hittite Empire.
An active trade network arose again in the eastern Mediterranean stretching
from Egypt to Greece during the Palace period. The Anatolian land route was
replaced by sea trade. Some areas began to specialize in cash crops like olives
and wine. A typical ship was still the 15 metre, 20 ton, one masted vessel as
evidenced by the Uluburn wreck found at Kas in Turkey, dating from 1,450 BC.
Such vessels carried diverse cargoes including people (migrants, messengers, and
slaves), though the main goods were likely metals, textiles, wine, and olive oil.
Evidence for some of these was found on the Uluburun wreck; other evidence
comes from archives and inscriptions akin to bills of lading. Broodbank (2013)
suggests that the value of cargo of the Uluburun ship was such that it was suf-
ficient to feed a city the size of Ugarit for a year. Ugarit was the largest trading
city in the Levant at the time with a population of about 6,000 - 8,000. This
highlights that sea trade still largely consisted of high value luxury goods. The
Ugarit archives also reveal that merchants operating on their own account had
become commonplace by the mid 2nd millennium. Levantine rulers relied more
on taxation than central planning of economic activities. Trade was both risky
and profitable; the most successful traders became among the richest members
of their societies.
Around the same time, the Mycenaeans traded as far as Italy. Sicily and the
Tyrrhenian got drawn into the network. While 60 - 70km crossings to Cyprus
or Crete and across the Otrano Strait (from Greece to the heel of Italy) were
commonplace, coast hugging still prevailed among sailors during the 2nd millen-
nium BC. After crossing the Otrano Strait, Greek sailors would continue along
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the coast of the Bay of Taranto, the instep of Italy’s boot, as is suggested by
the distribution of Greek pottery at coastal sites. Indigenous sea-farers from
the central Mediterranean now joined these routes, and the sail finally entered
the central Mediterranean around 1,200 BC. While there were no big break-
throughs, naval technology also improved in the late 2nd millennium. Better
caulking and keels added to sea-worthiness (Abulafia 2011), while brail rigging
and double prows improved manoeuvrability. Most notably, latitude sailing was
developed and allowed sailors to steer a straight east-westerly course. “This was
a leap in the scope of connections, a permanent shift in Mediterranean history
and a crucial stage in tying together the basin’s inhabitants across the soon-to-
be shrinking sea,” observes Broodbank (2013, p. 431) before warning that“we
should not exaggerate, nor anticipate, the importance of such connections at
this early juncture. Not until the Iron Age did relations become close enough to
fundamentally reshape the culture and economies of outlying regions.” (p. 441)
A new period of decline around 1,200 BC reduced the power of Egypt, wiped out
cities like Ugarit, and ended the reign of the last palace societies in the eastern
Mediterranean. In the more integrated world that the eastern Mediterranean
had become, troubles spread quickly from one site to others. The Bronze Age
came to an end with iron coming on the scene. Rather than being technologically
all that much superior to bronze, iron ore was far more abundant and widespread
than copper and hence much more difficult to monopolize. As was the case many
times before, decline and change opened up spaces for smaller players and more
peripheral regions. Cyprus flourished. Many Levantine cities recovered quickly.
Traders from the central Mediterranean also expanded. Traditionally, decline
during the Bronze Age collapse was often blamed on the anonymous “Sea Peo-
ples.” Modern scholarship seems to challenge whether these foreigners were
simply just raiders and pirates, as the Egyptians surely saw them, rather than
also entrepreneurial traders who saw opportunities for themselves to fill the void
left by the disappearance of imperial connections and networks. Some of these
new interlopers settled in the Levant (Broodbank 2013).
While there is much academic debate about the origin of the Phoenicians, there
is little doubt that the Levantine city states which had taken in these migrants
were the origin of a newly emerging trade network. Starting to connect the old
Bronze Age triangle formed by the Levantine coast and Cyprus, they began to
expand throughout the entire Mediterranean after 900 BC. The Phoenician city
states were much more governed by economic logic than was the case for royal
Egypt. One aspect of their expansion was the formation of enclaves, often at
nodes of the network. Carthage and Gadir (Cadiz) are prime examples but many
others existed. At least initially these were not colonies; the Phoenicians did
not try to dominate local populations. Instead, locals and other settlers were in-
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vited to pursue their own enterprise and contribute to the trading network. The
core of the network consisted of the traditional sea-faring regions, the Aegean
and the Tyrrhenian. The expanding trade network of the early 1st millennium
BC did not start from scratch but encompassed various regional populations.
Tyrrhenian metal workers and Sardinian sailors had opened up connections with
Iberia at the close of the 2nd millennium. But the newly expanding network
not only stitched these routes together, it also created its own, new, long-haul
routes.
These new routes began to take Phoenician and other sailors over long stretches
of open sea. While this had long been conjectured by earlier writers like Braudel
(2001, writing in the late 1960s) and Sherratt and Sherrat (1993), contempo-
rary scholars are more confident. Cunliffe (2008) writes about the course of a
Phoenician sailor: “Beyond Cyprus, for a ship’s master to make rapid headway
west there was much to be said for open-sea sailing. From ... the western end
of Cyprus he could have sailed along the latitude to the south coast of Crete
... where excavation has exposed a shrine built in Phoenician fashion. Travel-
ling the same distance again ..., once more following the latitude, would have
brought him to Malta” (p. 275-276), a route which became known as the “Route
of the Isles.” Abulafia (2011) describes their seafaring similarly: “The best way
to trace the trading empire of the early Phoenicians is to take a tour of the
Mediterranean sometime around 800 BC. ... Their jump across the Ionian Sea
took them out of the sight of land, as did their trajectory from Sardinia to the
Balearics; the Mycenaeans had tended to crawl round the edges of the Ionian
Sea past Ithaka to the heel of Italy, leaving pottery behind as clues, but the lack
of Levantine pottery in southern Italy provides silent evidence of the confidence
of Phoenician navigators.” (p. 71).
This involved crossing 300 - 500km of open sea. One piece of evidence for sail-
ing away from the coast are two deep sea wrecks found 65km off the coast of
Ashkelon (Ballard et al. 2002). Of Phoenician origin and dating from about 750
BC, the ships were 14 metres long, and each carried about 400 amphorae filled
with fine wine. These amphorae were highly standardized in size and shape.
This highlights the change in the scale and organization of trade compared to
the Uluburun wreck with its diverse cargo. It also suggests an early form of
industrial production supporting this trade.
An unlikely traveller offers a unique lens on the expansion of trade and the
density of connections which were forged during this period. The house mouse
populated a small area in the Levant until the Neolithic revolution. By 6,000
BC, it had spread into southern Anatolia before populating parts of north east-
ern Africa and the Aegean in the ensuing millennia (there were some travellers
on the Uluburun ship). There were no house mice west of Greece by 1,000 BC.
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Then, within a few centuries, the little creature turned up on islands and on the
mainland throughout the central and western Mediterranean (Cucchi, Vigne,
and Auffray 2005).
The Phoenicians might have been at the forefront of spreading mice, ideas,
technology, and goods all over the Mediterranean but others were part of these
activities. At the eve of Classical Antiquity, the Mediterranean was constantly
criss-crossed by Greek, Etruscan, and Phoenician vessels as well as smaller eth-
nic groups. Our question here is whether this massive expansion in scale led
to locational advantages for certain points along the coast compared to others,
and whether these advantages translated into the human activity which is pre-
served in the archaeological record. A brief, rough time line for the period we
investigate is given in figure 1.1.
1.3 Data and key variables
For our Mediterranean dataset we compute a regular grid of 10× 10 kilometres
that spans the area of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea using a cylindri-
cal equal area projection. This projection ensures that horizontal neighbours of
grid points are on the same latitude at 10km distance from each other, and that
each cell has an equal area over the surface of the earth.3 We define a grid-cell
as water if falls completely into water, using a coastline map of the earth from
Bjorn Sandvik’s public domain map on world borders4. We define it as coastal
if it is intersected by a coastline. We classify grid cells that are neither water
nor coastal as land. Our estimation dataset consists of coastal cells only, and
each cell is an observation. There are 3,646 cells in the data set.
We compute the distance between coastal point i and coastal point j moving
only over water dij using the cost distance command in ArcGIS. Our key vari-
able in this study, called cdi, measures the number of other coastal cells which
can be reached within distance d from cell i. Destinations may include islands
but we exclude islands which are smaller than 20km2. We also create separate
measures, one capturing only connectedness to islands, and a second measuring
connectedness to other points on the mainland coast. While we use straight
line or shortest distances, we realize that these would have rarely corresponded
to actual shipping routes. Sailors exploited wind patterns and currents, and
often used circular routes on their travels (Arnaud 2007). Our measure is not
supposed to mimic sailing routes directly but simply capture opportunities.
Figure 1.2 displays the measure c500 for a distance of 500km; darker points in-
3As the Mediterranean is close enough to the equator distortions from using another pro-
jection are small in this area of interest.
4We use version 3, available from http://thematicmapping.org/downloads/world_
borders.php.
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dicate better connected locations. Measures for other distances are strongly
positively correlated and maps look roughly similar. The highest connectedness
appears around Greece and Turkey partly due to the islands, but also western
Sicily and the area around Tunis. The figure also highlights substantial vari-
ation of the connectedness measure within countries. The grid of our analysis
allows for spatial variation at a fine scale. Since our measure of connectedness
has no natural scale that is easy to interpret, we normalize each cd to have mean
0 and standard deviation 1. Figure 1.3 shows a histogram of our normalized
connectedness measure for a distance of 500km. Its distribution is somewhat
bimodal, with a large spike at around -0.5, and a second, smaller one around
2. Basically all values above 1 are associated with locations in and around the
Aegean, by far the best connected area according to our measure.
We interpret the measure cd as capturing connectivity. Of course, coastal shape
could proxy for other amenities. For example, a convex coastal shape forms a
bay, which may serve as a natural harbour. Notice that our or 10×10 kilometre
grid is coarse enough to smooth out many local geographic details. We will cap-
ture bays 50 kilometres across but not those 5 kilometres across. It is these more
local features which are likely more relevant for locational advantages like natu-
ral harbours. Our grid size also smooths out other local geographic features, like
changes in the coastline which have taken place over the past millennia, due, for
example, to sedimentation. The broader coastal shapes we capture have been
roughly constant for the period since 3,000 BC, which we study (Agouridis,
1997).
Another issue with our measure of connectivity is whether it only captures bet-
ter potential for trade or also more exposure to external threats like military
raids. Overall, it was probably easier to defend against coastal attacks than
land-based ones (e.g. Cunliffe, 2008, p. 447) so this may not be a huge concern.
But at some level it is obvious that openness involves opportunities as well as
risks. In this respect we measure the net effect of better connectivity.
We also compute a global dataset based on a global grid. We increase the cell
size to 50 × 50 kilometres. This is for computational convenience, but also our
outcome variable at the global level varies only at the country level and thus
spatial precision is less relevant than in the Mediterranean data set. We focus
on the part of the world between -60 degrees and 60 degrees latitude, as units
outside that range are unlikely candidates for early urbanization for climatic
reasons. In the Southern Hemisphere there is hardly any landmass apart from
the Antarctic below 60 degrees, while in the Northern Hemisphere 60 degrees
is close to Helsinki, Aberdeen, and Anchorage, well north of climatic conditions
particularly favourable to early settlement.5 We again compute the distance
5In defining our connectedess measure, we restrict attention to the area between 78 and -54
degrees latitude, which roughly mark the northernmost and southernmost cities of the world.
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from each coastal grid point to each other coastal grid point by moving only
over water. Figure 1.4 shows the global connectedness measure c500. The most
connected coastal points are located again near Greece, but also in Southeast
Asia, Chile, Britain, and Northern Canada, while Western Africa and Eastern
South America have few well connected coastal points.
One limitation of the proposed connectivity measure cd is that it gives all coastal
points that can be reached within distance d equal weight. We would however
expect a connection with a well connected coastal point to be more beneficial
than a connection with a remote coastal cell. To address this limitation we could
weight destination cells by their own cd, and recompute a weighted version called
c2d. After normalization we could compute an additional measure c3d, where
we use c2d as the weight. Repeating this infinitely often, the measure converges
to a variable called “network centrality.” This is a standard measure in various
disciplines to capture the importance of nodes in a network. To compute the
centrality measure, we create a symmetric matrix A for all binary connections,
with entries that consist of binary variables indicating distances smaller than d.
We set the diagonal of the matrix to zero. We solve equation Ax = λx for the
largest possible eigenvalue λ of matrix A. The corresponding eigenvector x gives
the centrality measure.
Our main source of data on settlements in pre-history is the Pleiades dataset
(Bagnall et al. 2014) at the University of North Carolina, the Stoa Consortium,
and the Institute for the Study of the Ancient World at New York Univer-
sity maintained jointly by the Ancient World Mapping Center.6 The Pleiades
dataset is a gazetteer for ancient history. It draws on multiple sources to provide
a comprehensive summary of the current knowledge on geography in the ancient
world. The starting point for the database is the Barrington Atlas of the Greek
and Roman World (Talbert 2000); but it is an open source project and material
from multiple other scholarly sources has been added.
The Pleiades data are available in three different formats of which we use the
“pleiades-places” dataset. It offers a categorization as well as an estimate of the
start and end date for each site. We only keep units that have a defined start
and end date, and limit the data set to units that have a start date before 500
AD. We use two versions of these data, one more restricted (which we refer to
as “narrow”) and the other more inclusive (“wide”). In the narrow one we only
keep units that contain the word “urban” or “settlement” in the categorization.
These words can appear alongside other categorizations of minor constructions,
such as bridge, cemetery, lighthouse, temple, villa, and many others. One prob-
This excludes the Southern tip of Tierra del Fuego in South America as coastal destination,
but should be fairly inconsequential.
6Available at pleiades.stoa.org. We use a version of the dataset downloaded in June
2014.
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lem with the narrow version is that the majority of Pleiades sites do not have a
known category. So that we do not lose these sites we include all sites irrespec-
tive of their category; including both those classified as “unknown” or with any
other known classification in the wide version of the data.
Some of the entries in the Pleiades dataset are located more precisely than oth-
ers. The dataset offers a confidence assessment consisting of the classifications
precise, rough, and unlocated. We only keep units with a precisely measured
location.7 For both datasets, as we merge the Pleiades data onto our grid we
round locations to the nearest 10 × 10 kilometres and are thus robust to some
minor noise.
Since the Pleiades data is originally based on the Barrington Atlas it covers sites
from the classical Greek and Roman period well and adequate coverage seems to
extend back to about 750 BC. Coverage of older sites seems much more limited
as the number of sites with earlier start dates drops precipitously. For exam-
ple, our wide data set has 1,491 sites in 750 BC and 5,649 in 1 AD but only
63 in 1,500 BC. While economic activity and populations were surely lower in
the Bronze Age, there are likely many earlier sites missing in the data. As a
consequence, our estimation results with the Pleiades data for earlier periods
may be rather unreliable.
We therefore created an additional data set of sites from the Archaeological Atlas
of the World (Whitehouse and Whitehouse 1975). The advantage of the White-
house Atlas is that it focuses heavily on the pre-historic period, and therefore
complements the Pleiades data well. A disadvantage is that it is 40 years old.
Although there has been much additional excavation in the intervening period,
there is little reason to believe that it is unrepresentative for the broad coverage
of sites and locations. The interpretation of the archaeological evidence may
well have changed but this is of little consequence for our exercise. Another
drawback of the Whitehouse Atlas is that the maps are much smaller than in
the Barrington Atlas. As a result, there may have been a tendency by the au-
thors to choose the number of sites so as to fill each map without overcrowding
it, leading to a distribution of sites which is too uniform (something that would
bias our results against finding any relationship with our connectivity measure).
This, however, is offset by the tendency to include maps for smaller areas in
locations with many sites. For example, there are separate maps for each of
Malta, Crete, and Cyprus but only three maps for all of Iberia.
7Pleiades contains some sites that have the same identifier, but different locations. This
could reflect, among others, sites from different eras in the same location or different potential
locations for the same site. We deal with this by dropping all sites that have the same
Pleiades identifier and whose coordinates differ by more than 0.1 degree latitude or longitude
in the maximum. The latter restrictions affects around one percent of the Pleiades data. The
remaining identifiers with several sites are dealt with by counting them as one unit, averaging
their coordinates. For overlapping time spans, we use the minimum of such spans as the start
date, the respective maximum as end date.
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We geo-referenced all entries near the coasts on 28 maps covering the Mediter-
ranean in the Whitehouse Atlas ourselves. Using the information in the map
titles and accompanying text, we classified each map as belonging to one of
three periods: the Neolithic, the Bronze Age, or the Iron Age and later. Some
maps contain sites from multiple periods but give a classification of sites, which
we use. Other maps straddle periods without more detailed timing information.
In this case, we classified sites into the three broad periods ourselves using re-
sources on the internet. In a few cases, it is not possible to classify sites clearly
as either Neolithic or Bronze Age in which case we classified them as both (see
the appendix for details).
To measure the urbanization rate near each coastal grid point for time t we
count the number of sites from either Pleiades or Whitehouse that exist at time
t within 50 kilometres of that coastal point on the same landmass. We also count
the number of land cells that are within 50 kilometres of that coastal grid point
on the same landmass. We normalize the number of sites by the number of land
cells within this radius. We prefer this density measure to the non-normalized
count of sites in order to avoid that coastal shape (which enters our connec-
tivity measure) mechanically influences the chance of having an archaeological
site nearby. On the other hand, we want to classify a small trading islands as
highly urbanized. We normalize our measure of urban density to have mean
0 and standard deviation 1 for each period to facilitate comparison over time
when the number of settlements changes.
1.4 Specification and results
We run regressions of the following type:
uit = Xiγt + cdiβdt + it, (1.1)
where uit is the urbanization measure for grid point i, Xi are grid point control
variables and cdi is a connectivity measure for distance d. We only measure
connectivity of a location, not actual trade. Hence, when we refer to trade this
may refer to the exchange of goods but could also encompass migration and
the spread of ideas. uit measures the density of settlements, which we view as
proxy for the GDP of an area. Growth manifests itself both in terms of larger
populations as well as richer elites in a Malthusian world. We would expect that
the archaeological record captures exactly these two dimensions.
We use latitude, longitude, and distance to the Fertile Crescent, which all do not
vary over time, as control variables. We explore dropping the Aegean, to address
concerns that our results may be driven exclusively by developments around the
Greek islands, by far the best connected area in the Mediterranean. We also
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show results dropping North Africa to address concerns that there may be fewer
archaeological sites in North Africa due to a relative lack of exploration. This
may spuriously correlate with the fact that the coast is comparatively straight.
We cluster standard errors at the level of a grid of 2×2 degree following Bester,
Conley and Hanson (2011). We normalize uit and cdi to mean 0 and standard
deviation 1 to make our estimates comparable across years with different num-
bers of cities, and different magnitudes of connectedness measures.
Our measure of connectedness depends only on coastal and maritime geography
and therefore is plausibly exogenous. However, it might be spuriously correlated
with other factors that affect early growth, such as agricultural productivity, to-
pographic conditions, or rivers, which provide inland connections. Those factors
are hard to measure precisely. Hence, instead of including them on the right-
hand side of our regression equation as control variables, we follow the suggestion
of Pei, Pischke and Schwandt (2017) and show that they are not systematically
related to our measure of coastal connectivity. The results of these balancing
regressions are shown in table 1.1.
In the first row, we relate connectedness to agricultural productivity, which we
construct using data from the FAO-GAEZ database and following the method-
ology of Galor and O¨zak (2016): We convert agroclimatic yields of 48 crops in
5′ × 5′ degree cells under rain-fed irrigation and low levels of input into caloric
yields and assign the maximal caloric yield to 10 × 10km cells. For each coast
cell, we then calculate the average on the same landmass within 50km from the
coast cell. In the second row, we use Nunn and Puga (2012)’s measure of rugged-
ness, again averaged over 50km radii around our coast cells. Finally, the third
row looks at distance to the nearest river mouth. For this, we used Wikipedia to
create a list of all rivers longer than 200km, geocoded their mouths and mapped
them to our coast cells (Nile and Danube have large deltas that map to multiple
cells). We then calculate the distance of each coastal cell to the nearest river
mouth. All three measures are standardized to have mean 0 and standard devi-
ation 1. As a result, the sizes of coefficients are directly comparable to those in
our connectedness regressions.
Columns (1) starts by showing the results of balancing regressions just control-
ling for latitude and longitude. Column (2) also adds a control for distance to
the Fertile Crescent. This may be important because agriculture spread from the
Fertile Crescent throughout the Mediterranean Basin, and various authors have
linked the timing of the Neolithic Revolution to later development (Diamond
1997; Hibbs and Olsson 2004; Comin, Easterly, and Gong 2010). Conditional
on the full set of controls we use in our analysis, neither agricultural produc-
tivity, ruggedness, nor distance to the nearest river mouth seem to have a large
association with our measure of connectedness. Columns (3) and (4) show that
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dropping the Aegean from the sample leads to bigger associations but also im-
pairs precision. Outside of North Africa, a slight negative association between
connectedness and both ruggedness and agricultural productivity arises, but
only the latter is statistically significant. Overall, our measure of connectedness
does not appear to be systematically related to the three variables examined in
table 1.1, especially once we control for distance to the Fertile Crescent. As a
result, we will use all of latitude, longitude, and distance to the Fertile Crescent
as controls in the analyses that follow.
1.4.1 Basic results
In table 1.2 then, we start by showing results for connections within 500km and
the settlement densities in 750 BC from our different data sets. At this time,
we expect sailors to make extensive use of direct sea connections, and hence the
coefficients βdt from equation 1.1 should be positive. This is indeed the case for
a wide variety of specifications. We find the strongest results in the Pleiades
data with the wide definition of sites, and the association is highly significant.
The coefficient is slightly lower for the narrow site definition, and for Iron Age
sites from the Whitehouse Atlas. Dropping the Aegean in column (2) leads to a
loss of precision, with standard errors going up noticeably for all three outcome
variables. Coefficients are similar in magnitude or increase, indicating that the
Aegean was not driving the results in column (1). Dropping North Africa in
column (3) makes little difference compared to the original results.
The effects of better connectedness seem sizable: a one standard deviation in-
crease in connectedness increases settlement density by 20 to 50 percent of a
standard deviation. While the parameterization with variables in standard de-
viation units should aid the interpretation, we offer an alternative view on the
size of the coefficients in table 1.3. Here we presents results when we replace
our previous density measure by a coarser binary variable that simply codes
whether a coastal cell has at least one archaeological site within a 50km radius.
The effects are basically positive but somewhat more sensitive to the particular
specification and data set. Coefficients range from a high of 0.32 in the narrow
Pleiades data excluding the Aegean to zero in the Whitehouse data excluding
North Africa.
While this specification is much coarser than the previous one, it facilitates a
discussion of the magnitude of our results. Recall that there are two modes
around -0.5 and 2 in the distribution of the connectedness variable in figure 1.3.
Going from -0.5 to 2 roughly corresponds to moving from a point on the coast of
Southern France (say Toulon) to western Turkey (say Izmir). Using the coeffi-
cient for the wide Pleiades data in column (1) of 0.12, this move would increase
the probability of having a site within 50km by 30 percentage points. Such an
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increase is sizable—the unconditional probability of having any site nearby in
the wide Pleiades data is 61% and it is 49% among cells with connectivity below
zero. Of course, a 2.5 standard deviations increase in connectedness is also a
substantial increase. Most of our estimates of the effects of connectedness are far
from trivial but they also leave lots of room for other determinants of growth.
We now return to our original site definition as in table 1.2. A potential concern
with our results might be that we are not capturing growth and urbanization,
but simply the location of harbours. To address this, table 1.4 repeats the anal-
ysis of table 1.2, but omitting coastal cells themselves from the calculation of
settlement density. Here we are investigating whether a better connected coast
gives rise to more settlements further inland. The results are similar to those
from the previous table, indicating that the effects we observe are not driven
by coastal locations but also manifest themselves in the immediate hinterland
of the coast. This bolsters the case that we are seeing real growth effects of
better connections. The number of observations in table 1.4 is slightly lower
than before since we omit coastal cells that have only other coastal cells within
a 50km radius (e.g. the north-eastern tip of Cyprus).
Table 1.5 shows some further robustness checks of our results for different sub-
samples. Column (1) repeats our baseline results from table 1.2. Columns (2)
to (4) use only continental cells as starting points, dropping island locations.
In column (2), we keep both continent and island locations as potential desti-
nations. Results are similar or, in the case of the Whitehouse data, stronger.
Columns (3) and (4) explore whether it is coastal shape or the locations of is-
lands which drive our results. Here, we calculate connectedness using either only
island cells as destinations (in column 3) or only continental cells (in column 4).
Both matter, but islands are more important for our story. Coefficients for is-
land connections in column (3) are about twice the size of those in column (4).
Finally, column (5) replaces our simple connectedness measure with the eigen-
value measure of centrality; results are again very similar. These results suggest
that the relationships we find are not driven only by a particular subsample or
connection measure.
Our previous results are for connections within a 500km radius. Figure 1.5 dis-
plays coefficients for connectivities at different distances, using the basic speci-
fication with the wide Pleiades set of sites. It demonstrates that coefficients are
fairly similar when we calculate our connectivity measure for other distances.
This is likely due to the fact that these measures correlate pretty closely across
the various distances. There is a small hump with a peak around 500km, prob-
ably distances which were important during the Iron Age when sailors started
to make direct connections between Cyprus and Crete or Crete and Sicily. But
we don’t want to make too much of that.
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Figure 1.6 shows results from the wide Pleiades data over time. The figure has
various features. Coefficients are small and mostly insignificant until 1,000 BC
but increase sharply in 750 BC, consistent with the Iron Age expansion of open
sea routes. There are smaller and less significant effects of connectivity during
the late Bronze Age in 2,000 and 1,500 BC. From 500 BC, the effects of con-
nectivity decline and no correlation between sites and connectivity is left by the
end of the Roman Empire. In table 1.2, we have demonstrated that the large
association between connectedness and the presence of sites is replicated across
various data sets and specifications for the year 750 BC, so we are fairly confi-
dent in that result. Figure 1.6 therefore raises two questions: Is the upturn in
coefficients between 1,000 BC and 750 BC real or an artefact of the data? And
does the association between sites and connectedness vanish during the course
of the Roman Empire? On both counts there are reasons to be suspicious of the
Pleiades data. Coverage of sites from before 750 BC is poor in the data while
coverage during the Roman period may be too extensive.
We use the Whitehouse data to probe the findings for the earlier period. In
figure 1.7 we plot coefficients again against distances varying from 100km to
1,000km. The red line, which refers to sites in the Iron Age and later, shows
sizable and significant coefficients in the range between 0.2 and 0.3, as we had
already seen in table 1.2, and these coefficients vary little by distance. The blue
line shows coefficients for Bronze Age sites. Coefficients are small and insignif-
icant for small distances and for very large ones but similar to the Iron Age
coefficients for intermediate ones. The Bronze Age results are unfortunately a
bit noisier and the pattern by distance unfortunately does not completely resolve
the issue about the emergence of the sites - connections correlation either.
1.4.2 Persistence
Once geographical conditions have played a role in a site location, do we expect
this relationship to be stable into the future? There are two reasons why the
answer would be affirmative. Connections should have continued to play a role
during the period of the Roman Empire when trade in the Mediterranean reached
yet a more substantial level. Even if the relative role of maritime connectivity
declined—maybe because sailors got better and distance played less of a role, or
other modes of transport, e.g. on Roman roads, also became cheaper—human
agglomerations created during the Phoenician period may have persisted. A
large literature in urban economics and economic geography has addressed this
question and largely found substantial persistence of city locations, sometimes
across periods of major historical disruption (Davis and Weinstein 2002, Bleakley
and Lin 2012, Bosker and Buringh 2017, Michaels and Rauch forthcoming among
others). Either explanation is at odds with the declining coefficients over time
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in figure 1.6 after 750 BC.
We suspect that the declining coefficients in the Pleiades data stems from the
fact that the site density is becoming too high during the Roman period. In 750
BC there are 1,491 sites the data set and this number increases to 5,640 in 1
AD at the height of the Roman Empire. There are only 3,464 coastal gridpoints
in our data set. As a result, our coastal grid is quickly becoming saturated with
sites after the start of the Iron Age. We suspect that this simply eliminates a
lot of useful variation within our data set: By the height of the Roman Empire
most coastal grid points are located near some sites. Moreover, existing sites
may be concentrated in well-connected locations already and maybe these sites
grow further. New settlements after 750 BC, on the other hand, might arise in
unoccupied locations, which are less well connected.
In order to investigate this, we split the sites in the Pleiades data into those which
existed already in 750 BC but remained in the data in subsequent periods and
those which first entered at some date after 750 BC. Figure 1.8 shows results for
the period 500 BC to 500 AD. The blue, solid line shows the original coefficients
for all sites. The black, broken line shows coefficients for sites present in 750 BC
which remained in the data while the red, dashed line refers to sites that have
newly entered since 750 BC. The coefficients for remaining sites are very stable,
while the relationship between connectedness and the location of entering sites
becomes weaker and even turns negative over time. Because the new entrants
make up an increasing share of the total over time, the total coefficients (solid
line) are being dragged down by selective site entry during the Roman era. This
is consistent with the results of Bosker and Buringh (2017) for a later period,
who find that having a previously existing city close by decreases a location’s
chance of becoming a city seed itself.
1.4.3 Results for a world scale
Finally, we corroborate our findings for the Mediterranean at a world scale. We
have only a single early outcome measure: population in 1 AD from McEvedy
and Jones (1978). This is the same data as used by Ashraf and Galor (2011b)
for a similar purpose. Population density is measured at the level of modern
countries, and the sample includes 123 countries. Recall that we compute con-
nectivity for coastal cells on a 50 x 50km grid points for this exercise.
Mimicking our estimates for the Mediterranean, we start by running regressions
at the level of the coastal cell, of which we have 7,441. Both connectivity and
population density are normalized again. We obtain an estimate of 0.20 with
a standard error, clustered at the country level, of 0.16. Here we control for
the absolute value of latitude (distance from the equator) only but this control
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matters little.8
Alternatively, we aggregate the world data to the level of countries, which is
the unit at which the dependent variable is measured anyway. We normalize
variables after aggregating. Figure 1.9 is a scatter plot of c500 against mean
population density at the country level. The weights in this figure correspond
to the number of coastal grid points in each country. The line in the figure
comes from a standard bivariate regression and has a slope of 0.44 (0.33). These
estimates are in the same ballpark of the ones for the Mediterranean in table
1.2. Note that many Mediterranean countries can be found in the upper right
quadrant of this plot, highlighting how connectivity in the basin may have con-
tributed to the early development of this region.
1.5 Conclusion
We argue that connectedness matters for human development. Some geographic
locations are advantaged because it is easier to reach a larger number of neigh-
bours. We exploit this idea to study the relationship between connectedness
and early development around the Mediterranean. We argue that this associa-
tion should emerge most potently when sailors first started crossing open seas
systematically. This happened during the time when Phoenician, Greek, and
Etruscan sailors and settlers expanded throughout the Mediterranean between
800 and 500 BC. Barry Cunliffe (2008) calls this period at the eve of Classical
Antiquity “The Three Hundred Years That Changed the World” (p. 270).
This is not to say that sea trade and maritime networks were unimportant earlier.
While we find clear evidence of a significant association between connectedness
and the presence of archaeological sites for 750 BC, our results are more mixed
as to whether this relationship began to emerge at that period because the data
on earlier sites are more shaky. On the other hand, we find that once these
locational advantages emerged the favoured locations retain their urban devel-
opments over the ensuing centuries. This is in line with a large literature on
urban persistence.
While our paper speaks to the nexus between trade and growth we are unable
to link connectedness directly to trade in goods or other channels of sea based
transport like migrations or the spread of ideas. Some of the issues we hope to
explore in future work are the interactions between maritime connections and
other locational advantages, like access to minerals. Finally, we hope to probe
the persistence of these effects more by linking the results to data on more
modern city locations.
8Neither east-west orientation nor distance from the Fertile Crescent seems to make as
much sense on a world scale. Unlike for the Mediterranean, there were various centres of early
development around the world.
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1.6 Tables and Figures
Figure 1.1: Timeline
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Figure 1.2: Connectedness in the Mediterranean for a 500km distance
Figure 1.3: Distribution of our connectedness variable at 500km distance
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Figure 1.4: Connectedness in the world for a 500km distance
Figure 1.5: Coefficients for wide Pleiades sites by distance
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Figure 1.6: Coefficients for wide Pleiades sites over time
Figure 1.7: Coefficients for Whitehouse sites for different periods
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Figure 1.8: Coefficients for Wide Pleiades sites: Entry, Existing, Total
Figure 1.9: Global correlation between connectedness and population density
around 1AD
Weights reflect length of coasts of countries.
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Table 1.1: Balancing checks
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Agricultural productivity 0.11 -0.02 0.24 0.08 -0.06 -0.19
(following Galor and Ozak (2016)) (0.05) (0.06) (0.14) (0.13) (0.05) (0.05)
Ruggedness 0.10 0.10 -0.23 -0.26 -0.16 -0.16
(following Nunn and Puga (2012)) (0.08) (0.10) (0.30) (0.28) (0.09) (0.10)
Distance to the nearest -0.15 -0.12 -0.26 -0.30 -0.06 0.00
river mouth (0.09) (0.10) (0.27) (0.28) (0.08) (0.09)
Observations 3646 3646 2750 2750 3044 3044
Controls:
Longitude and Latitude X X X X X X
Distance to the Fertile Crescent X X X
Dropping Aegean X X
Dropping North Africa X X
Coefficients from a regression of various dependent variables on 500km connectedness.
Standard errors clustered at the level of 2x2 degree cells, in parentheses.
Table 1.2: Basic results
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3)
Pleiades Wide 750 BC 0.50 0.42 0.45
(0.07) (0.14) (0.08)
Pleiades Narrow 750 BC 0.25 0.48 0.22
(0.08) (0.16) (0.09)
Whitehouse Atlas Iron Age 0.28 0.50 0.20
(0.08) (0.18) (0.09)
Observations 3646 2750 3044
Controls:
Longitude and Latitude X X X
Distance to the Fertile Crescent X X X
Dropping Aegean X
Dropping North Africa X
Coefficients from regressions on 500km connectedness. Stan-
dard errors clustered at the level of 2x2 degree cells, in paren-
theses.
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Table 1.3: Results with a binary outcome variable
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3)
Pleiades Wide 750 BC 0.12 0.17 0.11
(0.04) (0.14) (0.04)
Pleiades Narrow 750 BC 0.07 0.32 0.06
(0.05) (0.11) (0.06)
Whitehouse Atlas Iron Age 0.04 0.03 -0.01
(0.04) (0.10) (0.04)
Observations 3646 2750 3044
Controls:
Longitude/Latitude X X X
Distance to the Fertile Crescent X X X
Dropping Aegean X
Dropping North Africa X
Coefficients from regressions on 500km connectedness. Stan-
dard errors clustered at the level of 2x2 degree cells, in paren-
theses.
Table 1.4: Results excluding coastal cells from outcome definition
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3)
Pleiades Wide 750 BC 0.49 0.34 0.46
(0.09) (0.13) (0.09)
Pleiades Narrow 750 BC 0.16 0.38 0.16
(0.15) (0.19) (0.15)
Whitehouse Atlas Iron Age 0.31 0.53 0.30
(0.07) (0.27) (0.08)
Observations 3234 2539 2647
Controls:
Longitude and Latitude X X X
Distance to the Fertile Crescent X X X
Dropping Aegean X
Dropping North Africa X
Coefficients from regressions on 500km connectedness. Stan-
dard errors clustered at the level of 2x2 degree cells, in paren-
theses. Coastal cells and their sites are omitted from the
outcome definition.
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Table 1.5: Results for different measure of connectedness
Standard 500km connectedness Centrality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pleiades Wide 750 BC 0.50 0.43 0.47 0.20 0.46
(0.07) (0.15) (0.14) (0.12) (0.09)
Pleiades Narrow 750 BC 0.25 0.42 0.46 0.20 0.19
(0.08) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.09)
Whitehouse Iron Age 0.28 0.49 0.47 0.29 0.23
(0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09)
Observations 3646 2658 2658 2658 3646
From All Continent Continent Continent All
To All All Island Continent All
Coefficients from a regression of density measures from different sources on measures
of 500km connectedness or eigenvalue centrality. Robust standard errors, clustered
at the level of 2x2 degree cells, in parentheses. All regressions control for longitude,
latitude, and distance to the Fertile Crescent.
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1.7 Appendix A: Coding of Whitehouse sites
We classified the maps contained in the Whitehouse Atlas into three broad time
periods: Neolithic, Bronze Age, and Iron Age or later based on the map title,
accompanying texts, and labels for individual sites. Table 1.6 provides details
of our classification of the maps. The maps on pages 72, 76, 90, and 96 straddle
both the Neolithic and Bronze Age period, while the map on page 102 could refer
to either the Bronze or Iron Age. For these maps, we narrowed down the dating
of sites based on resources we could find on the Internet about the respective
site. Table 1.7 provides details of our dating.
Table 1.6: Classification of maps in the Whitehouse Atlas
Pages Map title/details Time period
72f. Neolithic to Bronze Age sites in Anatolia Bronze Age or earlier
74f. Hittites and their successors Bronze Age
76f. Late prehistoric and proto-historic sites in Near East Bronze Age or earlier
90f. Neolithic to Bronze Age sites in Western Anatolia and the Cyclades Bronze Age or earlier
92f. Neolithic sites in Greece Neolithic
94f. Cyprus various
96f. Crete Bronze Age or earlier
98f. Mycenaean and other Bronze Age sites in Greece Bronze Age
100f. The Mycenaeans abroad Bronze Age
102f. The Phoenicians at home Bronze Age or Iron Age
104f. The Phoenicians abroad Iron Age or later
106f. Archaic and Classical Greece Iron Age or later
108f. The Greeks overseas Iron Age or later
110f. Neolithic sites in the central Mediterranean Neolithic
112f. Copper and Bronze Age sites in Italy Bronze Age
114f. Copper and Bronze Age sites in Sicily and the Aeolian Islands Bronze Age
116f. Copper and Bronze Age sites in Corsica and Sardinia Bronze Age
118f. Early Iron Age sites in the central Mediterranean Iron Age or later
120f. The central Mediterranean: Carthaginians, Greeks and Etruscans Iron Age or later
122 Malta Bronze Age or earlier
123ff. Neolithic sites in Iberia Neolithic
126ff. Copper and Bronze Age sites in Iberia Bronze Age
129ff. Early Iron Age sites in Iberia Iron Age or later
140f. Neolithic and Copper age sites in France and Switzerland Neolithic
164f. Bronze Age sites in France and Belgium Bronze Age
172f. The spread of Urnfield Cultures in Europe Iron Age or later
174f. The Hallstatt and La Tene Iron Ages Iron Age or later
176f. Iron Age sites in Europe Iron Age or later
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Table 1.7: Classification of specific sites in the Whitehouse Atlas
Map page Site name Neolithic Bronze Age Iron Age Source
72 Dundartepe 1 1 0 see notes
72 Fikirtepe 1 1 0 Whitehouse
72 Gedikli 1 1 1 TAY Project
72 Karatas 0 1 1 Wikipedia
72 Kayislar 1 1 0 TAY Project
72 Kizilkaya 0 1 1 Wikipedia (Kizilkaya/Burdur)
72 Kumtepe 1 0 0 Wikipedia
72 Maltepe 1 1 1 TAY Project
72 Mentese 1 0 0 TAY Project
72 Mersin 1 1 1 Wikipedia
72 Silifke 0 1 1 Wikipedia
72 Tarsus 1 1 1 Wikipedia
72 Tilmen Huyuk 1 1 1 TAY Project
72 Troy 0 1 1 Wikipedia
76 Amrit/Marathus 0 1 0 Wikipedia
76 Amuq 1 1 0 Whitehouse
76 Aradus 0 1 1 Wikipedia (Arwad)
76 Atchana/Alalakh 0 1 0 Wikipedia
76 Beisamoun 1 0 0 see notes
76 Byblos 1 1 1 Wikipedia
76 Gaza 0 1 1 Wikipedia
76 Gezer 0 1 1 Wikipedia
76 Hazorea 1 1 0 Whitehouse
76 Kadesh 1 1 0 Wikipedia (Kadesh (Syria))
76 Megiddo 1 1 1 Wikipedia
76 Mersin 1 1 1 Wikipedia
76 Samaria 1 1 1 New World Encyclopedia
76 Sidon 1 1 1 Wikipedia
76 Tainat 1 1 0 Whitehouse
76 Tell Beit Mirsim 0 1 1 see notes
76 Tyre 0 1 1 Wikipedia
76 Ugarit/Ras Shamra 1 1 0 Wikipedia
90 Akrotiraki 1 1 0 see notes
90 Chalandriani 0 0 0 Wikipedia
90 Dhaskalio 0 1 0 Wikipedia
90 Dokathismata 0 1 1 Wikipedia (see notes)
90 Emborio 1 1 0 see notes
90 Fikirtepe 1 1 0 Whitehouse
90 Glykoperama 1 1 0 Whitehouse
90 Grotta 0 1 0 see notes
90 Heraion 1 1 0 Whitehouse
90 Kephala 1 1 0 Whitehouse
90 Kumtepe 1 0 0 Wikipedia
90 Mavrispilia 1 1 0 Whitehouse
90 Paroikia 1 1 0 Whitehouse
90 Pelos 1 1 0 Whitehouse
90 Phylakopi 0 1 0 Wikipedia
90 Poliochni 1 1 0 Wikipedia (see notes)
90 Protesilaos 1 1 0 Whitehouse
90 Pyrgos 1 1 0 Whitehouse
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Table 1.7: Classification of specific sites in the Whitehouse Atlas, continued
Map page Site name Neolithic Bronze Age Iron Age Source
90 Saliagos 1 0 0 Wikipedia
90 Spedos 0 1 0 Wikipedia
90 Thermi 0 1 0 Wikipedia (Lesbos)
90 Tigani 1 1 0 Whitehouse
90 Troy 0 1 1 Wikipedia
90 Vathy 1 1 0 Whitehouse
90 Vryokastro 0 1 0 see notes
94 Alambra 0 1 0 Whitehouse
94 Amathous 0 0 1 Whitehouse
94 Anoyira 0 1 0 Whitehouse
94 Arpera 0 1 0 Whitehouse
94 Athienou/Golgoi 0 0 1 Whitehouse
94 Ayia Irini 0 1 0 Whitehouse
94 Ayios Iakovos 0 1 0 Whitehouse
94 Ayios Sozomenos 0 1 0 Whitehouse
94 Dhenia 0 1 0 Whitehouse
94 Enkomi 0 1 0 Whitehouse
94 Erimi 1 0 0 Whitehouse
94 Idalion 1 1 0 Whitehouse
94 Kalavassos 1 0 0 Whitehouse
94 Kalopsidha 0 1 0 Whitehouse
94 Karmi 0 1 0 Whitehouse
94 Karpasia 0 0 1 Whitehouse
94 Kato Paphos 1 1 0 Whitehouse
94 Khirokitia 1 0 0 Whitehouse
94 Kition 0 0 1 Whitehouse
94 Kouklia/ Old Paphos 0 1 0 Whitehouse
94 Kourion 1 1 1 Whitehouse
94 Krini 0 1 0 Whitehouse
94 Ktima 0 0 1 Whitehouse
94 Kyrenia 0 0 1 Whitehouse
94 Kythrea 1 0 0 Whitehouse
94 Lapithos 1 0 0 Whitehouse
94 Myrtou 0 1 0 Whitehouse
94 Nikosia 0 1 1 Whitehouse
94 Nitovikla 0 1 0 Whitehouse
94 Palaiokastro 0 1 0 Whitehouse
94 Palaioskoutella 0 1 0 Whitehouse
94 Petra tou Limniti 1 0 0 Whitehouse
94 Philia 0 1 0 Whitehouse
94 Pyla-Kokkinokremmos 0 1 0 Whitehouse
94 Salamis 0 1 1 Whitehouse
94 Sinda 0 1 0 Whitehouse
94 Soli/Ambelikou 1 0 0 Whitehouse
94 Sotira 1 0 0 Whitehouse
94 Troulli 1 0 0 Whitehouse
94 Vasilia 0 1 0 Whitehouse
94 Vouni 1 1 0 Whitehouse
94 Vounous 0 1 0 Whitehouse
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Table 1.7: Classification of specific sites in the Whitehouse Atlas, continued
Map page Site name Neolithic Bronze Age Iron Age Source
96 Amnisos 0 1 0 Wikipedia
96 Apesokari 1 1 0 Wikipedia
96 Apodhoulou 1 1 0 Whitehouse
96 Arkhanes 0 1 0 Wikipedia
96 Armenoi 1 1 0 Minoan Crete
96 Ayia Triadha 0 1 1 Wikipedia (Hagia Triadna)
96 Diktaean Cave 1 1 0 Wikipedia (Psychro Cave)
96 Erganos 1 1 0 Whitehouse
96 Fournou Korifi 0 1 0 Minoan Crete
96 Gournes 1 1 0 Whitehouse
96 Gournia 0 1 0 Minoan Crete
96 Idaean Cave 1 1 0 Wikipedia
96 Kamares Cave 1 1 0 Wikipedia
96 Karfi 0 1 0 Wikipedia
96 Katsamba 1 1 0 Whitehouse
96 Khania 1 1 1 Wikipedia
96 Knossos 1 1 1 see notes
96 Krasi 1 1 0 Wikipedia (Malia, Crete)
96 Mallia 0 1 0 see notes
96 Mirsini 1 1 0 Whitehouse
96 Mirtos 1 1 0 Minoan Crete
96 Mitropolis 1 1 0 Whitehouse
96 Mochlos 0 1 0 Minoan Crete
96 Monastiraki 0 1 0 Wikipedia
96 Mouliana 1 1 0 see notes
96 Palaikastro 0 1 0 Minoan Crete
96 Petras 0 1 0 Wikipedia
96 Phaistos 1 1 1 Wikipedia
96 Pirgos (Nirou Khani) 0 1 0 Wikipedia
96 Platanos 1 1 0 Whitehouse
96 Plati 1 1 0 Whitehouse
96 Praisos 1 1 1 Wikipedia
96 Pseira 1 1 0 Wikipedia
96 Rousses 1 1 0 Whitehouse
96 Sklavokampos 0 1 0 Wikipedia
96 Stavromenos 0 1 0 see notes
96 Tylissos 0 1 0 Wikipedia
96 Vasiliki 0 1 0 Wikipedia
96 Vathypetro 0 1 0 Minoan Crete
96 Zakro 0 1 0 Wikipedia
96 Zou 1 1 0 Minoan Crete
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Table 1.7: Classification of specific sites in the Whitehouse Atlas, continued
Map page Site name Neolithic Bronze Age Iron Age Source
102 Adana (Ataniya) 1 1 1 Wikipedia
102 Al Mina 0 0 1 Wikipedia
102 Amrit/Marathus 0 1 0 Wikipedia
102 Antioch 0 0 1 Wikipedia
102 Aradus 0 1 1 Wikipedia
102 Askalon 1 1 1 Wikipedia
102 Atchana/Alalakh 0 1 0 Wikipedia
102 Atlit 0 1 1 Wikipedia
102 Beersheba 1 1 1 Wikipedia
102 Berytus 0 0 1 Wikipedia
102 Byblos 1 1 1 Wikipedia
102 Enkomi 0 1 0 Wikipedia
102 Gaza 0 1 1 Wikipedia
102 Hazor 0 1 1 Wikipedia
102 Jaffa 1 1 1 Wikipedia
102 Kadesh 1 1 0 Wikipedia
102 Kourion 1 1 1 Wikipedia
102 Megiddo 1 1 1 Wikipedia
102 Minet el-Beida 0 1 1 see notes
102 Nikosia 0 1 1 Wikipedia
102 Salamis 0 1 1 Wikipedia
102 Samaria 1 1 1 New World Encyclopedia
102 Sarepta 0 1 1 Wikipedia
102 Shechem 1 1 1 Wikipedia
102 Sidon 1 1 1 Wikipedia
102 Simyra 0 1 1 Wikipedia
102 Tarsus 1 1 1 Wikipedia
102 Tripolis 0 0 1 Wikipedia
102 Tyre 0 1 1 Wikipedia
102 Ugarit/Ras Shamra 1 1 0 Wikipedia
122 Bahrija 0 1 0 Whitehouse
122 Borg in Nadur 0 1 0 Whitehouse
122 Ghar Dalam 1 1 0 Whitehouse
122 Skorba 1 0 0 Whitehouse
122 Tarxien 1 1 0 Whitehouse
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Sources and notes for site classification
Dundartepe: The Cambridge Ancient History, 3rd ed. Vol. 1, Part 2, Early His-
tory of the Middle East, eds. I. E. S. Edwards, C. J. Gadd, N. G. L. Hammond,
1971, p. 400 and Ancient West and East, Vol 1, Number 2, 2002, ed. Gocha R.
Tsetskhladze, p.245
TAY Project: http://www.tayproject.org/veritabeng.html under the site
name
Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org under the site name
Beisamoun: Israel Antiquities Authority, Beisamoun (Mallaha), http://www.
hadashot-esi.org.il/report_detail_eng.aspx?id=809
New World Encyclopedia: http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org under the
site name




Dokathismata: Entry under Amnorgos, end date unclear but clearly settled dur-





Poliochni: End date is unclear
Vryokastro: http://www.tinosecret.gr/tour/museums/512-vryokastro.htm
Minoan Crete: http://www.minoancrete.comusingpull-downmenus
Knossos: Wikipedia lists Knossos as abandoned around 1100 BC but the White-






Minet el-Beida: Wikipedia. No independent dating info for Minet el-Beida. It
is routinely referred to as the harbour of Ugarit. Hence dating the same as Ugarit
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1.8 Appendix B: Additional specifications
As the historical record in section 1.2 has shown, seafaring at short distances
was already common in the Mediterranean before the Iron Age. However, with
the advent of the Phoenicians, regular long-distance travel and trade across the
open sea emerged. Our measure of 500km connectedness might conflate short-
distance connectedness with long-run one. In table 1.8, we therefore create a
different version of connectedness that is based on points that can be reached
at a distance of 100 to 500km, i.e. excluding points within 100km. The results
are very similar to the basic ones in table 1.2.
Not only connections over sea mattered but land trade was important as well.
Rivers constituted important entry points for land based trade. As a result, cells
close to river mouths should be relatively advantaged. The inland connections
afforded by river mouths might also interact with the maritime connections
we have analysed so far. Sea and inland trade maybe either complements or
substitutes. Table 1.9 investigates these possibilities by entering a regressor for
distance to the nearest river mouth in our regressions, and interacting it with our
sea based connectivity measure. The main effect of the connectedness variable is
affected little by these additions. The main effect for distance to a river mouth is
positive, indicating that locations close to a river mouth have fewer settlements,
not more. But the coefficients are small and not significant. The interaction
terms are similarly small, except in the specification without the Aegean where
we find a positive (but at most marginally significant) interaction effect. This
would suggest that coastal and inland connections are substitutes rather than
complements.
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Table 1.8: Results when excluding short-distance connectedness
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3)
Pleiades Wide 750 BC 0.50 0.43 0.45
(0.07) (0.13) (0.08)
Pleiades Narrow 750 BC 0.26 0.51 0.22
(0.08) (0.15) (0.09)
Whitehouse Atlas Iron Age 0.27 0.52 0.19
(0.08) (0.17) (0.09)
Observations 3646 2750 3044
Controls:
Longitude and Latitude X X X
Distance to the Fertile Crescent X X X
Dropping Aegean X
Dropping North Africa X
Coefficients from regressions on connectedness between 100
and 500km. Standard errors clustered at the level of 2x2
degree cells, in parentheses.
Table 1.9: Results with interactions
Regressor (1) (2) (3)
Connectedness 0.49 0.43 0.45
(0.07) (0.14) (0.08)
Distance to 0.08 0.17 0.07
river mouth (0.06) (0.13) (0.09)
Interaction 0.09 0.19 0.02
(0.05) (0.11) (0.07)
Observations 3646 2750 3044
Controls:
Longitude/Latitude X X X
Distance to the Fertile Crescent X X X
Dropping Aegean X
Dropping North Africa X
Pleiades wide data. Coefficients from regressions on 500km
connectedness. Standard errors clustered at the level of 2x2
degree cells, in parentheses.
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Chapter 2
Male-biased Demand Shocks and
Women’s Labour Force
Participation: Evidence from
Large Oil Field Discoveries1
2.1 Introduction
Across the globe and over time, differences in female labour force participation
are substantial (Olivetti 2013). Across sectors, sex ratios vary considerably, even
within countries. For example, in 2008, women accounted for only 9 percent of
all the hours worked in construction in the United States, but for 76 percent
of all the hours worked in health services (Ngai and Petrongolo forthcoming).
Because of such differences in the occupational structure, sectoral shocks can be
gender-biased and affect men and women very differently.
One such example is oil wealth. The discovery of oil or natural gas resources
is a male-biased labour demand shock that leads to an increase in male wages.
However, as argued by Ross (2008), oil wealth may not only be beneficial to
men, but also detrimental to women’s labour force participation: Dutch Dis-
ease effects can harm other tradable sectors that employ women and reduce
1We thank Guy Michaels, Steve Pischke, Giacomo Ponzetto, Esteban Aucejo, Ghazala Az-
mat, Michel Azulai, Nitika Bagaria, Dan Black, Florian Blum, Zelda Brutti, Francesco Caselli,
Vasco Carvalho, Alejandro Cun˜at, Marta De Philippis, Jeremiah Dittmar, Richard Horn-
beck, Kilian Huber, Yu-Hsiang Lei, Alan Manning, Andrea Matranga, Rachel Ngai, Raphae¨l
Parchet, Frank Pisch, Roland Rathelot, Ferdinand Rauch, Pedro Souza, Jaume Ventura, Al-
wyn Young, several anonymous referees, and seminar participants at the London School of
Economics, University of Oxford, Institut d’Economia de Barcelona, Halle Institute for Eco-
nomic Research, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, University of Konstanz, the 2014
EDP Jamboree in Paris, the 15th Trans-Atlantic Doctoral Conference at LBS and the 2016
SAEe Simposio in Bilbao for their helpful comments and suggestions. To Guy Michaels, we
are particularly indebted for also sharing his dataset on oil discoveries with us. All remaining
errors are our own. Potlogea acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of
Economy and Competitiveness.
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demand for female labour. Moreover, oil discoveries increase male wages, which,
in household models of labour supply, may reduce married women’s labour sup-
ply (Ashenfelter and Heckman 1974, Becker 1981). Thus, both supply of and
demand for female labour decrease, and as a result female employment decreases
as well.
In this paper, we use the discoveries of large oil fields in the Southern United
States between 1900 and 1940 as a series of large and exogenous male-biased
demand shocks to study the implications of such shocks for female labour force
participation and for the marriage market. We use data on the location and dis-
covery of large oil fields, coupled with individual-level census data, to compare
the evolution of female labour market outcomes in oil-rich counties relative to
baseline counties. Using this difference-in-differences strategy, we find that oil
discoveries have a zero net effect on female labour force participation. While
oil shocks are initially male-biased and lead to increased male wages and male
employment in oil mining and manufacturing, the service sector also expands
and employs more women. If anything, we even find a slight increase in labour
force participation for single women. At the same time, increased male wages
increase the supply of “marriageable” men in the county and thus increase young
women’s marriage rates. Since married women were less likely to work, this has
a depressing effect on female labour market involvement.
Our study suggests that the effect of oil wealth on women is not necessarily
negative, but depends on social norms and institutions that establish whether
other sectors are open to women and what the socially acceptable role of married
women in the labour market is. In a broader context, our paper shows how the
effects of a gender-biased shock to the tradable sector can be offset by income
effects that lead to growth in the nontradable sector. We formalize this insight
in a model of structural transformation in a small open economy. If women are
allowed to work in services, our model shows that oil discoveries give rise to two
opposing labour demand effects for females: A demand reduction in the tradable
sector, and a demand increase in the nontradable sector. The more productive
the oil industry, the more likely it is that the latter effect will dominate.
Our paper belongs to a sizeable literature that has analysed the implications of
resource shocks and other demand shocks for local economies and local labour
markets (Pratt 1980, Corden and Neary 1982, Carrington 1996, Sachs and
Warner 1999, 2001, Black, McKinnish and Sanders 2005, Papyrakis and Ger-
lagh 2007, Marchand 2012, Furchtgott-Roth and Gray 2013). We confirm the
findings of a series of a recent papers that have found positive effects of resource
wealth on local economies (e.g. Michaels 2011, Aragon and Rud 2013, Fetzer
2014, Allcott and Kenniston 2014). Like them, we find that oil discoveries lead
to sustained and substantial population growth and to a shift of the economy
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from agriculture into oil mining, manufacturing, and services. However, the
focus of this literature has typically been on the more general implications of
resource wealth in terms of employment and welfare, and gender differences have
not been analysed in much detail.
At the same time, the vast changes in female labour force participation over
the last one hundred years have sparked considerable interest among labour
economists. Research has highlighted the importance of both supply-side and
demand-side factors as well that of changing social norms. Reasons for supply
shifts include medical advances (Goldin and Katz 2002, Albanesi and Olivetti
2016), labour-saving technological progress in the production of household goods
(Greenwood, Seshadri and Yorukoglu 2005, Jones, Manuelli and McGrattan
2015), declining child care costs (Attanasio, Low and Sanchez-Marcos 2008) and
the persistent effects of male wartime mobilization (Acemoglu, Autor and Lyle
2004). On the demand-side, the literature has documented the importance of
structural transformation (Akbulut 2011, Voigtla¨nder and Voth 2013, Ngai and
Petrongolo forthcoming) and trade integration (Do, Levchenko and Raddatz
2016, Gaddis and Pieters 2017) as shifters of gender-specific demands. Finally,
Fernandez (2011, 2013) and Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn (2013) present evidence
for the importance of social norms. Klasen and Pieters (2015) analyse the de-
terminants of continued low female labour force participation in India, and find
evidence of adverse factors operating through both demand-side and supply-side
channels, as well as through conservative social norms.
To the best of our knowledge, Michael Ross (2008, 2012) was the first to con-
nect resource wealth to female labour force participation. Several papers have
followed since then (Kang 2009, Norris 2010, Aragon, Rud and Toews 2016,
Kotsadam and Tolonen 2016). However, a sizeable part of this literature has
so far focused on cross-country comparisons. Such comparisons suffer from the
potential problem of not being able to control satisfactorily for differences in
institutions, culture and other unobservables at the country level. Our setting
is able to address this issue.
We rely on within-country variation in oil wealth that is plausibly exogenous.
This allows us to avoid many of the shortcomings of cross-country studies such
as the difficulty to adequately control for differences in institutions and culture.
Using information about the timing of oil field discoveries, we can employ a
clean difference-in-differences research design, comparing the evolution of oil-
rich counties before and after discoveries to that of non-oil counties over the
same time period. Oil discoveries as a source of variation in labour demand
are also not subject to endogeneity concerns that arise in connection with other
measures such as contemporaneous oil production. Closest to our paper in this
respect are two contemporaneous studies by Kotsadam and Tolonen (2016) and
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Aragon, Rud and Toews (2016). The former uses mine openings and closures in
Africa and finds a negative effect on female labour force participation. The key
difference to our paper is that these mines are more short-lived than the large oil
fields we consider- with an average life span of 10 years, they lead to local boom
and bust cycles. The oil wealth in our sample, on the other hand, had very
broad and long-lasting growth implications. In this respect, our paper is more
similar to Aragon, Rud and Toews (2016), who however look at a persistent
demand shock that is biased against males, namely the collapse of the UK coal
industry. Our setting is therefore arguably closer to the theoretical mechanisms
described by Ross (2008).
Finally, the case of the Southern United States offers us the advantages of
analysing consistent, high-quality data from a region that at that time still
relied heavily on agriculture. This is important because much of the discussion
surrounding the link between resource abundance and gender issues has concen-
trated on developing, often heavily agrarian economies.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 discusses the channels
through which oil discoveries could influence women’s labour market outcomes
and presents a simple model of sectoral reallocation in the wake of oil discover-
ies. The data and empirical strategy of our paper are then discussed in section
2.3. Section 2.4 presents the results and several robustness checks, section 2.5
concludes.
2.2 Theoretical Mechanisms
Before we proceed to the main body of our analysis, this section provides a
brief discussion of the mechanisms through which oil wealth could affect the
labour market outcomes of women. Existing work (see for example Ross 2008
and 2012), has identified both demand side and supply side channels that could
lead to mineral wealth having an adverse impact on women’s involvement in the
labour market.
2.2.1 A Model of Structural Transformation and Labour
Demand
On the labour demand side, oil discoveries are likely to lead to substantial struc-
tural transformation in the local economy that can change demand for male and
female labour. This has already been noted by Ross (2008) who describes how
oil wealth can lead to a “Dutch Disease” that reduces demand for female labour
by crowding out tradable goods industries that employ women. In what follows,
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we present a simple model of structural transformation in the wake of oil dis-
coveries. It will not only guide our empirical analysis, but also allow us to speak
about the implications of our findings beyond our empirical setting.
Set-up
Consider a local economy (county) endowed with exogenous populations of men
and women (denoted LM and LW respectively). This local economy can partic-
ipate in the production of two tradable goods, a consumption good Yc (we may
think of this as an agricultural good), and oil (Yo). It also produces a nontrad-
able good called local services (Ys).
The consumption good is produced by combining male labour, female labour,








where Ac denotes the county’s productivity in the delivery of the consumption
good, LcM and L
c
W denote male and female labour employed in the production
of the consumption good, while Nc represents the quantity of capital specific to
the consumption good employed in production. We assume that the county has
an exogenous endowment of such capital (land) given by N¯c.





where Ao reflects the county’s productivity in the oil sector, while L
o
M denotes
the number of male workers employed in oil production.





where As reflects the county’s productivity in the services sector, while L
s
W
denotes the number of women employed in services.
We consider counties to be small open economies, and as a result the prices
of tradable goods are exogenously determined: pc for the consumption good, po
for oil. The price of (nontradable) services, on the other hand, is determined
locally and is endogenous. We denote it as ps. We assume all good and factor
markets are perfectly competitive.
Preferences of all agents in the economy (men, women and capital owners)
are given by the Cobb-Douglas utility function:
U(c, s) = cγs1−γ (2.4)
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where c denotes the quantity consumed of the consumption good while s denotes
the quantity of services consumed.
Aside from working in the tradable sector or the services sector, women have
access to an outside option given by domestic activities. This outside option
yields an exogenous level of utility u¯. Men don’t have an outside option, so they
will always be working, either in the tradable sector or in oil.2
In our empirical exercise we analyse a historical time period featuring rela-
tively low female labour force participation. To make the model relevant to this
set-up we assume that the outside option provided by the domestic activity is
sufficiently attractive such that some women don’t work, at least before oil is













With the set-up above, we model oil discoveries as an exogenous increase in
the productivity of the oil sector. In what follows, we explore the effects of
rising productivity in the oil sector on the labour market outcomes of women.
In particular, we are interested in the impact of oil discoveries (modelled as
increases in Ao) on women’s labour force participation. The main prediction
of the model is presented in Proposition 1 below. The proof of this result is
presented in Appendix A.
Main Result










1. If 0 ≤ Ao < A∗1 no oil is produced in the county in equilibrium. Along this
range, any increase in Ao has no effect on women’s labour force participa-
tion (or wages). Increases in Ao along this range also do not affect male
wages.
2. if A∗1 < Ao < A
∗
2 oil is produced in the county in equilibrium. Along this
range, any increase in Ao leads to a reduction in women’s labour force
participation but keeps women’s wages unchanged. Increases in Ao along
this range lead to an increase in male wages and to the proportion of men
working in oil.
2The reason for this assumption is twofold. Firstly, we are primarily interested in modelling
female labour force participation. Secondly, the average male labour force participation rate
in our sample is around 90%, making it also an empirically less relevant case to study in our
setting.
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3. if A∗2 < Ao < A
∗
3 oil is produced in the county in equilibrium. Along this
range, any increase in Ao leads to an increase in women’s labour force
participation but keeps women’s wages unchanged. Increases in Ao along
this range lead to an increase in male wages and to the proportion of men
working in oil.
4. if Ao > A
∗
3 oil is produced in the county in equilibrium. Along this range,
women’s domestic outside option is no longer binding, and all women work
in equilibrium. As a result, further increases in Ao are no longer associated
with increases in women’s labour force participation (which is now 100%),
but to increases in female wages. Increases in Ao along this range lead to
an increase in male wages and to the proportion of men working in oil.
Corollary 1. In the absence of the service sector (i.e. if γ = 1), any increase
in Ao beyond the threshold at which the production of oil is economical in the
county is associated with declines in women’s labour force participation.
Proof: See Appendix A.
For small values of Ao (i.e. before oil discoveries), the production of oil is uneco-
nomical in the county. Moreover, in this range of low oil productivities, small
increases in oil productivity have no effect, as oil remains too costly to produce
in the county. As oil productivity crosses the threshold A∗1, the county becomes
productive enough in oil to begin production. This puts upward pressure on
male wages, as the oil sector contributes to the demand for male labour. Rising
male wages in turn affect the demand for female labour and implicitly women’s
labour force participation. The link between male wages and female labour de-
mand operates through two channels, one via the tradable sector and one via
the services sector.
Within the tradable sector, an increase in male wages has two opposite effects
on the demand for female labour. First, it tends to crowd out the tradable sec-
tor, as the costs of one of its inputs go up. We call this a scale effect, which leads
to the loss of female employment in this sector. Second, the increase in male
wages tends to encourage the substitution of male labour with female labour,
thus increasing demand for the latter. The strength of this substitution effect
depends on how easy it is to replace male with female labour (i.e. the greater
the substitutability of male and female labour, the stronger this effect is). In
the case of our Cobb-Douglas technology it can be shown that the scale effect is
guaranteed to dominate the substitution effect, such that rising male wages are
associated with declines in labour demand coming from the tradable sector3.
The increase in male wages caused by growth in oil related activities also
3For a more general specification in which male and female labour are combined into a
labour aggregate with an elasticity of substitution given by  it can be shown that the scale
effect dominates the substitution effect as long as  < 1α+β .
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raises the demand for local services. This income effect tends to increase female
employment in the service sector, thus potentially counterbalancing the depress-
ing effect of oil on demand for female labour in the tradable sector. The strength
of this effect crucially depends on the expenditure share (i.e. size) of the service
sector. The larger the share of income spent on local services, the more likely it
is that growth in this sector compensates for loss of female employment in the
tradable sector.
For an initial range of oil productivities beyond A∗1 (and up to A
∗
2), the overall
negative effect of growth in the oil sector on tradable sector female labour de-
mand dominates growing female employment in the services sector. As a result,
increases in Ao lead to decreases in female labour force participation. Beyond
A∗2, the relationship between these two forces is reversed, with the service sector
employment growth dominating female job losses in the tradable sector. As a
result, beyond A∗2 increases in Ao are associated with increases in female labour
force participation. Finally, beyond A∗3, male wages become sufficiently high
such that high demand in the services sector draws the entire female population
into the labour force (the outside option of domestic activity no longer binds).
For Ao > A
∗
3 further increases in Ao are no longer reflected in higher female
labour force participation (which is now 100%), but in higher female wages.
Given the analysis above, it should be clear that in the absence of the ser-
vice sector, any increase in Ao beyond the threshold that makes oil production
economical in the county is associated with declines in female labour force partic-
ipation. This is because the negative effect of rising male wages on the tradable
sector is still present, while the compensating force of increasing female labour
demand due to growth in services is no longer operational.
Finally, care has to be taken when taking the predictions of this model to the
data. While we have modelled oil discoveries as a continuous increase in Ao, the
setting we study is perhaps better described by a discrete jump in Ao. In this
context, the predictions of the model regarding the impact of oil discoveries on
female labour force participation are ambiguous. As the relationship between
(the continuous) Ao and female labour force participation is U-shaped, a discrete
jump in Ao may be associated with a decline, an increase or no change in female
labour force participation, depending on which portion of the U-shape the local
economy jumps to.
Our model offers several important insights. Firstly, if the local service sector
is absent or if women are precluded from working in it, oil discoveries reduce
demand for female labour in the tradable sector and therefore drive them out
of the labour market. On the other hand, if the service sector is present and is
open to women, oil discoveries continue to harm demand for female labour in
the tradable sector, but increase demand for female labour in the nontradable
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sector. The more productive the oil sector is, the more the latter effect is likely
to dominate, and female labour force participation may even increase.
2.2.2 Reducing Labour Supply
In addition to these demand side effects, oil can also depress women’s incentives
to participate in the workplace, leading to an inward shift of their labour sup-
ply curve. Resource mining and its associated activities tend to display heavily
male labour forces (something that will also be apparent in our setting) and thus
constitute a male-biased labour demand shock. Such a shock translates into sub-
stantially higher male wages, which constitutes an increase in non-labour income
for the spouses of these males. Moreover, in a Becker (1981) model of house-
hold labour supply, an increase in male wages would increase men’s comparative
advantage in market work. Both arguments give rise to a negative elasticity of
married women’s labour supply with respect to their husband’s wages, which
is also consistent with a sizeable empirical literature in labour economics (e.g.
Ashenfelter and Heckman 1974). In addition to boosting the non-labour income
of the wives of oil workers, oil could also increase government revenue and thus
government transfers. (Ross, 2008). However, recent studies have not found
that oil wealth translates into substantial increases in public goods provision
(Caselli and Michaels 2013, Martinez 2016). The more important effect would
thus be on married women whose husbands experience wage increases. For this
group, we would expect a decrease in labour supply.
Taken together, our theoretical discussion indicates two effects of oil on female
labour supply: As shown in the previous section, the labour demand effect is
ambiguous and depends on the size of the oil discovery shock. In addition, there
is a negative labour supply effect for women due to their husbands’ wages in-
creasing. The overall effect is therefore ambiguous, and we proceed to assess it
empirically.
2.3 Data and Empirical Strategy
In order to identify major oil field discoveries, we draw on the dataset compiled
by Guy Michaels (2011), which lists all counties in the Southern and Southwest-
ern United States that are situated above an oil field of 100 million barrel or
more before any oil was extracted. We will refer to these counties simply as
oil-rich counties. In addition, the dataset also contains information about the
earliest major discovery in each county. We treat a county as having discovered
its oil wealth after the first major discovery has taken place. Figures 2.1 to 2.5
give an overview over the geography of oil discoveries between 1900 and 1940
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based on county shapefiles from NHGIS (Minnesota Population Center, 2016).
There are only relatively few oil discoveries in the early years, with most discov-
eries happening in the 1920s and 1930s. In terms of geographic scope, we follow
Michaels (2011) and include all counties within 200 miles of the oil-rich counties
in Texas, Louisiana, and Oklahoma. This gives us a sample of 774 counties in
total.4
For our outcome variables, we use the individual-level US census data available
from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) for 1900 to 1940
(Ruggles et al 2015). This includes three novel, recently made available full
count (100%) samples for 1920, 1930, and 1940. For 1900 and 1910, we use the
largest samples available- a 5% sample for 1900, and a 1.4% sample that over-
samples minorities for 1910. We generally focus on the part of the population
which is of working age, defined to be between 17 and 65.
Most of our variables of interest are available for our whole period of analysis.
This includes labour force participation, the sector in which an individual works,
sex, race, and marriage status. Employment status conditional on labour force
participation was not recorded in the census of 1900 and 1920, but is available
for the remaining three census decades. For earnings, we observe annual wage
income in 1940 only, but we also have an “occupational earnings score” variable
that is available for 1900-1940. This variable assigns each individual the per-
centile rank of its occupation in terms of median earnings in 1950.
The staggered nature of oil discoveries across space and over time lends itself
quite naturally to a difference-in-differences research design. The basic regres-
sion we run uses the IPUMS individual level data and is of the form
yct = αc + τt + βDiscoveredOilF ieldct +X
′
cγt + uct (2.6)
where yct denotes outcome y (e.g. the labour force participation rate) in county
c and year t. DiscoveredOilF ield is a dummy that equals 1 if county c is
oil-rich and if at least one of its major oil fields has already been discovered,
and 0 otherwise. τ and α are year- and county fixed effects. X is a vector of
control variables that vary at the county level. In line with Michaels (2011), we
control for several geographic features that might be spuriously correlated with
oil wealth: Longitude, latitude, aridity, average annual rainfall, distance to the
closest navigable river, and distance to the ocean. All of these variables vary at
the county level only, but we allow for them to have time-varying effects.
4One potential issue is that especially in the Western part of the sample, population was
growing and counties therefore often changed, were split up, or newly created. In order to
address this, we compare the area of each county in each census decade to its area in 1940, and
drop all observations from a given county-year cell if the absolute difference of the county’s area
in that year compared to 1940 exceeds 5%. In addition, we drop all counties from Oklahoma
in 1900, as this state at this point was still largely unorganized and divided into the Oklahoma
and Indian Territory.
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Since our key variation lies at the county x year level, we aggregate the individual
census data to this level.5 We then run our regressions at this level, weighting
by the respective cell sizes and clustering standard errors at the county level.
This approach produces identical point estimates and standard errors as running
all our regressions at the individual level (Angrist and Pischke 2009). In all
regressions, we cluster standard errors at the county level. When calculating
standard errors, we use Young (2016)’s procedure that calculates an effective
degrees of freedom correction for clustered and robust standard errors. These
effective degrees of freedom are also used when performing hypothesis tests.
For wages, we only have data from 1940, requiring a cross-sectional specification
with stronger identifying assumptions:
yc = βDiscoveredOilF ieldc +X
′
cγ + ss + uc (2.7)
In this case, DiscoveredOilF ieldc codes whether county c has an oil field which
was already discovered by 1940. X is the same vector of control variables as
above, and s are state fixed effects. The more demanding identification assump-
tion behind this specification is that counties without oil wealth and counties
that had not yet discovered their oil wealth by 1940 are a valid counterfactual
for those counties with already discovered oil fields in 1940. In Appendix B, we
show several robustness checks, the results of which support this assumption.
The setting of our analysis is the American Southwest five to nine decades after
the American Civil War. After the war, the US South remained a predominantly
agricultural region that lagged considerably behind the rest of the country and
caught up only very slowly (Wright 1986, Caselli and Coleman 2001). This is
also borne out by the county-level summary statistics displayed in table 2.1.
We show the labour force shares of 4 major sectors (agriculture, manufacturing,
services, oil mining) for the beginning and end of our sample. As can be seen,
agriculture is by far the most important sector in 1900, but loses importance
over the next 40 years. Manufacturing and services, on the other hand, are
slowly gaining ground. Over the whole time period, our area of observation is
a very rural region, with an urban population share of only 15%. In addition,
the summary statistics also show a very low level of female involvement in the
labour force. Female labour force participation stood at 16.6% in 1900 and in-
creased by 3 percentage points by 1940. This is no Southern peculiarity: Across
the whole United States, female labour force participation rose from 20.6% in
1900 to 25.8% in 1940 (Goldin 1990, Chapter 2). However, there was consider-
able heterogeneity along two dimensions: Black women were much more likely
to work than white women (Goldin 1977), and single women had much higher
5When aggregating, we weight individual observations by the person weights provided by
IPUMS in order to improve the representativity of our sample.
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labour force participation than married ones (Goldin 1990).
All in all, our basic setting is thus a still heavily rural and agricultural economy
that is slowly moving towards more “modern” sectors, and which over the whole
period of analysis displays relatively low female labour force participation rates.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Oil and gender labour market differences
In 1900, the economy of the Southern United States was thus still predomi-
nantly agricultural and nearly no major oil field had yet been discovered, as
can be seen from figure 2.1. To set the stage for our main analysis relating re-
source shocks to gender outcomes, we first check whether oil discoveries indeed
represent important developments for the discovering counties. Table 2.2 shows
difference-in-differences results for the log of the working age population, female
population share, and the share of the labour force employed in, respectively, oil
mining, manufacturing, services, and agriculture. We do not find any evidence
for a resource curse, but rather detect substantial growth: Population increases
by around 42%, and the labour force shifts from agriculture into oil mining and,
to a lesser extent, manufacturing and services. These findings largely confirm the
results of Michaels (2011) for the same region, but are based on weaker identify-
ing assumptions. They show that oil discoveries constitute substantial shocks to
a county’s economy that lead to growth and structural transformation. Interest-
ingly, the population growth seems gender-balanced, with the female population
share staying unchanged. In tables 2.3 and 2.4, we then analyse whether the
economy’s structural transformation affects men and women differentially. The
results show that this is clearly the case: Oil discoveries lead to a decrease in
the share of the male labour force employed in agriculture by 8.8 percentage
points, while increasing the male labour force share employed in oil mining and
manufacturing by 6.5 and 1.2 percentage points, respectively. As there is virtu-
ally no oil mining prior to oil discoveries, this means that all of a sudden, 6.5%
of the whole male labour force work in the oil extraction industry, a sizeable
change to the local economy’s structure. Women, on the other hand, are nearly
not affected at all by the oil industry. However, they also experience a decrease
in the importance of agriculture of 6.3 percentage points, whereas the service
sector’s labour force share grows by 5.2 percentage points. Thus, both genders
leave agriculture in relative terms, but while men go increasingly into the oil
and manufacturing industries, women flock to the service sector. In terms of
our model, it seems that the service sector in our economy is clearly open to-
wards women.
In this case, our model has an ambiguous prediction in terms of female labour
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supply depending on the strength of the oil shock. Table 2.5 shows difference-
in-differences estimates of the effect of oil wealth on labour force participation
by gender. In columns 1 and 3, we show results for male and female labour
force participation, while columns 2 and 4 show results for the employment
rate conditional on being in the labour force, a measure which we do not have
for 1900 and 1920. Interestingly, we do not find large effects on either gender:
While the male labour force participation seems to increase at least slightly in
oil-rich counties, we do not observe any changes in female labour force partic-
ipation. Similarly, we fail to identify any effect of oil discoveries on either the
male or female employment rates. The respective point estimates are close to
zero across all specifications and statistically insignificant. Thus, in contrast to
the cross-country results of Ross (2008), we do not find evidence for a negative
relationship between oil wealth and female labour market participation. The
most likely explanation for this is the growth of the service sector. As discussed
in section 2.2, even though the initial demand shock of oil is male-biased (and
columns 1 of tables 2.3 and 2.4 suggest it indeed is), oil only reduces women’s
labour market involvement if there is no other sector that benefits from oil and is
open to women. In our case, as table 2.4 shows, the service sector is playing this
role: As the economy grows, demand for services increases, and more women go
to work in such jobs.6
So far, we have focused on quantities transacted in the labour market. To anal-
yse the effect of oil discoveries on wages, we look at two outcome variables. The
first is the most direct measure of wages, annual wage income. However, this
variable is only available for 1940, which requires a cross-sectional specification
with stronger identifying assumptions. To at least partially remedy this, we
also look at the occupational earnings score, available from IPUMS. The occu-
pational earnings score is a percentile rank of occupations based on their 1950
median earnings. It thus does not capture within-occupation changes in wages,
but it does capture movements of people into jobs that pay relatively more or
less. The advantage of this variable is that it is available for the whole time pe-
riod of 1900-1940 so that we can use our difference-in-differences specification.
In panel A of table 2.6, we report the results. In columns 1 and 2 we report
the averages of log annual wage earnings for men and women separately. Unlike
our previous results on labour force participation and employment, we identify
substantial effects of oil wealth on local wage rates that differ by gender. While
male wages increase by 26 log points on average, female wages stay nearly un-
changed. In columns 3 and 4, we convert annual wage income to percentile
6In Appendix B, we show that nearly the whole growth in the importance of the service
sector as employer of female labour is due to the personal service and entertainment sector.
This suggests that income effects rather than demand linkages from other industries are the
driver of this growth.
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ranks of the 1940 wage distribution to facilitate comparison with the occupa-
tional score variable.7 We see the same relative movement: Men move up 7.5
percentiles, whereas women increase their earnings by at most one percentile.
Columns 5 and 6 display cross-sectional estimates for 1940 for the occupational
score variables. They show the same relative picture: Men gain 5 percent-
age ranks, while women in this specification even lose ground. In the panel
difference-in-differences specification of columns 7 and 8, the gap between the
estimates is a bit smaller, but still sizeable and in line with previous findings.
Clearly, the structural transformation that counties experience in the wake of oil
discoveries is not gender-neutral: While men obtain high-paying jobs in oil min-
ing and manufacturing, the service sector jobs for women tend to be relatively
low-paid occupations in the personal service sector. The gender gap therefore
increases. In addition, comparing columns 3 and 4 to 5-8, we see that a large
part of the wage growth is due to occupational changes, but there is also evi-
dence for within-occupational wage increases, as the wage percentile coefficients
are larger than then occupational score ones. One concern with these findings is
that the male wage growth could be driven by the high wages in oil mining and
thus only accrue to the small group of oil miners. In panel B we therefore drop
all individuals working in the oil extraction sector. As can be seen, while the
wage growth decreases a bit, it stays economically and statistically significant:
Outside of the oil industry, men gain 3 percentile ranks in the occupational
earnings distribution, 6 percentiles in the wage distribution and 22.5 log points
in wages. For women, on the other hand, the coefficients are nearly unchanged.
Given the low number of women in the oil mining industry, this should not come
as a surprise.
All in all, so far, our results display a much more nuanced effect of the initial
male-biased demand shock on women: While men greatly benefit from new jobs
in oil mining and manufacturing and can substantially increase their wages, fe-
male wages remain more or less unchanged. Moreover, oil does not appear to
drive women out of the labour market, instead female labour force participation
remains unchanged. The likely explanation is an increase in service sector jobs
that absorbs any “excess” female labour. However, the service sector increase
comes predominantly in personal service sector jobs that are not as well paid,
such that the gender pay gap increases.
7In creating percentile ranks, we follow the IPUMS procedure behind occupational earnings
scores very closely: We first use the 1940 national full count to create a z-score of wage income
and then transform this into a percentile rank.
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2.4.2 Heterogeneity along marriage status and race
One potential issue with our findings so far, in particular with the absence of a
negative effect on female labour force participation, could be that most women
were not part of the labour force anyways. As Goldin (1990, 2006) has shown,
female labour force participation was still very low and only slowly rising dur-
ing the first third of the twentieth century. This is also visible in our sample,
where the female labour force participation rate over the whole time period is
just below 24%. The vast majority of women thus was most likely already in a
corner solution with no labour force participation, which could explain why we
do not observe any changes in labour supply. While this argument has merit,
it overlooks two important sources of heterogeneity in female labour market in-
volvement: Marriage status and race. We therefore analyse whether we observe
heterogeneous responses to oil discoveries along these dimensions, and whether
these potential heterogeneous responses can explain the absence of an overall
change in female labour market involvement.
Marriage status was a crucial determinant of labour force participation in the
early 20th century United States. Until the 1920s, it was typical for women to
exit the labour force upon marriage (Goldin 2006), and in many places, employ-
ers had explicit “marriage bars” that prevented the hiring or led to the firing
of married women. Not surprisingly then, in 1900, across the whole country,
only 5.6% of all married women were working, as opposed to 43.5% of all single
women, and the former share had only increased to 13.8% by 1940. (Goldin
1990) Our failure to find a significant labour force participation result could
thus be due to us pooling irresponsive married women with more responsive
singles. If this is the case, we would expect to find a reaction for singles at least.
Table 2.7 therefore shows results separately for single and married women. As
can be seen, while we find a small negative point estimate for married women,
if anything, our point estimate for single women is positive and amounts to 1.3
percentage points. While not very precisely estimated, this would mean that far
from crowding singles out of the labour market, oil if anything increased their
propensity to work. For the more responsive group of singles, our conclusion
that oil does not drive them out of the labour market thus holds a fortiori.
However, in addition to changing female labour force participation directly, oil
might also have other demographic effects. As we have shown, male wages in-
crease substantially after oil discoveries. This could increase the local supply
of “marriageable” men and thereby increase marriage rates (Buckley 2003, Jel-
nov 2016). Increased marriage rates in turn have a dampening effect on female
labour force participation due to married women being less likely to work.
One challenge in assessing the plausibility of this channel is the problem that
there is a large “stock” of already married women who are not affected by oil
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discoveries at all. We therefore need to focus on “marginal” women whose de-
cision when and whether to marry can still be affected by oil wealth- these will
typically be younger women, among which the marriage rate and thus the stock
of married women is lower. In table 2.8, we show the effects of oil discoveries on
a woman’s probability of being married. Column 1 shows results for all women
and illustrates our stock problem: Among all women, the marriage rate is close
to 70% (and many of those not married are widowed already), and we do not
find an effect of oil on marriage rates. For women aged 30 or below, or 25 or
below, where more women are in the process of making their marriage decision,
we find that oil increases the probability of being married by a statistically sig-
nificant 1.5 percentage points.
Overall, separating the analysis for single and married women supports our pre-
vious conclusion that oil does not reduce female labour force participation. If
anything, single women even experience a slight increase in labour market in-
volvement. However, this effect is counterbalanced by the fact that young women
also are more likely to get married, and married women during this period rarely
work. Social norms about the appropriate role of married women thus seem to
keep women from benefiting more from oil than could have been possible.
In addition to marriage status, race was another important determinant of fe-
male labour force participation in our setting. Black women were considerably
more likely to work. In 1920, the labour force participation of white females was
21.6%, while for non-white women, it stood at 43.1% (Goldin 1990). Reasons for
this difference include economic factors such as black husbands’ lower average
incomes, but also cultural differences and the legacy of slavery. (Goldin 1977,
Boustan and Collins 2013)
Our overall unchanged female labour force participation rate thus might mask
racial heterogeneity. Black women with a generally greater labour force involve-
ment should be more responsive to the shocks brought about by oil discoveries.
In addition, they were particularly present in the low-skilled personal service
sector jobs that experienced particular employment increases. (Goldin 1977) To
assess whether black and white women react differentially to oil discoveries, we
split our sample by race. Table 2.9 shows the results for labour force partic-
ipation, average earnings scores and the share of the labour force working in
services and agriculture- in columns 1-4 for whites, in columns 5-8 for blacks.
The results show that black women indeed react much more to oil discoveries:
The importance of the agricultural sector as employer decreases by nearly 9 per-
centage points for them, while the services experience a corresponding increase.
This movement from agriculture to services also appears financially beneficial,
as black women gain more than a percentile rank in the occupational earnings
score. For white women, on the other hand, all these responses are qualitatively
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of the same sign, but much more muted. The likely explanation for this hetero-
geneity is that white women start from considerably better paying jobs- they are
on average in the 32nd percentile of the median occupational earnings distribu-
tion, whereas blacks are in the 7th, and few white women work in agriculture.
For whites, who already have relatively well-paid service sector jobs, the new
personal service jobs are thus not very attractive. Black women, on the other
hand, can considerably improve over their existing agricultural jobs. Finally,
however, overall labour force participation stays unchanged for both races.
All in all, analysing the effect of oil along the dimensions of race and marriage
status has uncovered several important additional results. First off, oil discover-
ies do increase the earnings of women, but only of black women who on average
had the worst-paying jobs and for whom the new personal service sector jobs are
an improvement. White women, the majority of which is already in the service
sector, do not gain and also do not react a lot in general. Secondly, if anything,
single women even experience an increase in labour market opportunities, but
this effect is counterbalanced by an increased propensity to marry and a so-
cial environment where married women are strongly discouraged from working.
Again, as in the case of the service sector’s openness, this highlights the role
of social norms. Had the labour market been more open to married women,
we might even have seen a slight increase in female labour force participation.
Instead, women seem to benefit less than they could have. Finally, our general
results seem robust to splitting the sample of women both by race and marriage
status. In Appendix B, we perform further robustness checks and show that
our results are also robust to using a leads and lags specification instead of a
simple dummy for oil discoveries, to including county-specific linear time trends,
to dropping all counties without large oil fields, and to excluding all counties
who do not have a discovered oil field themselves, but are adjacent to one. Using
the methodology of Pei, Pischke and Schwandt (2017), we also show that oil dis-
coveries are not systematically associated with the presence of the boll weevil,
another important local economic shock during our period of analysis (Lange,
Olmstead and Rhode 2009, Ager, Brueckner and Herz forthcoming).
2.4.3 Migration
As we have shown in table 2.2, counties that discover oil experience great popu-
lation growth. This immediately raises the question of migration. Migration is
not a problem for the identification strategy of our paper, but it poses potential
challenges for the interpretation of our results: Do the changes and potential
benefits of oil accrue only to migrants, or does the incumbent population also
share the benefits? The ideal test of this hypothesis would be to split the sample
by migrant status. Unfortunately, however, we do not observe migrant status.
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What we do know is each individual’s state of birth. We can thus at least iden-
tify a subsample of migrants, namely those who migrated across state borders.
These are also the migrants who on average travelled greater distances. If there
is a concern of selective migration and spatial sorting, this would therefore be the
group where we would suspect these factors to operate in the strongest way. As
one admittedly imperfect way of addressing the questions posed by migration,
we therefore split the sample by birth- one group consists of people that were
born in a different state and thus clearly migrated to their new residence at some
point in their life (albeit not necessarily after oil discoveries). The second group
consists of people that live in their state of birth. This group is made up of short-
distance migrants and individuals who have not moved at all. In tables 2.10 and
2.11, we show our key results separately for these two groups. Table 2.10 shows
results for the overall sex ratio and for the male-related outcomes: labour force
participation rate, employment rate, average earnings scores and the sectoral
allocation of the labour force. For men, we can indeed see some evidence for
selective migration: For men born out of state, the occupational earnings score
results and the sectoral reallocation from agriculture to oil and manufacturing
are considerably stronger than for men born in their state of residence. However,
neither group displays a huge change in labour force participation rate. Table
2.11 shows the results for our female-related outcome: Labour force participa-
tion and employment rates, marriage rates of women aged 25 or below, average
occupational earnings scores and sectoral composition of the labour force. Here,
the case for selective migration seems considerably weaker: The marriage rate
increase is driven almost entirely by women born in state, and the sectoral real-
location from agriculture to services is very similar for both groups. In addition,
again no group displays a change in labour force participation rates or earnings
scores. Overall, for men, selective migration is clearly a concern and at least
part of our findings are due to migrants being systematically different from the
existing population. However, for women, this case seems much weaker.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analysed the implications of a male-biased labour de-
mand shock in the tradable sector on labour market outcomes by gender. Our
particular focus has been on testing the hypothesis that oil discoveries adversely
affect female labour market participation.
We have provided a theoretical framework in which we model the oil sector as
male-dominated and oil discoveries as male-biased labour demand shocks. In our
model, oil discoveries lead to two opposing changes in female labour demand:
Demand for female labour in the tradable sector is reduced, whereas demand for
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women in the nontradable sector increases. If the service sector does not exist or
is not open to women, female labour force participation unambiguously declines.
On the other hand, if the service sector is open to women, the nontradable sector
might have enough pull to actually increase female labour force participation.
We then use oil discoveries in the US Southwest between 1900 and 1940 to em-
pirically estimate the effect of oil wealth on gender labour market differences.
Contrary to previous studies (e.g. Ross 2008), we do not find a negative re-
lationship between oil wealth and female labour force participation, which is
instead found to be unchanged. Our explanation for this is a process of sectoral
reallocation by gender that is consistent with our model: The initial oil shock
indeed brings about male-biased employment increases in oil mining and man-
ufacturing with associated wage gains for men. However, the service sector also
expands and offers ample employment opportunities for women, who therefore
do not leave the labour force. If anything, we even find that the labour market
prospects of single women slightly improve. However, at the same time, there is
an increased supply of marriageable men in the county, and the marriage rate of
young women increases. In our period of analysis, married women were strongly
discouraged from market work, so that this increased marriage rate depresses
any potential gains women could have made from oil discoveries.
Our findings point to the importance of social norms and institutions in trans-
mitting gender-biased demand shocks. A first such norm is the openness of the
service sector to women. In our setting, the service sector is open to women and
expands considerably. Our model indicates that if the latter was not the case,
we would indeed expect to find a negative employment effect for women. This
could also explain the negative cross-country result in Ross (2008), which, as
noted by himself, seems to be absent in countries where women are common in
the service sector.
A second relevant social norm concerns the “appropriate” role of married women.
In our setting, married women are socially discouraged (and sometimes outright
barred) from working, and as a consequence, they potentially benefit less from
oil discoveries than they could have under different social norms.
The broader implication of our paper is that an initial gender-biased shock to a
tradable sector does not necessarily lead to aggregate gender-biased outcomes.
Through income effects (or potentially backward or forward linkages), the initial
gender-biased implications can easily be attenuated or even fully netted out.
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2.6 Tables and Figures
Figure 2.1: Map of Oil Discoveries 1900
Note: Oil abundant counties (dark grey), Neighbours of oil abundant counties
(grey), Other counties (light grey)
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Figure 2.2: Map of Oil Discoveries 1910
Note: Oil abundant counties (dark grey), Neighbours of oil abundant counties
(grey), Other counties (light grey)
Figure 2.3: Map of Oil Discoveries 1920
Note: Oil abundant counties (dark grey), Neighbours of oil abundant counties
(grey), Other counties (light grey)
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Figure 2.4: Map of Oil Discoveries 1930
Note: Oil abundant counties (dark grey), Neighbours of oil abundant counties
(grey), Other counties (light grey)
Figure 2.5: Map of Oil Discoveries 1940
Note: Oil abundant counties (dark grey), Neighbours of oil abundant counties

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Share of the Labour Force employed in
Oil Mining Manufacturing Agriculture Services
Discovered Oil Field 0.065*** 0.012*** -0.088*** 0.004
(0.008) (0.004) (0.016) (0.004)
Mean Dep Var 0.012 0.087 0.536 0.087
Number of observations 3,577, number of clusters 774. Standard errors, clus-
tered at the county level, in parentheses. Standard errors and p-values are
based on bias adjusted standard errors and effective degrees of freedom cor-
rections as in Young (2016)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.3: Sectoral shifts by gender: Men
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Share of the Labour Force employed in
Oil Mining Manufacturing Agriculture Services
Discovered Oil Field 0.001*** -0.009* -0.063** 0.052*
(0.000) (0.005) (0.030) (0.028)
Mean Dep Var 0.001 0.045 0.329 0.479
Number of observations 3,475, number of clusters 774. Standard errors, clus-
tered at the county level, in parentheses. Standard errors and p-values are
based on bias adjusted standard errors and effective degrees of freedom cor-
rections as in Young (2016)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.4: Sectoral shifts by gender: Women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES LF Part. Rate Empl. Rate LF Part. Rate Empl. Rate
Female Female Male Male
Discovered Oil Field -0.003 -0.004 0.008 -0.005
(0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004)
Observations 3,590 2,171 3,594 2,231
Mean Dep Var 0.246 0.938 0.907 0.941
Years 1900-1940 1910, 30, 40 1900-1940 1910, 30, 40
Number of clusters 774. Standard errors, clustered at the county level, in paren-
theses. Standard errors and p-values are based on bias adjusted standard errors
and effective degrees of freedom corrections as in Young (2016)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































VARIABLES Female LF Participation Rate
Discovered Oil Field 0.013 -0.008
(0.013) (0.009)
Sample Single Women Married women
Observations 3,543 3,590
Mean Dep Var 0.483 0.139
Number of clusters 774. Standard errors, clustered at
the county level, in parentheses. Standard errors and p-
values are based on bias adjusted standard errors and ef-
fective degrees of freedom corrections as in Young (2016)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.7: The effects of oil on female LFP by marriage status
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Share of women married
Discovered Oil Field 0.002 0.015** 0.015*
(0.004) (0.007) (0.008)
Sample All Women Women ≤ 30 Women ≤ 25
Observations 3,590 3,582 3,573
Mean Dep Var 0.690 0.594 0.501
Number of clusters 774. Standard errors, clustered at the county
level, in parentheses. Standard errors and p-values are based on
bias adjusted standard errors and effective degrees of freedom
corrections as in Young (2016)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Female pop share LF Part Rate Employment Rate Average occ.
earnings score
Panel A People born in state of residence
Disc Oil Field -0.000 0.010 -0.005 3.191***
(0.002) (0.008) (0.004) (0.642)
Observations 3,572 3,557 2,206 3,539
Panel B People born outside of state of residence
Disc Oil Field -0.005 0.005 -0.007 5.913***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (1.725)
Observations 3,586 3,583 2,221 3,566
Sample All Men Male LF Male LF
(5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Share of Male LF employed in
Oil Mining Manufacturing Services Agriculture
Panel A People born in state of residence
Disc Oil Field 0.038*** 0.007 0.004 -0.061***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.013)
Observations 3,538 3,538 3,538 3,538
Panel B People born outside of state of residence
Disc Oil Field 0.105*** 0.015** 0.005 -0.126***
(0.014) (0.006) (0.006) (0.028)
Observations 3,566 3,566 3,566 3,566
Number of clusters 774. Standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses.
Standard errors and p-values are based on bias adjusted standard errors and effective
degrees of freedom corrections as in Young (2016)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.10: Comparing state natives and state migrants, part 1
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES LF Part Rate Share Married Employment Rate Average occ.
earnings score
Panel A People born in state of residence
Disc Oil Field -0.006 0.015* -0.007 0.654
(0.012) (0.008) (0.007) (0.622)
Observations 3,557 3,533 2,114 3,373
Panel B People born outside of state of residence
Disc Oil Field 0.002 0.009 0.001 0.268
(0.090) (0.016) (0.016) (1.027)
Observations 3,573 3,456 2,094 3,374
Sample All Women Women ≤ 25 Female LF Female LF
(5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Share of Female LF employed in
Oil Mining Manufacturing Services Agriculture
Panel A People born in state of residence
Disc Oil Field 0.001*** -0.004 0.053 -0.066*
(0.000) (0.005) (0.032) (0.032)
Observations 3,370 3,370 3,370 3,370
Panel B People born outside of state of residence
Disc Oil Field 0.002*** -0.022*** 0.060* -0.068*
(0.001) (0.006) (0.029) (0.036)
Observations 3,365 3,365 3,365 3,365
Number of clusters 774. Standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses.
Standard errors and p-values are based on bias adjusted standard errors and effective
degrees of freedom corrections as in Young (2016)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.11: Comparing state natives and state migrants, part 2
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2.7 Appendix A: Theoretical results
An equilibrium of the economy described in section 2.2 is characterized by the
system of equations (2.8) to (2.17):
LoM + L
c





W ≤ LW (2.9)








































where beyond previously established notation wi are the wages of workers of
gender i ∈ {W,M}, rc is the rental rate of specific capital while LLFW denotes the
number of women in the labour force (which due to the presence of the outside
option can be fewer than the total population of women).
Equations (2.8) to (2.10) are market clearing conditions in the various factor
markets. Equations (2.11) and (2.12) are optimality conditions from the maxi-
mization problem of consumption good producers. Equations (2.13) to (2.15) are
zero profit conditions for producers of the consumption good, oil and services
respectively. Equation (2.16) is an optimality condition from the consumer’s
utility maximization problem. Equation (2.17) represents the participation con-
dition of women into the labour force.
2.7.1 Low Oil Productivity
It can be shown that for Ao small enough such that (2.14) does not bind, the
condition in (2.5) guarantees that (2.17) binds8. Therefore we begin our analysis
with very small Ao where we know that (2.14) does not bind and (2.17) binds.
8This can be shown by contradiction. Assume there is an equilibrium where no men work
in oil, u¯ obeys (2.5) and (2.17) does not bind. This leads to a contradiction.
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In such an equilibrium we have that:
Lc∗M = LM (2.18)









where (2.20) is obtained by plugging (2.15) in (2.17) and rearranging. With
these results in place the group of equations (2.11) to (2.13) represent a system
of three equations with three remaining unknowns. We first divide (2.11) by























This configuration is only an equilibrium if we can confirm that (2.14) does not






















Thus if condition (2.23) is met the configuration above is an equilibrium featuring
no oil production and some women not working. Moreover, for any 0 ≤ Ao < A∗1
increases in Ao have no effect on any of the equilibrium quantities or prices (we
have the exact same equilibrium in this range).




















Oil production begins. However, given the continuity of our set-up, we expect
that in the neighbourhood of the threshold it should still be the case that some
women don’t work, whichever the effect of increased Ao is on female labour force
participation. We thus search for equilibria where Ao > A
∗
1 and (2.17) binds.
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In such an equilibrium we have








Plugging these last two equations into (2.13) and solving for rc yields:










































W + (1− γ)AopoLM + (1− γ)r∗cN¯c
γw∗W
(2.27)









1−β [β + (1− γ)(1− α− β)N¯c]
1−α−β
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1−β [β + (1− γ)(1− α− β)N¯c]
1−α−β
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Two observations are in order at this stage. One is that (2.17) is guaranteed
to bind between A∗1 and A
∗
2. The imposition of restriction (2.5) guarantees that
(2.17) binds at A∗1 and in the neighbourhood (via continuity). Moreover between
A∗1 and A
∗
2 increases in Ao are associated with declines in female labour force
participation, such that if (2.17) binds at A∗1 it will also bind at A
∗
2 and all the
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intermediate points between. The second observation is that as the size of the
service sector gets arbitrarily small (γ → 1) the magnitude of A∗2 goes to infinity,
which shows that in the absence of the services sector, any increase in oil sector
productivity beyond the threshold at which oil production begins brings about
a decline in female labour force participation (the result of Corollary 1).
2.7.3 A Sufficiently Large Oil Boom Brings All Women
into the Labour Force
All that is left to show is that there exists and A∗3 > A
∗
2 such that beyond A
∗
3
all women are drawn into work. We will prove this by contradiction. Assume




2 we have that (2.17)




1 oil is produced in equilibrium, which means that
equations (2.20) and (2.24) to (2.27) hold. For A∗3 > A
∗
2 we know that female
labour force participation is increasing. We then proceed to take the limit of the
number of women in the labour force, given by (2.27) when A∗3 goes to infinity.
We are allowed to do this because by assumption (2.27) holds for any A∗3. But




But by assumption, the female population of the county (LW ) is finite. We have
reached a contradiction which concludes the proof.
2.8 Appendix B: Further results and robust-
ness checks
In this appendix, we present several additional findings and several checks of the
robustness of our key findings. One first additional investigation concerns the
exact nature of the service sector increase from which females are benefitting.
We have shown that the share of females employed in the service sector increases.
This could happen due to a variety of reasons: As manufacturing, refining and
other capital-intensive sectors grow, demand for more advanced services such as
banking, insurance, and business services like accounting and advertising might
grow. On the other hand, income effects could lead to growth in the demand
for personal services and entertainment. Of course, the types of jobs that would
arise would be quite different in both scenarios. Our baseline classification in-
cludes all service sector industries and thus cannot inform us of which type of
services experience particular growth. In table 2.12, we therefore disaggregate
the service sector into three narrower categories: Personal services and Enter-
tainment (this includes for example individuals working in private households, in
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hotels, in laundering, cleaning or dyeing services and in entertainment venues),
Finance, Business, and Repair Services (e.g. banking, insurance, advertising,
accounting, auto repair services), and professional services (e.g. medical, legal
and educational services). Overall, we had found in section 2.4 that the share
of women employed in services increases by 5.2 percentage points after oil dis-
coveries. As our results in table 2.12 show, the lion’s share of this increase -
4.5 percentage points or more than 85% - comes from the personal services and
entertainment category, whereas the other two categories display only very small
increases. This suggests that the main reason for the blossoming of service sec-
tor jobs are income effects and the resulting increased demand for personal and
recreational services. Inter-industry demand linkages that would lead to growth
in professional and business services seem to be, at least in terms of female em-
ployment, less relevant.
In addition, in this section we also implement a number of robustness checks
that aim to provide further support for the notion that the effects we find are
indeed caused by the discovery of major oil fields.
As a first check, we show that before oil discoveries, oil-rich counties were not
systematically different from counties without major oil deposits. To do so, we
run a series of cross-sectional regressions for 1900:
yc = βOilRichc +X
′
cγ + ss + uc (2.31)
where OilRich is 1 if a county sits on top of a large oil field an 0 otherwise.
As can be seen in table 2.13, across 10 different outcome variables, we do not
find substantial differences between the two groups of counties. Oil- and non-oil
counties have essentially the same male and female labour force participation
rate, the same distribution of the labour force over our 4 sectors of interest,
and very similarly-sized populations. The only statistically significant difference
arises in occupational earnings scores, where it seems that oil-rich counties on
average have worse-paying occupations. However, the difference is only about
one and a half percentile ranks.
Overall, the two groups of counties thus look very balanced. These findings are
reassuring as they imply that the oil wealth “treatment”can be seen as nearly
randomly assigned and thus the setting we study constitutes a valid natural
experiment and the common trend assumption needed for the validity of our
difference-in-differences design is likely to hold.
To assess this key assumption more rigorously, we augment our baseline panel
specification by replacing our variable of interest with a full set of leads and lags
of the date of oil discovery relevant for each oil-rich county. The specification
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we estimate is thus of the form:




+X ′cγt + uct (2.32)
where the set of dummies DiscoveredOilF ieldc,t+j code for whether an oil field
is to be discovered 20−30 years from period t, 10−20 years from period t, 10−0
years from period t or was discovered 0−10 years prior to period t, 10−20 years
prior to period t or more than 20 years prior to period t, with the omitted ref-
erence category being represented by discoveries that occur more than 30 years
after the reference period t. All the remaining variables and controls retain their
meanings from specification 2.6 in section 2.3. We show graphical results from
this specification for population and the labour force shares in our four major
sectors in figures 2.6 to 2.10. Results for our remaining variables of interest are
shown in tables 2.14 to 2.17.
Reassuringly, our results indicate that there is no evidence that oil-rich counties
display systematically different characteristics before the discovery of oil, with
virtually all the leading dummies (that indicate oil discoveries in the future)
having no significant impact on any of our outcome variables of interest.
The findings related to the lagging dummies (that indicate time elapsed since
discovery) largely confirm the results from our main specifications in the pre-
vious section: While there is no effect on either male or female labour force
participation rates, sectoral reallocation is active. An interesting, but also intu-
itive further result is that the reallocation of male labour into the oil industry
takes place immediately, while the increase in manufacturing needs a bit longer
to materialize. In the case of the importance of services for female employment,
it seems that oil counties originally display lover values and then catch up after
oil discoveries take place. Yet another pattern is displayed by population, which
increases sharply after oil discoveries and then continues to grow. All in all, our
results from the lead and lag analysis are consistent with the results emerging
from our main specifications. They support the view that the systematic differ-
ences we observe between oil-rich and baseline counties do indeed appear after
oil discoveries and can be attributed to oil abundance in a causal way. A more
parametric robustness check for our assumption of common trends is to include
county-specific linear time trends, which is done in 2.18 and 2.19. Again, our
basic conclusions remain unchanged. The one major exception to this is that
the reallocation of men into the manufacturing sector becomes weaker and sta-
tistically insignificant, which can be explained by the fact that oil discoveries
induce a post-treatment trend which is partly picked up by the linear trend.
Another related robustness check that also probes our identifying assumption
involves performing our analysis on a limited sample from which all counties
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without oil deposits have been dropped. This is a further guard against the pos-
sibility that oil and non-oil counties might have been on different trends even
in the absence of oil discoveries. It is a very demanding empirical exercise, as it
involves deriving identification only from the time variation in oil field discov-
eries, as well as dropping more than three quarters of our observations. We do
it for our key variables of interest- employment and labour force participation
rates as well as the sectoral composition of the labour force and occupational
earnings scores by gender, the female population share and the share of women
aged 25 and below who are married. Results are shown in tables 2.20 and 2.21.
Overall, the findings of this robustness test provide a convincing validation of
our previous results: having a discovered oil field is found to be associated with
a reallocation of men from agriculture into oil and (to a lesser extent) manu-
facturing, while women increasingly work in service sector jobs. Especially men
experience an increase in occupational earnings scores, which can help to explain
the increase in young women’s marriage propensity. Overall, both male and fe-
male labour force participation rates stay unchanged. Generally, most results
from our baseline specification survive unqualified, and the point estimates of
the coefficients obtained by estimating over this limited sample are very similar
to those obtained in the previous section. The two exceptions are the sex ratio,
where we here find a small decrease in the female population share of less than
one percentage point, and the female occupational earnings scores, which in this
sample display a positive evolution. However, the point estimate for women is
substantially below the one of males, indicating that our conclusion of an in-
creased gender pay gap remains the same.
Another concern with our findings is the possibility of spatial spillovers. While
workforces should be less mobile in our period of analysis than nowadays, there
is still a possibility that workers commute short distances and that thus coun-
ties close to oil counties also get partially treated. In addition, there might be
smaller oil fields that are not in our dataset close to larger ones, such that again
we would observe some spatial spillovers, a problem already noted by Michaels
(2011). To address this concern of spatial spillovers, we repeat our basic speci-
fication from section 2.4, but drop all county x year cells pertaining to counties
which border a county with a discovered oil field, but have not (yet) discovered
an oil field of their own in that given year. The results of this exercise are
shown in tables 2.22 and 2.23. Again, our results from before are confirmed; if
anything, we find slightly larger point estimates, consistent with minor spatial
spillovers. Our basic conclusions remain the same as before: Oil does not change
female labour force participation, but relatively more women move from agri-
culture into services, and younger women are more likely to get married. Men,
on the other hand, experience substantial increases in earnings that are due to
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sectoral reallocation from agriculture to oil mining and manufacturing.
So far, all of our robustness checks have dealt with our panel difference-in-
differences specification. In table 2.24, we perform two robustness checks for
the 1940 cross-sectional specification which we had to employ for our wage re-
gressions. The first (columns 1 and 3) involves adding an additional dummy
for “having an undiscovered oil field”to our specification. With this we are
testing whether oil-rich counties in general appear to be different in the 1940
cross-section. Naturally, oil that is not yet discovered should not affect eco-
nomic outcomes, so if we observe any sizeable coefficients on this dummy, we
would have to be worried. Fortunately for the credibility of our cross-sectional
results, this is not the case: including a dummy for an undiscovered oil field
barely changes the point estimate on our variable of interest, and the estimated
coefficient for undiscovered oil fields is usually insignificant, albeit in the case of
women (column 3) not very precisely estimated. In columns 2 and 4, we per-
form a placebo test: We drop all counties that had discovered oil fields in 1940
and compare the remaining oil-rich counties (whose oil wealth had not yet been
discovered) to counties without oil. Again, if our identifying assumptions are
valid, we would expect to see no effect of the undiscovered oil field dummy, and
again this is the case, which provides further reassurance for our cross-sectional
estimates.
Finally, one potential worry is that the timing of earlier oil discoveries might be
spuriously correlated with the arrival of the boll weevil. This beetle decimated
the South’s cotton harvests in the late 19th and early 20th century, which has
been shown to have had severe effects on local economies (Lange, Olmstead and
Rhode, 2009), including a reduction of female labour force participation (Ager,
Brueckner and Herz forthcoming). If the arrival or prevalence of the weevil were
correlated with oil wealth or oil discoveries, this could therefore be cause for
concern with our results. To examine this potential concern, we follow Pei, Pis-
chke and Schwandt (2017), who suggest that instead of including an indicator
for weevil presence as control in each of our regressions, an easier and more pow-
erful test can be obtained by putting the weevil’s presence on the left hand side
of or our regression equation. We do so in table 2.25, using county-level data on
the weevil’s first arrival from Lange, Olmstead and Rhode (2009). We focus on
1900-1930, since the weevil plague subsided after that, and employ three differ-
ent specifications. In column 1, we use our simple cross-sectional specification
to analyse whether oil wealth is correlated with whether the weevil ever reached
a given county at all. As can be seen, this is not the case. In columns 2 and
3, we instead use our standard difference-in-differences framework to analyse
whether oil discoveries are associated with the arrival of the weevil. In column
2, we code the left hand side variable as 1 if the weevil has already reached the
86
county and 0 if not, and similarly for oil discoveries on the right hand side. In
column 3 instead, both our left hand and main right hand side variable are 1
if there has been a weevil arrival (or oil discovery) within the last 10 years. In
both cases, we do not find a statistically significant effect of oil discoveries on
weevil presence. The economic shocks due to the weevil plague are therefore no
confounder for our analysis.
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(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Share of the female LF employed in
Personal serv. and Finance, Business, and Professional serv.
entertainment repair serv.
Discovered Oil Field 0.045 0.004 0.003
(0.027) (0.003) (0.006)
Mean Dep Var 0.331 0.024 0.125
Number of observations 3,475, number of clusters 774. Standard errors, clustered
at the county level, in parentheses. Standard errors and p-values are based on bias
adjusted standard errors and effective degrees of freedom corrections as in Young
(2016)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.12: Dissecting the female service sector increase
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Labour Force Participation Rate Occ. earnings score Urban Pop Share
Female Male Female Male
Oil Rich 0.001 0.004 -1.674* -1.569 -0.071
(0.016) (0.005) (0.924) (2.444) (0.067)
Observations 587 588 549 588 588
Mean Dep Var 0.213 0.930 15.121 27.509 0.233
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES Share of the Labour Force employed in ln(pop)
Oil mining Manufacturing Services Agriculture
Oil Rich -0.000 0.004 -0.008 0.026 -0.023
(0.000) (0.008) (0.021) (0.055) (0.102)
Observations 588 588 588 588 588
Mean Dep Var 0.000 0.051 0.128 0.63
Standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Standard errors and
p-values are based on bias adjusted standard errors and effective degrees of freedom
corrections as in Young (2016)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.13: Balancing checks in 1900
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Female pop share LF Part Rate Employment Rate Average occ.
earnings score
-30 to -21 0.000 0.009 0.004 0.360
(0.003) (0.006) (0.008) (0.760)
-20 to -11 -0.000 0.012* 0.018 -0.759
(0.004) (0.007) (0.011) (0.809)
-10 to -1 0.004 0.017* 0.031*** -1.158
(0.004) (0.009) (0.011) (0.950)
0 to 10 -0.005 0.020* 0.018 3.055***
(0.005) (0.010) (0.011) (1.058)
11 to 20 0.005 0.026** 0.014 4.198***
(0.006) (0.013) (0.012) (1.507)
20+ 0.008 0.005 0.019 3.717**
(0.008) (0.034) (0.013) (1.512)
Sample All Men Male LF Male LF
Observations 3,594 3,594 2,231 3,577
Number of clusters 774. Standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses.
Standard errors and p-values are based on bias adjusted standard errors and effective
degrees of freedom corrections as in Young (2016)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.14: Leads and lags analysis, part 1
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Share of Male LF employed in
Oil Mining Manufacturing Services Agriculture
-30 to -21 0.003 0.007 0.006 0.006
(0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.013)
-20 to -11 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 0.026*
(0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.015)
-10 to -1 -0.006 0.004 -0.002 0.039**
(0.005) (0.012) (0.005) (0.019)
0 to 10 0.061*** 0.008 0.001 -0.049**
(0.010) (0.011) (0.005) (0.021)
11 to 20 0.064*** 0.021* 0.008 -0.077***
(0.090) (0.012) (0.006) (0.023)
20+ 0.043*** 0.033** 0.012 -0.069**
(0.090) (0.014) (0.090) (0.028)
Number of observations 3,577, number of clusters 774. Standard errors,
clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Standard errors and p-
values are based on bias adjusted standard errors and effective degrees of
freedom corrections as in Young (2016)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.15: Leads and lags analysis, part 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES LF Part Rate Share Married Employment Rate Average occ.
-30 to -21 -0.016 0.006 0.006 0.361
(0.018) (0.011) (0.010) (0.664)
-20 to -11 -0.008 0.011 -0.010 0.448
(0.025) (0.013) (0.015) (0.730)
-10 to -1 -0.005 0.008 0.015 0.281
(0.025) (0.015) (0.015) (0.868)
0 to 10 -0.015 0.026* 0.000 1.073
(0.026) (0.015) (0.016) (0.843)
11 to 20 -0.005 0.019 -0.008 0.745
(0.028) (0.017) (0.016) (1.058)
20+ 0.001 0.024 0.010 -0.295
(0.033) (0.024) (0.018) (1.147)
Sample All Women Women ≤ 25 Female LF Female LF
Observations 3,590 3,573 2,171 3,478
Number of clusters 774. Standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses.
Standard errors and p-values are based on bias adjusted standard errors and effective
degrees of freedom corrections as in Young (2016)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.16: Leads and lags analysis, part 3
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Share of Female LF employed in
Oil Mining Manufacturing Services Agriculture
-30 to -21 -0.000 0.001 -0.029 0.023
(0.000) (0.006) (0.055) (0.049)
-20 to -11 -0.000 -0.006 -0.047 0.048
(0.000) (0.007) (0.079) (0.072)
-10 to -1 -0.000 0.001 -0.043 0.035
(0.000) (0.008) (0.072) (0.065)
0 to 10 0.001*** -0.008 -0.004 -0.015
(0.000) (0.008) (0.078) (0.071)
11 to 20 0.001 -0.013 0.032 -0.045
(0.001) (0.010) (0.085) (0.079)
20+ 0.004*** -0.019 -0.006 0.001
(0.001) (0.013) (0.101) (0.093)
Number of observations 3,475, number of clusters 774. Standard errors,
clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Standard errors and p-
values are based on bias adjusted standard errors and effective degrees of
freedom corrections as in Young (2016)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.17: Leads and lags analysis, part 4
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Female pop share LF Part Rate Employment Rate Average occ.
earnings score
Disc Oil Field -0.013*** 0.014 -0.007 5.048***
(0.004) (0.011) (0.010) (0.953)
Sample All Men Male LF Male LF
Clusters 774 774 774 774
Observations 3,594 3,594 2,231 3,577
(5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Share of Male LF employed in
Oil Mining Manufacturing Services Agriculture
Disc Oil Field 0.074*** 0.001 0.002 -0.096***
(0.015) (0.006) (0.005) (0.021)
Number of observations 3,577, number of clusters 774. Standard errors, clustered
at the county level, in parentheses. Standard errors and p-values are based on bias
adjusted standard errors and effective degrees of freedom corrections as in Young
(2016)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.18: Results when including county-specific linear time trends, part 1
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES LF Part Rate Share Married Employment Rate Average occ.
earnings score
Disc Oil Field -0.018 0.029* 0.002 1.265
(0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.908)
Sample All Women Women ≤ 25 Female LF Female LF
Observations 3,590 3,573 2,171 3,478
Clusters 774 774 774 774
(5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Share of Female LF employed in
Oil Mining Manufacturing Services Agriculture
Disc Oil Field 0.001 0.007 0.043* -0.072**
(0.000) (0.005) (0.023) (0.027)
Observations 3,475 3,475 3,475 3,475
Clusters 774 774 774 774
Number of observations 3,475, number of clusters 774. Standard errors, clustered
at the county level, in parentheses. Standard errors and p-values are based on bias
adjusted standard errors and effective degrees of freedom corrections as in Young
(2016)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.19: Results when including county-specific linear time trends, part 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Female pop share LF Part Rate Employment Rate Average occ.
earnings score
Disc Oil Field -0.007** -0.001 -0.016** 3.523***
(0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.941)
Sample All Men Male LF Male LF
Observations 771 771 487 766
Clusters 171 171 171 171
(5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Share of Male LF employed in
Oil Mining Manufacturing Services Agriculture
Disc Oil Field 0.063*** 0.005 0.003 -0.074***
(0.010) (0.005) (0.004) (0.017)
Number of observations 766, number of clusters 171. Standard errors, clustered at the
county level, in parentheses. Standard errors and p-values are based on bias adjusted
standard errors and effective degrees of freedom corrections as in Young (2016)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.20: Results when dropping all counties without an oil deposit, part 1
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES LF Part Rate Share Married Employment Rate Average occ.
earnings score
Disc Oil Field -0.005 0.014 -0.009 1.148*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.638)
Sample All Women Women ≤ 25 Female LF Female LF
Observations 770 765 464 733
Clusters 171 171 171 171
(5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Share of Female LF employed in
Oil Mining Manufacturing Services Agriculture
Disc Oil Field 0.000 -0.005 0.036 -0.050
(0.001) (0.005) (0.028) (0.031)
Number of observations 733, number of clusters 171. Standard errors, clustered at the
county level, in parentheses. Standard errors and p-values are based on bias adjusted
standard errors and effective degrees of freedom corrections as in Young (2016)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.21: Results when dropping all counties without an oil deposit, part 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Female pop share LF Part Rate Employment Rate Average occ.
earnings score
Disc Oil Field -0.006 0.013* -0.001 4.277***
(0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (1.042)
Sample All Men Male LF Male LF
Observations 3,027 3,027 1,775 3,015
Clusters 741 741 722 741
(5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Share of Male LF employed in
Oil Mining Manufacturing Services Agriculture
Disc Oil Field 0.071*** 0.010** 0.002 -0.086***
(0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.018)
Number of observations 3,015, number of clusters 741. Standard errors, clustered
at the county level, in parentheses. Standard errors and p-values are based on bias
adjusted standard errors and effective degrees of freedom corrections as in Young
(2016)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.22: Results when excluding neighbouring counties without discovered
oil wealth, part 1
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES LF Part Rate Share Married Employment Rate Average occ.
earnings score
Disc Oil Field -0.006 0.022** 0.004 0.424
(0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.757)
Sample All Women Women ≤ 25 Female LF Female LF
Observations 3,023 3,007 1,717 2,918
Clusters 741 740 710 738
(5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Share of Female LF employed in
Oil Mining Manufacturing Services Agriculture
Disc Oil Field 0.001*** -0.010* 0.052* -0.062**
(0.000) (0.006) (0.027) (0.028)
Number of observations 2,915, number of clusters 738. Standard errors, clustered
at the county level, in parentheses. Standard errors and p-values are based on bias
adjusted standard errors and effective degrees of freedom corrections as in Young
(2016)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.23: Results when excluding neighbouring counties without discovered
oil wealth, part 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Average ln(annual wage income)
Discovered Oil Field 0.258*** 0.038
(0.083) (0.072)
Not Yet Discovered -0.042 -0.034 -0.072 -0.054
(0.102) (0.104) (0.090) (0.0903)
Counties All Omit disc oil fields All Omit disc oil fields
Sample Male LF Male LF Female LF Female LF
Observations 758 643 758 643
Standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Standard errors and
p-values are based on bias adjusted standard errors and effective degrees of freedom
corrections as in Young (2016)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.24: Robustness checks 1940 cross section
95
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Weevil ever present Weevil already present Weevil arrived
within the last 10 yrs
Oil rich -0.029
(0.022)
Disc Oil Field -0.039
(0.036)
Discovery within 0.055
the last 10 yrs (0.043)
Sample Cross-section Panel 1900-1930 Panel 1900-1930
Observations 758 2,820 2,820
Clusters 758 773 773
Standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Standard errors and
p-values are based on bias adjusted standard errors and effective degrees of freedom
corrections as in Young (2016)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 2.10: Leads and lags for the LF share employed in services
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Chapter 3
Voting Behaviour and Public
Employment in Nazi Germany1
3.1 Introduction
To what extent can governments use their economic means to favour their sup-
porters or to punish their adversaries? While a large body of empirical literature
has successfully established the economic value of political connections for firms,
the evidence for voters or more aggregated units of observation is much more
scarce. In this paper, I try to fill this gap by analysing whether cities benefit
from having voted for the “right”, i.e. the winning political party. In particular,
the meteoric rise of the German National Socialist party in the 1930s, its seizure
of power in 1933 and the subsequently enacted racial and political discrimina-
tion, programmes of large-scale public investment, and expansion of the armed
forces create a quasi-experimental situation that allows to identify the causal
effect of a city’s vote share on subsequent public employment. Between 1928
and 1933, the Nazi party grew from being one of many small and unimportant
radical parties to representing the largest fraction in the parliament, making
Adolf Hitler chancellor in January 1933 and, together with a coalition partner,
achieving a parliamentary majority in March of the same year. In the subsequent
years, the Nazi government increased the armed forces and enacted several laws
that prevented Jews and political opponents from holding public office. These
policy measures together with the extremely rapid rise of the National Socialists
create a unique possibility to estimate whether Hitler’s government used public
employment also in a way that favoured those cities that had helped him come
1I thank Steve Pischke, Guy Michaels, Michel Azulai, Sascha Becker, Florian Blum, Abel
Brodeur, Robin Burgess, Marta De Philippis, Georg Graetz, Kilian Huber, Yu-Hsiang Lei, An-
drei Potlogea, Robin Scha¨dler, Pedro Souza, Daniel Sturm, Nico Voigtla¨nder, several anony-
mous referees, and seminar participants at the LSE Labour Work in Progress Seminar for
their helpful comments and suggestions. I also thank Michael Beaney from the LSE Language
centre for proofreading an earlier version of this chapter.
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to power.
On a firm-level, the value of political connections has been demonstrated con-
vincingly by several papers. Fisman (2001) shows that rumours about the health
of the Philippine dictator Suharto had a particularly strong influence on the
share prices of firms that were politically connected to Suharto’s regime. Sim-
ilar positive effects of being politically connected have been found by Johnson
and Mitton (2003) for Malaysia, Khwaja and Mian (2005) for Pakistan and
Jayachandran (2006) for the United States of America. Other studies compare
companies across countries: Faccio et al. (2006) show that around the globe,
politically connected firms are more likely to be bailed out, while Faccio (2006)
finds that political connections occur particularly often both in more corrupt
and in more transparent countries. Of particular relevance for this paper is the
study by Ferguson and Voth (2008), who show that firms that had (directly
or through their executives) supported the German National Socialists prior to
their seizure of power experienced particularly high stock market returns during
the first two months of the Nazi regime: between January and March 1933,
connected firms outperformed non-connected ones by between 5 and 8%.
The potential benefits of political connections for individual voters have been
analysed less, particularly due to data restrictions: while political connections of
firms’ executives and firms’ donations are often public, the average voter’s polit-
ical affiliations and convictions are mostly neither known to the government nor
to the researcher, and hence cannot be analysed. One notable exception is the
recent study by Hsieh et al. (2011), who document evidence that Venezuelan
voters who had signed a petition calling for a referendum against Hugo Chavez
were subsequently subject to drops in both earnings and employment. The pecu-
liarities of this referendum, where signers had to sign not only with their name,
but were also required to provide their address and birth date, allowed Hsieh et
al. to identify the signers and to match them with data from the Venezuelan
Household Survey. However, such detailed data on political affiliations are usu-
ally not available. One way out is to look at more aggregated units of observation
such as cities, regions or electoral districts. Anderson and Tollison (1991), for ex-
ample, present empirical evidence that US states with “influential”congressmen
and senators (as measured by their tenure and their committee memberships)
received more public funds during the New Deal era. Levitt and Snyder (1995)
analyse the spending patterns of Federal programmes on a congressional district
level and find that the Democratic majorities in the late 1970s have favoured
districts with higher Democratic vote shares. Hodler and Raschky (2014) look
at regions and show that in autocratic regimes, the birth regions of political
leaders benefit more from foreign aid than others. Other evidence for regional
favouritism in autocratic regimes is presented by Do et al. (forthcoming).
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In this paper, I use cities as a “middle ground”between individual outcomes and
larger units of aggregation. My paper adds to the existing literature by using a
novel dataset to analyse whether cities with higher vote shares for the German
National Socialists in 1933 experienced higher levels of public employment be-
tween then and 1939.
A closely related paper to mine is the contemporaneous study by Voigtla¨nder
and Voth (2016) who analyse the effect of public spending - in particular high-
way construction during the early years of the Nazi regime - on support for
the NSDAP. They find that highway construction increased support for the
NSDAP through signalling government “competence”. Methodologically, by ex-
amining the opposing direction of causality, my paper complements the study
by Voigtla¨nder and Voth (2016). Their finding of a causal effect of public spend-
ing on NSDAP support also suggests a potential issue of reverse causality in a
simple regression of public spending on NSDAP vote shares. This is one reason
why I employ an instrumental variables strategy. In addition to this potential
problem of reverse causality, several previous studies (most recently King et al.
2008) have highlighted the importance of the post-1929 economic crisis for the
NSDAP’s electoral results. While I control for city fixed effects and time-varying
effects of several control variables, differential unobserved impacts of the eco-
nomic crisis would likely lead to differences in public employment and could also
be correlated with the 1933 Nazi vote share. In order to address both concerns, I
employ a standard two-stage least squares estimation. As instrumental variable,
I use the vote share of the “Economic Association”in 1912, a party alliance that
tried to attract similar voters to the NSDAP later on.
I find that cities with higher NSDAP vote shares indeed had higher relative
growth of public employment after 1933: for every additional percentage point in
the vote share, the number of public employment positions increased by around
2.5 percent. When measured relative to the total population, a one standard-
deviation increase in the 1933 vote share led to an increase in the share of public
employment of 45% of a standard deviation in the year 1925. The findings are
robust to including or excluding cities that underwent substantial changes in
their population and territory during the period of observation, to using the
1930 or 1932 elections instead of the 1933 one as explanatory variable, and
to employing different definitions of “public employment”as outcome variables.
Taken all together, my findings indicate a significant positive effect of having
voted for the National Socialists for cities, thus providing evidence that the Nazis
did indeed use economic policy and public employment policies to reward more
loyal cities or punish disloyal ones. In a broader context, this is further evidence
that governments can have and use the ability to reward their voters or punish
their adversaries, although some caveats apply to the representativeness of Nazi
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Germany.
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows: section 3.2 presents
the historical background of Hitler’s rise to power and the National Socialist eco-
nomic policy between 1933 and 1939, while section 3.3 discusses the data and
identification strategy used in the analysis. The results and robustness checks
are presented in section 3.4, and section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Historical Background
In the early 1930’s, Hitler’s National Socialist German Workers’ Party (Nation-
alsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, NSDAP) experienced a meteoric rise
from being one of many small parties in Weimar Germany to the strongest fac-
tion in the national parliament, the Reichstag. After an unsuccessful putsch
in Bavaria in 1923, the party was banned and could only run for the national
election in May 1924 by being the junior partner in an alliance with the German
Vo¨lkisch Freedom Party (Deutschvo¨lkische Freiheitspartei), another nationalist
and anti-Semitic party in Weimar Germany. The two parties received 6.5% of
the votes and also ran together in the December 1924 election, albeit under
the new name of National Socialist Freedom Movement (Nationalsozialistische
Freiheitsbewegung). This time, the alliance only achieved a vote share of 3%.
Soon afterwards, the two parties separated and the NSDAP was re-formed in
1925. In 1928, it ran for the first time under this name at a national election,
winning only 2.6% of the votes and 12 seats in the parliament. (Falter 1991,
Chapter 2.1 and 2.2, Falter, Lindenberger, and Schumann 1986, Chapter 1.3) In
the following years, the NSDAP changed its appearance and, benefiting from the
deep recession that befell Germany in the wake of “Black Friday”(1929), grew
stronger and stronger.2 In September 1930, the National Socialists gained 18.3%
of all votes, a share that they managed to even double two years later, when
they came out of the July 1932 election with 37.4%, making them the strongest
faction in the Reichstag. They and the Communists held more than half of
all seats in the Reichstag, rendering it impossible to form a coalition of demo-
cratic parties with a parliamentary majority. As a result, the chancellors had
to rely more and more on the authority and legislative powers of the president
via so-called “emergency decrees”. After the demise of 3 chancellors (Heinrich
Bru¨ning, Franz von Papen and Kurt von Schleicher) within half a year, the as-
sociates of President Hindenburg managed to convince him to appoint Hitler to
head the government, which happened on January 30, 1933. (Kolb 2005, Part
C) The new chancellor was still far from being a dictator. At the time of his
appointment, Hitler, like his predecessors von Papen and von Schleicher, had
2For a recent review of key aspects of Germany’s economy at the time of the crisis, see
Ritschl (2013).
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no parliamentary majority. However, Hindenburg soon dissolved the Reichstag,
and in the elections that followed in March, the NSDAP won 43.9% of the votes.
Together with its coalition partner, the national conservative German National
People’s Party (Deutschnationale Volkspartei, DNVP), the National Socialists
now also had a majority in the parliament. Subsequently, the Enabling Act
(Erma¨chtigungsgesetz ) was passed, giving legislative powers to the executive
branch of the government. In the following months, Hitler used these powers to
put the German states under the rule of centrally appointed “Commissars”(a
process commonly known as “coordination”or Gleichschaltung), to ban trade
unions and to pressure all other parties until they dissolved. By July 1933, the
NSDAP was the only remaining party in Germany and with the death of Presi-
dent Hindenburg in 1934, the last remaining non-Nazi source of power died, and
Hitler and his party had now control over every aspect of government. (Kershaw
1999, ch. 10-12)
Not surprisingly, economic policy was an important item on the agenda of the
newly-appointed chancellor. Already in May 1932, the NSDAP had demanded
an “immediate economic programme”(Wirtschaftliches Sofortprogramm) in or-
der to address the issue of unemployment. In particular, the party advocated
increasing employment through large public investments that were, at least in
parts, supposed to be financed through debt. (Barkai 1988, p.42) In the follow-
ing years massive military and non-military investment ensued. Full employ-
ment was achieved by 1936, a success that the general public attributed largely
to Hitler. (Abelshauser 1998) However, modern econometric analyses suggest
Germany’s economic upswing was not caused by Hitler’s policies, but largely due
to market forces and an international economic recovery that would have bene-
fited the country also in the absence of a Nazi government. Public expenditure
grew in the process of rearmament, but it often crowded out private demand.
(Ritschl 2002, 2003, Weder 2006)
During the same time, the Nazis also enacted several important policies in or-
der to redesign the public sector according to their ideas. In 1933, the Law for
the restoration of the professional civil service (Gesetz zur Wiederhestellung des
Berufsbeamtentums) was passed. It allowed the dismissal of “non-Aryan”or po-
litically “unreliable”civil servants.3 A similar law was enacted for lawyers, and
as far as “non-Aryan”professionals were concerned, both laws were made stricter
with a reform of the Citizenship Act in 1935 that precluded Jews from holding
public office. While these laws, ceteris paribus, led to a decrease in public em-
ployment, employment in the armed forces increased. Within two and a half
years, the strength of the German army increased fourfold to around 400,000
men in autumn 1935. While part of this had been achieved by integrating police
3See Waldinger (2010, 2012) for some economic consequences of such dismissals.
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units into the armed forces, the increase in size between 1933 and 1934 was to
a large extent due to volunteers. The officer corps alone increased between Oc-
tober 1933 and October 1935 by nearly 3,000 men. With the re-introduction of
national conscription in October 1935, the expansion of the army was advanced
further. The navy and the air force, a completely new formation, experienced
similar increases. (Deist 2003, ch. II) Obviously, this increased military force
also required new installations. In this respect, it is noteworthy that the city
of Coburg, a small town in Northern Bavaria with very high vote shares for the
Hitler movement4 that was labelled “the first Nazi town”in a book by Hayward
and Morris (1988), experienced a substantial amount of public construction after
the Nazi’s seizure of power. In 1934, several new military barracks were built,
followed by a regional centre for the Hitler Youth in 1937. Other projects, such
as a new monument to remember soldiers killed in action or a “thingstead”, were
planned, but never realised. (No¨th 2006)
In addition, the new Nazi government also greatly changed the composition of
public employees. The dismissal of Jewish or politically opposing civil servants
is one prominent example. Women were also affected by this. While it is a myth
that the Nazis drove women out of the labour force en masse, they did take
action against women in the upper ranks of civil and professional service jobs.
Women were excluded, for example, from the judiciary, the bar, and (with few
exceptions) the highest levels of public service jobs. At the same time, however,
the number of women working in low-level office jobs increased. (Stephenson
2001, ch. 3)
Finally, and particularly importantly for this study, it was Hitler’s explicit de-
sire that deserving party veterans would be rewarded for their loyalty by giving
them attractive positions in the local administration and related branches. In
Heilbronn, for example, several men were hired by the municipal administra-
tion solely based on account of their long-lasting party membership, and one
position seems to have been created exclusively for one such party stalwart. An-
other applicant was told by the NSDAP district head that “...as an old party
member, you have a salary that is not commensurate with your contribution
in establishing the 3rd Reich. I will immediately look for a suitable position
for you.”(Schlo¨sser 2003) The importance of party affiliation and patronage in
the distribution of public sector jobs can also be seen in the fact that civil ser-
vants and teachers are particularly prevalent among the “March Converts”, i.e.
among those that joined the Nazi party after it had already come to power.
Falter (2013) notes that the number of civil servants in the party more than
quadrupled in 1933 and suspects that many of these entries were motivated by
4In 1933, for example, the NSDAP received 55.8%, compared to the overall national result
of 43.9%.
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the desire to secure or advance public sector careers.5
It is easily conceivable that giving local administration jobs to party veterans
and removing political opponents from office would have increased the number
of public employment jobs in NSDAP strongholds (where there presumably were
more long-standing party members) relative to cities whose electorate had with-
stood the new regime (where there were more opponents and thus more people
that potentially could be dismissed). Local folklore gives an example for another
form of (presumed) punishment of opposing cities. According to popular belief,
the independent city of Lu¨beck6 lost its independence due to its opposition to
Hitler. Allegedly, the town council in 1932 had prevented Hitler from speaking
within the city’s borders, and Hitler took revenge in 1937 by revoking the city’s
independent status and making it part of Schleswig-Holstein. While the overall
credibility of this story is rather dubious (see Pressemitteilung der Stadt Lu¨beck
2012), its existence alone suggests that people believed that Hitler’s policy was
driven by such thoughts.
Taken together, the clearly discriminating purpose of the Nazis’ public employ-
ment laws and the anecdotal evidence above suggests that the Nazis, once in
power, might have used public employment and the appointments of public ser-
vants to reward cities and regions that had been loyal to them and to punish
those that had been reluctant until the very last. If this were the case, one
would expect to find a relative increase in public employment for cities with
high NSDAP vote shares. Such a rewarding behaviour could be due to political
patronage, which has been shown to be operational in other settings as well (e.g.
Xu 2017 for the case of the British Empire, Gagliarducci and Manacorda 2016
for nepotism in modern Italy). Hitler’s desire to give public sector jobs to long-
standing party members and similar decrees in road construction (Silverman
1998, p.188) indicate that this was also a motive in Nazi Germany. Ideological
considerations also might have played a role. Erdmann (1969, p.115ff.) points
out that the Nazis tried to fabricate the illusion of a long-standing National
socialist tradition, creating a propagandistic cult around the early days of the
party and the events that the movement’s “old guard”had lived through. Loyal
supporters were given honorary medals like the “blood medal”(Blutorden; see
Schmitz-Berning 1998, p.117f.) for participants of Hitler’s putsch in 1923, and
cities would be given (or adopt with official consent) honorary titles such as
“the capital of the movement”(Munich, see Schmitz-Berning 1998, p.296f.) or
5According to Schoenbaum (1966/1997, ch. 7), the traditional central bureaucracy proved
somewhat resilient to party patronage, with obvious exceptions such as the ministries headed
by Goebbels and Go¨ring. However, he also notes that the local level saw a closer union of
state administration and party: In 1935, for example, around 20% of all State and local offices
were occupied by party members that had joined the party before 1933. Among city offices,
this share even amounted to 47%.
6Three La¨nder in the Weimar Republic were merely city-states: Bremen, Hamburg and
Lu¨beck, all of them former Hansa cities.
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“First National Socialist town in Germany”(Coburg, see Sandner 2000, p.157).
Celebrating long-standing loyalty and National Socialist tradition thus appears
frequently in Nazi propaganda. Finally, rewarding core voters as opposed to
marginal ones can be utility-maximizing for candidates in some models of vot-
ing games, for example when candidates need loyal “activists”(Lindbeck and
Weibull 1987) or if core voters are more responsive and less risky investments
than swing ones (Cox and McCubbins 1986). The evidence presented by Hsieh
et al. (2011), Hodler and Raschky (2014) and Do et al. (forthcoming) also
highlights the importance of political and regional favouritism in distributional
politics, particularly in autocratic regimes and countries with worse institutions.7
However, it should be noted that a priori, it is also conceivable that public spend-
ing could be particularly increased in more disloyal regions in order to “buy sup-
port”from former adversaries or marginal voters and thus stabilise the regime
in its early days. An emerging body of economic literature has shown that local
government spending has a positive causal effect on support for the government
(see for example Manacorda, Miguel, and Vigorito 2011 and Litschig and Mor-
rison 2012). Particularly important for the context of my study, Voigtla¨nder
and Voth (2016) find that areas traversed by newly-built motorways reduced
their opposition to the Nazi regime between 1933 and 1934. If the NSDAP were
distributing public funds and jobs in a way to broaden its support base, one
would expect to find a relative decrease in public employment for cities with
high NSDAP vote shares, or a relative increase for cities with low NSDAP vote
shares.
3.3 Empirical Strategy
3.3.1 Data and Summary Statistics
In order to evaluate whether the Nazis allocated more public sector jobs to cities
with high Nazi vote shares, I collected data on the number and fraction of people
working in such jobs from the German Censuses of Occupation. Administered
in 1925, 1933, and 1939, they contain fairly detailed data about the number
of people working in different occupations and types of jobs. Unfortunately,
the definitions of jobs and occupations and the method of counting them vary
somewhat over time. The 1939 census, for example, reports separate numbers for
people working in the public administration and armed forces, in teaching occu-
pations, church-related occupations, in legal or economic counselling, and in the
entertainment industry. The 1925 census, on the other hand, groups all of those
occupations together, while the 1933 census has a slightly finer categorisation
7Related to this literature, but of less importance for the setting I study, Burgess et al.
(2015) document the role of ethnic favouritism in autocratic regimes.
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that at least separates the entertainment industry from administration, armed
forces, church, and teaching. The ideal measure for the purpose of my analysis
would be the 1939 census category of people working in public administration
and the armed forces, but in order to obtain a consistent measure of “public
employment”for all three censuses, I am forced to group several occupations,
following the widest definition of the 1925 census. Because of this, my measure
of public employment does not only include occupations related to the admin-
istration and the armed forces, but also teaching professions, artists and other
entertainment professions, and church-related professions. For more details, I
refer to Appendix A. While this wider definition introduces additional noise
into my outcome variable, table 3.1 provides evidence that public administra-
tion proper is still the key driver of my measure. In Panel A, I use the narrower
1939 employment categories to decompose my aggregated 1939 measure. As can
be seen, in 1939 nearly two thirds of the people working in public employment
according to my wide definition worked in occupations belonging to public ad-
ministration and the armed forces. Typical occupations in this narrow category
in 1939 include officers, non-commissioned officers and long-serving privates in
the Wehrmacht, civil servants in various levels of public administration, and the
police (see Appendix A). In Panel B, I decompose my aggregated measure in
1933 into the two components that the 1933 census reports separately, and again
it can be seen that artists and entertainers are only a very small part.8 Finally,
and most importantly, Panel C shows that the variation that my aggregate mea-
sure uses is extremely similar to the variation in the narrower categories of public
employment according to the 1933 and 1939 definitions: In 1939, my aggregated
measure of public employment is extremely highly correlated with the number
of workers in the narrower 1939 census category of public administration, armed
forces, and judicature (both numbers normalised by city population) and even
more so with the somewhat broader 1933 category. Thus, while aggregating
several census categories introduces noise, the resulting variable still seems to
be driven to a very large extent by public administration proper. To address
further concerns, I will show that using only 1933 and 1939 and the narrower
definition of public employment according to the 1933 census leads to similar
results, as does using the number of civil servants (Beamte) across all sectors,
which is available for 1933 and 1939. I will also show cross-sectional results for
1939 only, using the narrower categories of the 1939 census.
In my baseline results, I will use the data from 1925, 1933 and 1939 and thus the
wider, but internally consistent public employment definition described above.
My main outcome variable is the log of the number of public administration
jobs (denoted logadmin). Since the German cities experienced considerable
8The fraction of the entertainment category in 1933 is much larger than in 1939 since the
1939 census groups some artists (e.g. actors) with teachers.
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population growth between 1925 and 1939, I also examine the ratio of public
administration jobs to total population (adminpop) and the ratio of public ad-
ministration jobs to the labour force (adminshare). While the latter measure
is robust to population changes, it is subject to another type of criticism: pub-
lic investment is likely to also have increased employment in other sectors (for
example due to increased spending on construction or military equipment). In
some cities, growth in these industries might have outpaced growth in public
employment, leading to a decrease in adminpop or adminshare, even though
the city might still have been benefiting from increased public employment. Put
differently, a relative increase in adminpop or adminshare might just mean that
the rest of the city’s economy was doing relatively poorly, thereby increasing
the share of public sector jobs. However, this is not a concern for logadmin,
which measures absolute, rather than relative, increases in public employment.
Both the absolute and the relative measures therefore have their respective ad-
vantages and disadvantages. In practice, both lead to similar results, as will be
shown below.
The advantage of using public sector employment, on the other hand, is that
most of the respective job categories are under the direct control of the central or
regional government (e.g. the number of officers and non-commissioned officers
in the armed forces) and less constrained by the pre-existing regional industry,
making them a more natural outcome measure that also has closer resemblance
to the individual-level outcome measure employed by, for example, Hsieh et al.
(2011). Data about this measure of public employment is available for nearly
300 cities; In particular, it is available for all cities with more than 20,000 in-
habitants and for some smaller ones that happened to be independent cities,
not belonging to any other administrative district (Kreisfreie Sta¨dte). Figure
3.1 gives an impression of the geographical distribution of public employment
growth over the sample period. Specifically, it maps quintiles of the difference
in logadmin between 1939 and 1925. As can be seen, the increases in public em-
ployment are spread relatively evenly across the country, with perhaps a small
concentration of strong increases in Central Germany.
The main explanatory variable of interest is the NSDAP vote share in the elec-
tion of March 1933. For this, I use the extensive database on social and electoral
variables of Weimar Germany compiled by Dirk Ha¨nisch and Ju¨rgen Falter. This
database also contains other socioeconomic variables that might be of interest
when analysing NSDAP vote shares. In particular, I include the Jewish share
of a city’s population in 1925 and the unemployment rate at the time of the
census in 1933.9 In addition to these socioeconomic variables, I also control for
9For Berlin, the data in the database are on the level of the city’s administrative districts.
I created an aggregated measure for Berlin by adding all districts and boroughs belonging to
it. In order to assess the validity of this aggregation, I compared the aggregated population to
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longitude, latitude, an indicator for being in the Rhineland and an indicator for
being a Nazi gau capital. These variables are included to control for potential
geographic determinants of public, especially military employment. According
to articles 42-44 of the Versailles treaty, Germany was not allowed to maintain
or construct fortifications or assembly troops on the left (Western) bank of the
Rhine or within 50km of its right (Eastern) bank. In 1936, Hitler violated this
stipulation by “reoccupying”the Rhineland with armed forces. If the Rhineland
is also correlated with voting behaviour, this could create a spurious correlation
between public employment and vote shares. To avoid this concern, I control for
a city lying in the “Rhineland”as defined by the Versailles Treaty. Similarly, the
territorial reorganisation of the former German states (La¨nder) into new units
called Gaue might also have led to differential changes in public employment in
the gau capital cities. If these capital cities had also been more likely to vote for
the Nazis, again a spurious correlation might arise. I therefore also include an
indicator for whether a city was a gau capital in 1938. (Das Buch der deutschen
Gaue 1938)
One potential problem is the question whether a city in 1925 was the same city
in 1933 and 1939, as many German cities underwent changes in their territory
and population, acquiring smaller surrounding towns and villages, merging with
other cities and the like. The prime example for this is Wilhelmshaven, which
more than quadrupled its population between 1933 and 1939 due to the acqui-
sition of the neighbouring city of Ru¨stringen. Similar mergers occurred in the
Ruhr area in 1928-1930. In order to avoid problems due to these territorial
restructurings, I excluded all those cities which experienced a substantial en-
largement in their population between 1910 and 1925, 1925 and 1933 or 1933
and 1939.10
In addition, I use voting data from the 1912 Reichstag election, for which I
have city-level data for all cities that had more than 10,000 inhabitants in 1910.
These were obtained from the official election results, published by the Statis-
tisches Reichsamt in 1913. Ultimately, I end up with a sample of 246 cities for
the three census years 1925, 1933 and 1939. The 1933 census was administered
on June 16, four and a half months after Hitler had become chancellor, but still
before his large-scale rearmament programmes had begun. I therefore usually
the one from the censuses in 1925 and 1933. Some differences exist, but they are well below
5%.
10In particular, for all cities whose population growth between 1910 and 1925 or 1925 and
1933 or 1933 and 1939 exceeded the mean growth rate by more than one standard deviation,
I analysed whether this large population growth was due to territorial gains or changes that
made the city grow by more than 25% alone. If this was the case, I excluded the city.
For details, see Appendix B. As an alternative measure, I simply excluded all cities whose
population growth between either 1910 and 1925, 1925 and 1933 or 1933 and 1939 exceeded
the mean growth by more than one standard deviation. The results are not sensitive to this,
as shown in section 3.4.2.
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treat it as a pre-NSDAP year but will show in section 3.4.2 that my results are
not driven by this.
Table 3.2 shows summary statistics of the explanatory and explained variables.
As can be seen, both the number and shares of public employees increased from
1925 to 1933, and then decreased again. The number of public employees is
higher in 1939 than in 1925, whereas their shares out of the total population
or labour force are lower. Given the large amount of public investment and
the substantial increase of the German armed forces between 1933 and 1939,
this might seem surprising. The most likely explanation is that public employ-
ment was driven up between 1925 and 1933 by general employment measures,
since it was already used as a means of fighting unemployment before the Nazis
came to power. Hitler’s predecessors von Papen and von Schleicher had already
made credit and funds for public employment measures available (Golecki 1986,
p.XXXIV-XL), and Blaich (1970) uses the example of Ludwigshafen to show
how cities themselves tried to fight the economic crisis by employing otherwise
unemployed workers in the construction of roads and sewerage systems. This
pattern of a strong increase as a reaction to the economic crisis makes it even
more difficult to uncover the causal effect of the NSDAP vote share using a stan-
dard OLS approach. Cities where more of these emergency projects were carried
out could experience an increase in public employment between 1929 and 1933,
followed by a decrease until 1939, when full employment had rendered these
emergency measures obsolete. As an alternative measure of public employment,
I also use the number of civil servants (Beamte) across all sectors. Data for this
variable exists for 1933 and 1939, and this measure (which should measure more
permanent jobs, but across a wider spectrum of sectors) shows a raw increase
even between 1933 and 1939. The mean NSDAP vote share in my sample of
cities is 41.8%, very close to the national average of 43.9%. The 1912 Economic
Association was a much smaller party. Across my whole sample, it averaged
1.5% of all votes, but with a sizeable dispersion- in 191 cities it did not receive
any votes, while four cities recorded EA vote shares greater than 20%.
3.3.2 The “Economic Association”and its voters
It is unlikely that a simple OLS regression, even after controlling for city fixed
effects and control variables, uncovers the causal effect of Nazi support on sub-
sequent public employment. The main endogeneity concern in such a regression
is due to the economic crisis in the years following 1929. For example, cities that
were more adversely affected by the crisis might have been differentially prone to
vote for the NSDAP in 1933 and they might also have been subsequently those
with different public employment shares. The NSDAP vote share would then be
correlated with the error term, and as a consequence, the estimate of β in such
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a regression will be inconsistent. Another potential problem could arise if public
employees themselves are more or less likely to vote for the NSDAP, creating
a reverse causality problem. Finally, Voigtla¨nder and Voth (2016) have shown
that local highway construction caused increased support for the NSDAP gov-
ernment, suggesting an additional reverse causality problem: Voting behaviour
might affect public spending, but public spending (or expected public spending)
might also affect voting behaviour.
In order to address these issues of potential endogeneity, I instrument the 1933
NSDAP vote share by the vote share of another party, the “Economic Associ-
ation”(Wirtschaftliche Vereinigung, henceforth EA) in the 1912 election. The
EA was an alliance of several smaller parties, most notably the “Christian-Social
Party”(Christlich-Soziale Partei) and the “German-Social Party”(Deutschsoziale
Partei). Most of these parties had conservative, nationalist platforms that de-
nounced both socialism and capitalism and tried to attract the votes of middle-
class voters particularly in Protestant and rural areas. In addition, both the
“Christian-Social Party”and the “German-Social Party”were openly anti-Semitic.
(Gra¨fe 2012, Bergmann 2012) The constituent parties of the EA were not strong,
and the alliance only obtained a few seats in the 1912 election. However, there
are strong parallels between the voters that the EA tried to attract, and the
voters that in 1933 voted for the NSDAP.
While the NSDAP had started out using anti-capitalist and socialist rhetoric
and catering to the preferences of blue-collar voters, it markedly changed its
approach as a result of its disappointing results in 1928. After 1928, the party
focussed more on rural areas and presented itself less as a radical force against
capitalism but rather as an ultra-nationalist, conservative party that advocated
law and order and the fight against the treaty of Versailles. The aim was to at-
tract more middle-class voters that heretofore had been repulsed by the party’s
more proletarian agenda. (Stachura 1978) This transformation was a successful
one; By 1933, the NSDAP had become, in the words of Ju¨rgen Falter (1991,
p.372), “a people’s party with a middle-class belly”(eine Volkspartei mit Mit-
telstandsbauch), in which the middle classes were the largest fraction. Thus,
after 1928, the NSDAP presented itself more as an ultra-nationalist party for
the middle-class, with a particular focus on rural and Protestant voters, trying
to attract the very voters that the EA before World War I had tried to attract,
as well as sharing its antisemitism.11 Because of this, the vote share of the EA
in the 1912 election and the NSDAP vote shares after 1928 are significantly pos-
itively related (this is also shown more formally in the first-stage results below),
and the former can be used as an instrument for the latter.
11After 1930, the NSDAP toned down its antisemitism considerably (see for example
Voigtla¨nder and Voth 2012). Still, it remained, in the words of Herbert (2000, p.18f.) “a
receptacle”for Anti-Jewish elements.
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The basic idea of this instrument is to use variation in NSDAP vote shares that
is not due to the economic crisis post 1929, but due to persistent political atti-
tudes of the local population such as antisemitism or extreme nationalism.12 In
order to be a valid instrument, the 1912 EA share has to satisfy the exclusion
restriction. In particular, the identifying assumption of this strategy is that the
1912 EA share does not have an effect on public employment outcomes later on,
other than through affecting support for the NSDAP. Several aspects make the
1912 EA vote share attractive in this respect. Firstly, dating more than 20 years
prior to the 1933 election, use of the 1912 EA share should not be susceptible
to reverse causation problems due to either public spending in the Weimar era,
expected public spending by a potential NSDAP government, or the voting be-
haviour of public employees. Secondly, using a vote result prior to the economic
crisis that started in 1929 allows to purge the 1933 vote shares of any factors
due to this crisis. One remaining concern, however, is that there might still be
unobserved factors that are correlated both with the 1912 EA share and with the
1933 NSDAP share and that might also be relevant for the evolution of public
employment over time. Cities with a high EA share might be fundamentally
different from those with low or no EA votes, and these differences might also
affect public employment patterns. The absence of such differences cannot be
tested or proved in a formal sense. However, I can at least examine whether
the instrument is correlated with the level and evolution of relevant variables
before 1933. In table 3.3, I run a cross-sectional regression for 1925, relating the
three public employment outcomes (the ratio of public employment to either
the population or the labour force, and the natural logarithm of public employ-
ment) to the 1912 EA vote share. Odd numbered columns show simple bivariate
correlations, even numbered ones include controls. Since I cannot include fixed
effects in the cross-sectional regressions, I include the natural logarithm of a
city’s population as an additional control to make sure I compare cities of simi-
lar size. On the other hand, I omit the 1933 unemployment rate from these 1925
regressions. There is clearly no relationship between public employment in 1925
and the 1912 EA vote share. Regardless of the in- or exclusion of controls, the
estimates are statistically insignificant and of small magnitudes. For example,
according to the specification with controls, increasing the 1912 EA vote share
by one full standard deviation would decrease the 1925 public administration
jobs to population ratio by only 2% of a standard deviation. While the absence
of a correlation between my instrument and the level of public employment in
1925 is reassuring, the identifying assumption of my strategy is not that the
12It is for this reason that I do not control for measures of long-term antisemitism that
Voigtla¨nder and Voth(2012) have constructed and used. If antisemitism led to increased votes
for the EA in 1912, this is “good”variation that I want to use in my estimates, and not remove
it by controlling for it.
113
1912 EA vote share is uncorrelated with the counterfactual level of public em-
ployment, but with its counterfactual changes. To assess this, In columns 1-3
of table 3.4 I show the results of a “placebo test”, examining whether cities
with different 1912 EA vote shares experienced different evolutions of public
employment between 1925 and 1933. Specifically, I regress my 3 outcomes on
the interaction between the 1912 EA share and an indicator for the year 1933,
an indicator for the year 1933, city fixed effects and my control variables, each
of which is interacted with an indicator for the year 1933. The results from
this exercise are encouraging. The 1912 EA vote share is never significantly
associated with the development of public employment between 1925 and 1933,
and the point estimates are small. For example, increasing the 1912 EA vote
share by one standard deviation is associated with an increase in administration
jobs as a ratio to total population of less than 1% of a standard deviation of
the 1925 administration job ratio. Even more encouraging, in columns 4-6, I
examine whether the 1912 EA share is correlated with the evolution of a city’s
economy as measured by the employment shares of three broadly defined sec-
tors and again do not find any relationship. Between 1925 and 1933, cities with
high or low 1912 EA vote shares did not experience different evolutions of em-
ployment in either agriculture, manufacturing or commerce. Finally, in columns
7-9, I look at the occupational class composition of a city’s economy, measured
by the respective shares of blue-collar employees, white-collar employees, and
self-employed. Again, there is no relationship between voting for the Economic
Association and changes in a city’s occupational class structure.13
Another important question is whether cities with different 1912 EA vote shares
were affected differentially by the economic crisis after 1929. I provide a coarse
assessment of this in table 3.5, where I correlate unemployment during the crisis
with voting for the EA in 1912. A slight negative bivariate correlation is present
between the unemployment rate in 1933 and the 1912 EA vote share, but this is
not robust to the inclusion of controls. In addition, when looking at changes in
unemployment by regressing the difference in the logs of unemployment in 1932
and 1930 on the 1912 vote share, I again do not detect any sizable or statistically
significant relationship.
The previous results strengthen the instrument’s case for exogeneity: The 1912
EA share is not correlated with the level or evolution of public employment be-
tween 1925 and 1933. It is also not associated with changes in the city’s sectoral
or occupational class structure. Finally, there is also no evidence that cities with
high EA vote shares experienced different evolutions of unemployment during
13For columns 4-9, it should be noted that the measures employed differ for the 1925 and
1933 census, as the 1925 census does not contain the number of people employed in a given sec-
tor, but the number of people employed in a given sector and their family members. However,
such uniform differences in measurement should be absorbed by the year fixed effect.
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the economic crisis in the early 1930’s. It is still possible that cities with high
and low EA votes differed along other dimensions, but the previous results seem
to indicate that such differences, if present, were not very consequential in eco-
nomic terms.
Based on this, I will employ a standard two-stage least square estimation pro-
cedure. The basic model of interest is
yit = β ·NSDAPshare33i ·D1939t+ τ ·D1939t+γ′ ·Xi ·D1939t+ ci+uit (3.1)
where yit represents the outcome, i.e. either logadmin , adminshare or adminpop,
in city i and year t, where t can be 1925, 1933 or 1939. NSDAPshare33i denotes
the NSDAP vote share in the 1933 election in city i and D1939t is a dummy
which is 1 for the year 1939. The city fixed effects ci will account for time-
invariant city characteristics that have a constant effect on public employment
over time. X is a vector of time-invariant city-level controls, discussed in the
previous section. To address the endogeneity problem arising from the likely
correlation between the 1933 NSDAP vote share and the economic crisis, the
variable of interest in equation 3.1 will be replaced by its prediction based on
the same controls and the 1912 EA share:
NSDAPshare33i·D1939t = η·EAshare12i·D1939t+θ·D1939t+χ′·Xi·D1939t+ξi+it
(3.2)
These predicted values will then be used as regressors of interest in the second
stage:
yit = β · ̂(NSDAPshare33i ·D1939t)+τ ·D1939t+γ′ ·Xi ·D1939t+ci+uit (3.3)
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Baseline estimates
Before turning to the instrumental variable estimation described in equations
3.2 and 3.3, table 3.6 presents the results of simple OLS estimations of equation
3.1. As discussed in the previous section, these regressions are based on the very
strong assumption that the 1933 NSDAP vote share is exogenous, i.e. uncorre-
lated with the error term. This is not very likely, with the economic crisis after
1929 being a prime confounder. An extensive body of literature has analysed the
reasons for the NSDAP’s rapid electoral successes, which socioeconomic groups
were more likely to vote for the National Socialists and why they did so. (see,
among others, Frey and Weck 1981, Falter et al. 1983, Falter et al. 1985, Falter
1991, van Riel and Schram 1993, Sto¨gbauer 2001, King et al. 2008, Adena et al.
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2015, Koenig 2015, Spenkuch and Tillmann 2016, Satyanath, Voigtla¨nder and
Voth forthcoming). While some disagreement about certain issues still exists,
there is a clear consensus that the economic crisis that affected Germany in the
early 1930’s was a prime driver of National Socialist vote shares. If cities that
were affected more by the crisis were differentially likely to vote for the NSDAP
in 1933, the OLS estimates here would be biased. The sign of the bias is unclear
a priori: if cities that were affected more by the crisis were more industrialised
and therefore more strongly connected to the communist parties, and public
employment increased in these cities as a response to the crisis, the resulting
OLS estimate could be downwardly biased. A similar negative bias could arise
if public servants were more likely to vote for the NSDAP and cities with more
public employment experienced slower growth in public employment (for exam-
ple since they were less affected by the crisis and thus did not need large-scale
investment programmes, or at least only smaller ones). On the other hand, if
cities that were affected more by the crisis turned towards the Nazis, it is easily
conceivable that an upward bias might arise.14 With these caveats in mind, the
estimates of β in table 3.6 are negative, but typically not very sizable and not
significantly different from zero. Taken at face value, this would mean that a
city’s NSDAP vote share in 1933 had no or a slightly negative effect on the city’s
public employment share in 1939. This could mean that if anything, instead of
“favouring”loyal cities, the new government tried to “buy support”from more re-
sistant cities, for example in an attempt to stabilise its power in the early days
of the regime. However, due to the reasons above, OLS estimates should be
viewed with caution and I turn next to the instrumental variable (IV) estimates
discussed in section 3.3.2. By using an instrumental variable that significantly
predates the 1929-1932 economic crisis, this approach avoids any correlation be-
tween the NSDAP vote shares and the intensity of the crisis.
The 2SLS estimates based on using the 1912 vote share for the “Economic Asso-
ciation”as instrumental variable for the 1933 NSDAP vote share are presented
in table 3.7. As can be seen from the first stage result, the 1912 EA vote share
and the 1933 NSDAP vote share are indeed strongly and, as one would expect,
positively related. The first-stage results indicate that a one percentage point
increase in the 1912 EA vote share increases the 1933 NSDAP vote share by
around 0.35 percentage points. Thus, the translation between 1912 EA vot-
ers and 1933 NSDAP voters is not one-to-one, which is not surprising, given
that some members of the Economic Alliance joined other parties after 1918, in
14The exact relationships between the economic crisis in the late 1920s and the rise of the
NSDAP are still debated in the literature. The most recent study by King et al. (2008) finds
that the most adversely affected groups reacted differently in their voting behaviour: While
the “working poor”such as self-employed shopkeepers and professionals increasingly voted for
the Nazis, the unemployed turned towards the communists. A priori, it is therefore not clear
how adverse effects of the economic situation would correlate with the NSDAP vote share.
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particular the German National People’s Party, Hitler’s coalition partner from
January 1933 (Bergmann 2012).
Turning to the main results in Panel B, addressing the potential endogeneity of
the 1933 vote shares uncovers a positive and significant effect of voting for the
NSDAP on subsequent public employment. An increase in the 1933 NSDAP
vote share of one percentage point would increase the number of public sector
jobs by around 2.3%, a quite substantial increase. When looking at public em-
ployment as a share of population, the results indicate that a one percentage
point increase in the 1933 NSDAP vote share is associated with a 0.1 percent-
age point increase in the ratio of public employment to total population. Put
differently, an increase of one standard deviation in the 1933 vote share leads to
an increase of around 45% of a standard deviation in terms of the 1925 public
employment share. The results for public employment as a share of the labour
force are similar in magnitude.15 All these results are relative results- they show
that cities with greater NSDAP vote shares experienced a relative increase in
public employment compared to cities with lower Nazi support. As the sum-
mary statistics in section 3.3.1 show, both the number of public employment
jobs and its shares are lower in 1939 compared to 1933. In this sense, my results
show that public employment fell less for cities with greater NSDAP support.
Below I will also show results based on the number of civil servants, which at
least in raw numbers increased between 1933 and 1939. Taken all together, the
results from table 3.7 show that high 1933 NSDAP vote shares led to a subse-
quent relative increase in public sector jobs, both in absolute numbers and in
ratios of the population. This pattern thus would not be consistent with the
Nazi government buying support from opposing cities, but rather rewarding its
strongholds via public employment.
Table 3.8 provides further evidence that the estimates in table 3.7 are based on
government discrimination, rather than other economic forces at work. Here, I
repeat the analysis above, but this time using the metal industry, a sector that
contracted during the 1929 crisis and expanded during the pre-war build-up,
but was not under direct government control, so I would not expect to find an
effect here.16 The estimates are all not significantly different from zero. In the
15As explained in section 3.3.1, the 1912 EA vote share has a somewhat unusual distribution
with many zeros and a right tail of four cities with very high values. This distribution could
mask some heterogeneity in the effects, which I further explore in Appendix C. Cities with
no 1912 EA vote share are important for the precision of the estimate, but tend to dampen
the effect size. Because of this, the 55 cities with nonzero EA vote share display larger effect
sizes, but lower precision. The four cities with EA vote shares above 20% are influential for
the overall results but less so when focussing on only cities with positive instrument values.
Removing both extremes results in a smaller sample and less precise estimation, but does not
change the sign of the results.
16In the case of adminpop and adminshare, a slight negative coefficient could arise mechan-
ically, as an increase in the share of public employment has to be compensated by all other
sectors.
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case of adminpop and adminshare, the point estimates are relatively sizable,
but very imprecisely estimated, whereas for logadmin also the point estimate
would indicate a very limited negative effect of 1%.
Overall, my findings indicate that cities that had voted more for the Nazis expe-
rienced a relative increase in the number and importance of public sector jobs.
As the historical record in section 3.2 shows, there are several potential channels
that could explain this. On the one hand, the NSDAP could have simply allo-
cated public funds or public employment positions to its strongholds or taken
them away from opposing cities. The case of Lu¨beck losing its independence
would be an example, but it is most likely only local folklore. Another, poten-
tially more important channel is political patronage. Patronage has been shown
to be operational in other settings (e.g. Xu 2017 for the case of the British
Empire, Gagliarducci and Manacorda 2016 for nepotism in modern Italy), and
it is likely that it was also important in Nazi Germany. As described above, the
Nazi government passed several laws and decrees to redesign the German civil
service, removing Jews, political opponents and women from office and giving
jobs to party veterans. This changed the composition of the public sector, but it
could also have easily changed its distribution across cities: Cities that had op-
posed the NSDAP before probably had more political opponents in public jobs
that were then removed, whereas Nazi strongholds probably had more party
stalwarts that were rewarded, for example by creating new positions for them.
In this sense, my results are likely an understatement of the change in the civil
service, since they only show changes in the size of the public sector, and not
in its composition. This is one caveat that has to be borne in mind. Another
caveat is that part of the increased importance of public sector jobs could be
due to supply factors rather than increased demand. The 1939 census groups
the armed branches of SA and SS together with the regular Wehrmacht forces,
and in cities leaning more towards the Nazis, more people might have decided
to join these outfits (or the armed forces in general). While such differential
supply-side behaviour is possible, the actual allocation of men to units and thus
barracks would still be a decision to be made by the respective organisation and
thus the government or one of its branches.
3.4.2 Robustness
This section addresses several potential concerns with the findings from the IV
regressions. As explained in Section 3.1, there were several mergers and re-
structurings of cities between 1925 and 1933. I tried to exclude all cities whose
population growth was mostly driven by territorial enlargement. Still, a certain
arbitrary element remains- when are territorial changes so important that a city
is no longer comparable over time? In table 3.9, I repeat the analysis of table
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3.7 for two different and somewhat “extreme”samples: In columns 1-3, I do not
drop any cities, while columns 4-6 exclude all cities whose growth between either
1910 and 1925, 1925 and 1933 or 1933 and 1939 exceeded the respective mean
by more than one respective standard deviation. For convenience, the first stage
results are omitted and only the respective F statistic is displayed. Compared to
the main results in table 3.7, standard errors increase a bit both when including
more cities (columns 1-3) and when including fewer (columns 4-6). In the latter
case, the point estimates are very similar to the main specification, whereas not
dropping any cities if anything seems to lead to slightly larger point estimates.
Overall, however, the qualitative conclusions from before do not change.
The validity of using the 1933 NSDAP vote share as explanatory variable might
also be questioned on several grounds. First of all, throughout the analysis, I
have treated 1939 as the only year after the NSDAP rise to power, consider-
ing 1925 and 1933 to be pre-treatment years. The reason for this is that the
first large-scale public investment programme by the National Socialists, the
Rheinhardt programme, started in June 1933, few days before the 1933 census
data were collected, and the expansion of the armed forces occurred even later.
Against this definition, however, one can argue that the National Socialists came
to power already in January 1933 and already had a parliamentary majority after
March 1933. As shown by Ferguson and Voth (2008), shareholders immediately
reacted to this change in power, and so might have other economic variables.
Moreover, the Nazis started a major prosecution of their political enemies after
the Reichstag Fire in February 1933, which might also have had implications for
public employment. Similarly, the “Law for the restoration of the professional
civil service”was also already passed in April 1933. Hence, treating 1933 as a
pre-treatment year might be problematic, though if anything, it would most
likely bias my estimates towards 0.
In table 3.10, I examine the effect of dropping the potentially confounded year
1933, only comparing 1925, a clear pre-treatment year, to 1939, a clear post-
treatment year. The results are again very similar to the baseline results and if
anything slightly larger, which would be in line with the 1933 numbers already
being slightly contaminated by the Nazi rise to power. However, any such con-
tamination appears to be very limited.
Another potential concern with the 1933 election is that it was not the election
that brought Hitler into power, it was only the one that gave him a parliamen-
tary majority. Secondly, since the election happened after the Reichstag Fire
and the subsequent prosecution of Communists, it is questionable whether this
election was really a free one. In table 3.11, I therefore redo the analysis of table
3.7, but use different elections as main explanatory variables, in particular those
in September 1930, July 1932 and November 1932. While data for the 1930 elec-
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tion are available for all cities in my sample, the results for the 1932 elections
were unfortunately only reported at the district level. I can therefore run these
regressions only on a limited sample that includes cities that were also a district
at the same time (Stadtkreise, as opposed to cities that were part of a Land-
kreis), which decreases the sample size by around one third. Still, the results
from table 3.11 confirm the previous results, both in terms of sign and magni-
tude and indicate that there is a positive relationship between voting shares for
the NSDAP and subsequent public employment. In addition, the first stage F
statistics show that the relationship between the 1912 EA vote shares and the
later NSDAP vote shares is stronger in 1932 than in 1930. This is consistent
with the NSDAP becoming more and more attractive for the nationalist lower
middle class voters to whose preferences the constituent parties of the Economic
Association had catered in Imperial Germany 20 years earlier.
Another potential problem is the wide definition of public employment that I
am using throughout the analysis. As mentioned in section 3.3.1, creating a
consistent measure for 1925, 1933 and 1939 requires aggregating several occu-
pations, some of which are clearly not part of “public employment”. This will
increase the noise in my outcome variable and thus impair the precision of my
estimates, but if these other jobs also react to the Nazi rise to power, it could
introduce biases. In table 3.12, I therefore examine the robustness of my results
with regards to different outcome variables. Such variables unfortunately do not
exist for 1925, but for both 1933 and 1939. In columns 1 and 2, I therefore show
results for my baseline outcome for these two years only. For brevity, I focus on
adminpop and logadmin as outcome variables, omitting adminshare, which is
very highly correlated with adminpop. As can be seen, the results when using
1933 and 1939 are very similar to the main results in table 3.7, which is further
evidence that in spite of the late census, 1933 is still a valid pre-treatment year.
In columns 3 and 4 then, I use a more narrow public employment definition
based on the 1933 census definition that at least omits the cinema, theatre and
other entertainment occupations. The results from using this definition are very
similar to those in columns 1 and 2. In columns 5 and 6, I employ a very different
outcome variable. Instead of trying to get at the public administration sector,
I here use the occupational class of civil servants (Beamte) across all sectors.17
Again, results are very similar: Increasing the 1933 NSDAP vote share by one
percentage point would lead to an increase in the number of civil servants by
2.7%, very much in line with the 2.3% in column 2 of this table and column 3
in table 3.7.
An even narrower definition of public employment is possible when using data
17I cannot use 1925 for this regression, since the 1925 census aggregates civil servants with
all white-collar employees. The 1933 and 1939 civil servant numbers differ slightly in that the
former omits the most top-level civil servants, but this should be a minor difference.
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from 1939 only. In table 3.13, I show results from cross-sectional regressions
for the five narrow employment categories that together form my employment
definition that is consistent across the three censuses. These regressions cannot
control for fixed effects and therefore rely on stronger identifying assumptions.
As before, to at least partly remedy this, I include the natural logarithm of a
city’s population as additional control. In Panel A, I show the respective ratio of
each of the five categories to total population, i.e. the equivalent of adminpop.
As can be seen, the overall increase in adminpop is driven mostly by public ad-
ministration and the armed forces. Legal and economic counselling and teaching
occupations show at most a very slight increase. Entertainment does not respond
at all, whereas church-related occupations even decrease. Panel B, which uses
the natural logarithm, by and at large confirms the previous findings. However,
the estimate for public administration becomes relatively imprecise and loses
statistical significance. Still, the point estimate of a 3.1% is very similar and
if anything slightly larger than the previous ones. Overall, as already argued
in section 3.3.1, public administration and the armed forces appear to be the
prime drivers of my measure of public employment. Taken together, the results
in tables 3.12 and 3.13 show that while the aggregation of several occupational
classes is undesirable from a conceptual point of view, it seems to have little
implications for the sign or magnitude of my findings.
3.5 Conclusion
Between 1928 and 1933, the NSDAP developed from a small and unimportant
party in Weimar Germany into the strongest party in the German parliament,
bringing its leader Adolf Hitler to the head of the German government by Jan-
uary 1933 and gaining a parliamentary majority by March of the same year.
Subsequently, Hitler used this power not only to concentrate all political com-
petences among his followers, but also to enact large public investment and
rearmament programmes and to overhaul the civil service. In this paper, I doc-
ument evidence that the public employment policies during the early Nazi era
were not ideologically colour blind. Using a city’s 1912 vote share of the Eco-
nomic Alliance, a small party in Imperial Germany that catered to similar voters
as the late NSDAP, as an instrumental variable for the 1933 NSDAP vote share,
I find that the latter had a positive and significant effect on subsequent public
employment at the city level. A one percentage point increase in the 1933 vote
share caused the number of public employment jobs to grow by around 2.5 per-
cent, a finding which is not driven by cities undergoing territorial changes, by
the inclusion or exclusion of the potentially already contaminated census year of
1933, or by the potentially worrisome and unfree 1933 election shares and is also
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robust to using different definitions of public employment as outcome variables.
The results of this study also shed additional light on the ability of governments
to use economic policy as a means to reward and protect their voters and sup-
porters, and/or to punish their political adversaries. Thereby, it adds to a vast
body of literature that has documented such behaviour on a firm-level and, to
a certain extent, also for individuals. Of course, some cautionary remarks ap-
ply. In particular, Germany’s Nazi government had incomparable powers to any
modern democratic government. Being freed of the constraints usually posed by
a parliamentary opposition, judicial review by courts and a free press, it seems
reasonable to assume that the National Socialists’ ability to reward a city’s loy-
alty was substantially larger than in most countries at most times. On the other
hand, my measure of public employment only captures changes in its size, not
its composition and therefore potentially understates the extent of rewarding for
loyal followers.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that one important mechanism behind my finding
is the preferred allocation of public sector jobs to loyal party stalwarts. Several
questions remain in this respect for future research: Can this behaviour also be
documented at the individual level? Were there other channels through which
public employment was targeted towards cities favouring the Nazis? Are there
any long-term effects of the increased public employment in the 1930’s, i.e. did
the economic reward for the cities survive the Second World War and persist
longer than the Nazi government, or did they disappear when the favoured party
members lost office? And, in a broader context, what are the welfare implica-
tions of such favouring behaviour? In these respects, there is substantial scope
for further research.
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3.6 Tables and Figures
Share of the 1939 subcategories in the overall definition of public employment, 1939
Mean Std. deviation
Public Administration, Armed Forces, Judicature 64.935 13.351
Teaching and artistic occupations 23.325 8.654
Church-related occupations 7.079 8.242
Legal and Economic Counselling 3.094 1.388
Entertainment (without artists) 1.567 1.050
Share of the 1933 subcategories in the overall definition of public employment, 1933
Mean Std. deviation
Public Administration, Armed Forces, Church, Education 1933 92.099 3.637
Entertainment 7.901 3.637
Correlation of baseline public employment definition with narrower definitions in 1939
(all measures normalised by city population)
Public Administration, Armed Forces, Church, Education (Census def. 1933) 1.000
Public Administration, Armed Forces, Judicature (Census def. 1939) 0.956
Observations 246

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Public employment
Ratio to Population Ratio to Labour Force Natural Logarithm
EA share 1912 0.003 0.009 -0.002 0.004 -0.013 0.000
(0.030) (0.022) (0.067) (0.052) (0.010) (0.005)
Controls X X X
Cross-sectional results for 1925 with 246 cities. Controls are the natural logarithm of
city population, longitude, latitude, an indicator for the Rhineland, an indicator for
being a gau capital, and the Jewish population share in 1925. Robust standard errors
in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Unemployment rate 1933 ∆ln(Unemployed)1932−1930
EA share 1912 -0.124* -0.066 0.002 0.000
(0.068) (0.056) (0.002) (0.003)
Controls X X
Observations 246 246 201 201
Cross-sectional results for 1925. Controls are longitude, latitude, an in-
dicator for the Rhineland, an indicator for being a gau capital, and the
Jewish population share in 1925. Columns 1 and 2 also control for the
natural logarithm of city population. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.5: Relationship between the instrument and the economic crisis
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Public Employment
Ratio to Pop. Ratio to LF Natural Log
NSDAP share 1933 · D1939 -0.007 -0.009 -0.002
(0.011) (0.025) (0.003)
Panel data results for 1925, 1933 and 1939, 246 cities and 738 observa-
tions. Robust standard errors, clustered at the city level, in parentheses.
All regressions control for city fixed effects, an indicator for 1939 as well
as interactions of an indicator for 1939 with an indicator for being a gau
capital, the Jewish population in 1925, the unemployment rate in 1933,
longitude, latitude and an indicator for being in the Rhineland.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.6: OLS estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: First stage Dep. variable: NSDAP vote share 1933
EA share 1912 · D1939 0.339***
(0.093)
F-stat first stage 13.21
Panel B: 2SLS estimation Public Employment
Ratio to Pop. Ratio to LF Natural Log
NSDAP share 1933 · D1939 0.098** 0.266** 0.023*
(0.049) (0.122) (0.013)
Panel data results for 1925, 1933 and 1939, 246 cities and 738 observa-
tions. Robust standard errors, clustered at the city level, in parentheses.
All regressions control for city fixed effects, an indicator for 1939 as well
as interactions of an indicator for 1939 with an indicator for being a gau
capital, the Jewish population in 1925, the unemployment rate in 1933,
longitude, latitude and an indicator for being in the Rhineland.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.7: IV estimates
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(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Metal industry Employment
Ratio to Pop. Ratio to LF Natural Log
NSDAP share 1933 · D1939 -0.195 -0.401 -0.010
(0.149) (0.325) (0.014)
F-stat first stage 13.21
Panel data results for 1925, 1933 and 1939, 246 cities and 738 observa-
tions. Robust standard errors, clustered at the city level, in parentheses.
All regressions control for city fixed effects, an indicator for 1939 as well
as interactions of an indicator for 1939 with an indicator for being a gau
capital, the Jewish population in 1925, the unemployment rate in 1933,
longitude, latitude and an indicator for being in the Rhineland.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Ratio to Pop. Ratio to LF Natural Log
NSDAP share 1933 · D1939 0.105** 0.319** 0.023*
(0.048) (0.128) (0.013)
F-stat first stage 13.15
Panel data results for 1925 and 1939, 246 cities and 492 observations. Robust
standard errors, clustered at the city level, in parentheses. All regressions
control for city fixed effects, an indicator for 1939 as well as interactions of
an indicator for 1939 with an indicator for being a gau capital, the Jewish
population in 1925, the unemployment rate in 1933, longitude, latitude and
an indicator for being in the Rhineland.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The 1925 census of occupations groups the following occupations together (Oc-
cupation group ”D”): Administration, Armed Forces, Church, Free profes-
sions (Verwaltung, Heerwesen, Kirche, freie Berufe). In 1933, some of these
groups are reported separately: Occupation group 51 of the 1933 census re-
ports the number of people working in jobs related to Administration, Armed
Forces, Church, Education and others (Verwaltung, Wehrmacht, Kirche, Bil-
dung, Erziehung usw.), while occupation group 54 deals with occupations con-
nected to Theatre, Cinemas and Movie Recording, Broadcasting, Music, Sports
and Showmen (Theater, Lichtspiele und Filmaufnahme, Rundfunkwesen, Musikgewerbe,
sportliche und Schaustellungsgewerbe). Clearly, the latter group is not in the fo-
cus of my analysis. However, since these professions are contained in Occupation
Group D of the 1925 census, I also included them for 1933 and added the Oc-
cupation Groups 51 and 54 of the respective census.
The 1939 census makes even finer distinctions: Occupation Group 61 deals
with Administration and Armed Forces (Berufe der o¨ffentlichen Verwaltung und
Rechtspflege, der Wehrmacht usw), Occupation Group 62 with teaching profes-
sions and artists (Lehr- und Bildungsberufe, ku¨nstlerische Berufe). Church-
related professions are reported in Group 63 (Berufe der Kirche, Mo¨nche und
Nonnen), while Group 64 contains professions related to legal counselling (Berufe
der Rechts- und Wirtschaftsberatung). Group 68 finally contains the entertain-
ment industry (Berufe des Unterhaltungsgewerbes (außer Ku¨nstler)). Again, a
better measure would be to only count groups 61 and maybe 62 and 64, but due
to the reporting schemes in 1925 and 1933, I added up the number of people
working in groups 61-64 and 68.
Which different sectors and occupations does this aggregate measure contain?
The following gives an overview of the different subcategories in the 3 censuses.
Unfortunately, apart from 1939, these subcategories are not reported separately
at the city level.
• 1925
– Occupation Group D: Administration, Armed Forces, Church, Free
professions (Verwaltung, Heerwesen, Kirche, freie Berufe)
∗ W137. National, state, district and municipal administration,
judicature (if in civil service position), penal system (Reichs-,
Landes-, Bezirks- und Gemeindeverwaltung, Reichtspflege (soweit
in beamteter Stellung) und Strafvollzug)
∗ W138. Army and navy, army and navy administration (incl.
military hospitals) (Heer und Marine, Heeres- und Marinever-
waltung (einschl. Milita¨rlazarette))
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∗ W139. Church, divine service, mission, institutions and asso-
ciations for religious purposes (Kirche, Gottesdienst, Mission,
Anstalten und Vereine fu¨r religio¨se Zwecke)
∗ W140. Education, instruction, libraries, scientific institutes and
art collections (Bildung, Erziehung, Unterricht, Bu¨chereien, wis-
senschaftliche Institute und Kunstsammlungen)
∗ W141. Legal counselling and representation of interests (Rechts-
beratung und Interessenvertretung)
∗ W142. Artists, private scholars, authors (Ku¨nstler, Privatgelehrte,
Schriftsteller)
∗ W143. Theatres and operas, music business (Theater und Opernha¨user,
Musikgewerbe)
∗ W144. Cinemas (Lichtspielwesen)
∗ W145. Broadcasting (Rundfunkwesen)
∗ W146. Sports business, horse rental, showman business (Sportliche
Gewerbe, Pferdeverleihung, Schaustellungsgewerbe)
• 1933
– Occupation Group 51: Administration, Armed Forces, Church, Edu-
cation and others (Verwaltung, Wehrmacht, Kirche, Bildung, Erziehung
usw.)
∗ 511. National, state and municipal administration, public ju-
dicature (Reichs-, Landes- und Gemeindeverwaltung, o¨ffentliche
Rechtspflege)
∗ 512. Wehrmacht (incl. army and navy administration, naval
yard, army and navy hospitals etc.) (Wehrmacht (einschl. Heeres-
und Marineverwaltung, Marinewerft, Heeres- und Marinelazarette
usw.))
∗ 513. Church, institutions and associations for religious purposes
(Kirche, Anstalten und Vereine fu¨r religio¨se Zwecke)
∗ 514. Education, instruction (Bildung, Erziehung, Unterricht)
∗ 515. Visual arts, free literary and scientific activity (Bildende
Kunst, freie schriftstellerische und wissenschaftliche Beta¨gigung)
∗ 516. Legal and economic counselling, representation of interests
(Rechts- und Wirtschaftsberatung, Interessenvertretung)
∗ 517. Residential business (administration incl. allocation) (Wohngewerbe
(Verwaltung einschl. Vermittlung)
– Occupation Group 54: Theatre, Cinemas and Movie Recording, Broad-
casting, Music, Sports and Showmen (Theater, Lichtspiele und Fil-
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maufnahme, Rundfunkwesen, Musikgewerbe, sportliche und Schaustel-
lungsgewerbe)
• 1939
– Occupation Group 61: Occupations in public administration and ju-
dicature, Wehrmacht etc. (Berufe der o¨ffentlichen Verwaltung und
Rechtspflege, der Wehrmacht usw)
– Occupation Group 62: Teaching and instruction occupations, artistic
occupations (Lehr- und Bildungsberufe, ku¨nstlerische Berufe)
– Occupation Group 63: Occupations in the church, monks and nuns
(Berufe der Kirche, Mo¨nche und Nonnen
– Occupation Group 64: Legal and economic counselling (Rechts- und
Wirtschaftsberatung)
– Occupation Group 68: Entertainment occupations (excl. artists)
(Berufe des Unterhaltungsgewerbes (außer Ku¨nstler))
To give a sense of what occupation group 61 in 1939 measures, the fol-
lowing professions were reported separately at a coarser level (state or Prussian
province): Judges and attorneys (Richter und Staatsanwa¨lte), trainee judges and
civil servants (Regierungs- und Gerichtsrefendare), Bailiffs and executory offi-
cers (Gerichtsvollzieher, Vollstreckungsbeamte), Officers (Wehrmacht) (Offiziere
(Wehrmacht)), Non-commissioned officers and long-serving privates (Wehrma-
cht) (Unteroffiziere und langdienende Mannschaften (Wehrmacht)), Leaders and
trainee leaders of the Reich Labour Service (Reichtsarbeitsdienstfu¨hrer und -
anwa¨rter), Police (Polizei- und Gendarmerieoffiziere, Vollzugsbeamte der Ord-
nungspolizei (ohne Offiziere) and Vollzugsbeamte der Sicherheitspolizei (ohne Of-
fiziere)), fire brigade (without engineers and technicians) (Feuerwehrleute (ohne
Ingenieure und Techniker)), Leaders and men of the armed units of SA and
SS (Fu¨hrer der bewaffneten Einheiten der SS und der SA and Ma¨nner der be-
waffneten Einheiten der SS und der SA), civil servants in administration (if
not included in other occupations) (Verwaltungsbeamte (soweit nicht in an-
deren Berufen nachgewiesen)), clerical assistants (also department managers)
and similar employees in public administration and judicature, in the NSDAP,
in the public administration of labour and the economy etc (if not included in
other occupations) (Sachbearbeiter (auch Dienststellen - und Abteilungsleiter u.
a¨hnl. Angestl. in der o¨ffentlichen Verwalt. u. Rechtspflege, in der NSDAP,
in der o¨ffentl. Arbeits- und Wirtschaftslenkung usw. (soweit nicht in anderen
Berufen)).
The largest of these categories are the Wehrmacht and the civil servants in
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public administration. In the whole of Germany, Occupation Group 61 com-
prised 1,074,571 members in 1939. Of those, 328,819 were in the Wehrmacht,
and 403,019 were Verwaltungsbeamte. Another 86,848 people belonged to the
broad category of Sachbearbeiter (auch Dienststellen - und Abteilungsleiter u.
a¨hnl. Angestl. in der o¨ffentlichen Verwalt. u. Rechtspflege, in der NSDAP,
in der o¨ffentl. Arbeits- und Wirtschaftslenkung usw. (soweit nicht in anderen
Berufen). Many of those were public administration employees that were not
in the civil service (i.e. Angestellte as opposed to Beamte). Various police cat-
egories accounted for 125,222 members, and the leaders of the Reich Labour
Service for another 50,767. The armed branches of SA and SS were relatively
small outfits, amounting to only 29,882 or less than 3% of the whole measure.
For the regressions where I use the number of civil servants (Beamte) as out-
come variables, I use the 1933 and 1939 census. In 1933, the respective oc-
cupational class is called “civil servants and soldiers, excluding those in senior
positions”(Beamte und Soldaten (ohne die in leitender Stellung).18 In 1939, the
respective category is called “civil servants”(Beamte).
In table 3.4, I analyse a city’s social class composition, using the categories
of blue collar, white collar and self employed. Blue collar is defined to contain
labourers (Arbeiter), helping family members (Mithelfende Familienangeho¨rige),
and domestic workers (Hausangestellte). The white collar category contains the
census categories of employees (Angestellte) and civil servants (Beamte), which
are reported separately in 1933 and grouped together in 1925. Self-employed
is a census category in itself (Selbststa¨ndige). In 1933, it also contains high-
ranking civil servants and officers (Beamte und Offiziere in leitender Stellung).
As described in the text, the 1925 census does not report the number of people
working in each broad category, but the number of workers and their depen-
dants, whereas the 1933 census reports the number of people working in each
category. However, such uniform differences in measurement should be absorbed
by the year fixed effect.
3.8 Appendix B
In order to address the problem caused by city mergers and restructurings, I
analysed all cities whose growth rate between either 1910 and 1925, 1925 and
1933 or between 1933 and 1939 exceeded the respective mean growth rates by
more than one standard deviation. For those cities, I examined whether they
grew by 25% or more alone because of enlargements. Details about which cities
or villages were added to the respective cities were obtained from Wikipedia
unless stated otherwise. The names, population data and sources for the cities
18High-ranking civil servants and soldiers are reported with the self-employed, which is why
they are missing from my measure.
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are given below.
From 1925 to 1933, 25 cities exceeded the mean growth rate by more than one
standard deviation. 19 of them were dropped for the following reasons.
Beuthen’s population in 1925 stood at 62543. Newly added districts had a total
population of 26080 in 1925 according to the Statistisches Jahrbuch Deutscher
Sta¨dte 1928. Hence, Beuthen grew by 40% alone due to these acquisitions. Sim-
ilarly, Bielefeld (population in 1925: 86062) received incorporations totalling a
1925 population of 27893 (Statistisches Jahrbuch Deutscher Sta¨dte 1932), rep-
resenting a growth of more than 32%. Bochum (population in 1925: 211249)
was enlarged through several rounds of incorporations that, according to the
Statistisches Jahrbuch Deutscher Sta¨dte 1929 and 1931, totalled 156462 and
meant that it was dropped from the dataset as well. Duisburg incorporated
several cities and towns in 1929, including the large city of Hamborn. According
to the Statistisches Jahrbuch Deutscher Sta¨dte 1930, Hamborn alone led to a
population growth of more than 46%. Essen grew by 161977 people or nearly
35% relative to its baseline level of 470525 in 1925. (Statistisches Jahrbuch
Deutscher Sta¨dte 1931). Gelsenkirchen incorporated Buer and other cities in
1928, leading to growth of nearly 60% (Statistisches Jahrbuch Deutscher Sta¨dte
1930) Hagen’s incorporations were as large as 43900 or 44% of its 1925 pop-
ulation. Herne incorporated the towns of Bo¨rnig, Sodingen, Cray, Oestrich,
Bladenhort and Holthausen. The 1925 census gives the following numbers for
Bo¨rnig, Sodingen and Holthausen, respectively: 7979, 8198, 5942. The other
villages are not listed and hence must have been smaller than 2000 inhabitants.
Still, even without them, the three larger ones totalled 22119 people, which rep-
resents a 32% increase in population for Herne. Hindenburg in 1927 acquired sev-
eral surrounding towns and municipalities, growing by nearly 69% (Statistisches
Jahrbuch Deutscher Sta¨dte 1928). Luenen acquired Brambauer and parts of an-
other town, Derne. Brambauer alone led to growth of around 56%. Neustrelitz,
a town of 12260 inhabitants in 1925, was merged with Strelitz, thereby gaining
4687 inhabitants as of 1925, or 38%. Oberhausen incorporated several surround-
ing entities, totalling 84466 according to the Statistisches Jahrbuch Deutscher
Sta¨dte 1931, or nearly 80% of the city’s 1925 population. The towns of Lennep
and Lu¨ttringhausen (together 27826 according to the 1925 census) were added
to Remscheid, making it grow by 36%. Rheine had a 1933 population of 17732.
According to the homepage of the administrative district of Mu¨nster (of which
the city is a part), the city acquired additional territory in 1929 that made its
population grow by about 10000 inhabitants. Bad Salzemen (9998) and Frohse
(2064, both numbers according to the 1925 census) were added to Scho¨nebeck,
which as a consequence grew by 56%. Solingen’s 1925 population was more than
doubled by the acquisition of Gra¨frath, Ho¨hscheid, Ohligs and Wald, totalling
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83799 inhabitants (Census of population 1925). Several towns were incorporated
into Wiesbaden, making its 1925 population of 102737 grow by 30684 or nearly
30% according to the Statistisches Jahrbuch Deutscher Sta¨dte (1928). Witten’s
population in 1925 stood at 45295. Annen, Stockum, Du¨ren and parts of Lan-
gendreer and Bommern were added to this. While Du¨ren is missing from the
1925 census list and hence must have had less than 2000 inhabitants, Annen and
Stockum had 1925 populations of 17822 and 3196, respectively. Zweibru¨cken re-
ceived the villages of Bubenhausen and Ernstweiler. Bubenhausen’s population
as of 1925 was 3817, or 24% of Zweibru¨cken’s in the same year. For Ernstweiler,
the census contains no population data. However, even under a very conserva-
tive assumption of only 200 inhabitants, the two acquisitions would exceed the
25% threshold, so Zweibru¨cken was also dropped.
Six cities were not dropped, although they experienced substantial territorial
gains.
Dortmund, with a 1925 population of 321743, received additional incorporations
totalling 70491 according to the Statistisches Jahrbuch Deutscher Sta¨dte 1931,
or 22%. Similarly, Eschweiler received the surrounding villages of Nothberg,
Hastenrath and Scherpenseel. Nothberg and Hastenrath are listed in the 1925
census as having populations of 2176 and 2187, while Scherpenseel had less than
2000 inhabitants. Even under the conservative assumption that it was exactly
at this cut-off, the sum of the three gains would total only 6363, or 24% of
Eschweiler’s 1925 population. Ellguth-Zabrze (2205), Sosnitza (6453), Richters-
dorf (3661) and Zernik (2083, all figures from the 1925 census) were made part
of Gleiwitz, making its 1925 population grow by 17.5%. Heilbronn experienced
substantial population growth between 1925 and 1933, but I could not find any
evidence for territorial gains. Mainz acquired Bretzenheim (5692), Weisenau
(6637), Ginsheim (4611), Bischofsheim (5438) and Gustavsburg (below 2000, all
figures from 1925 census). Even if Gustavsburg’s population had been at 2000,
this would have resulted in growth of 22.5% relative to the 1925 level. Euren,
Biewer, Ku¨renz, Olewig and a part of Pallien were made part of Trier (1925
population: 58140). The 1925 census gives the population of Euren and Ku¨renz
as 3248 and 4268, respectively; Biewer, Pallien and Olewig are not listed and
hence must have been smaller than 2000 inhabitants. However, even under the
most conservative assumption that they each had exactly 2000 inhabitants, the
sum of the added populations would only reach 23% of Trier’s 1925 population.
Between 1933 and 1939, 15 cities exceeded the mean growth rate by more than
one standard deviation. Seven of them were dropped.
In a large-scale reorganisation, the cities of Altona, Wandsbek and Harburg-
Wilhelmsburg were added to Hamburg (1129307). Their population as of 1933
stood at 400818. Potsdam (1933 population: 73676) acquired several surround-
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ing towns, including Nowawes (1933 population: 29229). Radebeul (1933 popu-
lation: 12949) was merged with Ko¨tschenbroda (1933 population: 18909). Wein-
garten (8385 according to the census of occupation 1933) was incorporated into
Ravensburg (18930) in 1939, making the latter grow by 44%. Stolberg (17394)
acquired parts of Bu¨sbach, Eilendorf and Eschweiler, whose total is given as
12199 by the census 1933. In a curious reorganization, Ru¨stringen (48562 in
1933 according to the census) was added to Wilhelmshaven (1933: 28016).
Zweibru¨cken was dropped already because of its large growth between 1925
and 1933.
Eight cities were not dropped.
For Neubrandenburg, Oranienburg and Swinemu¨nde, I could not find any ev-
idence of territorial gains. Cuxhaven acquired Groden (1678), Westerwisch
and Su¨derwisch (864), Stickenbu¨ttel (644), Duhnen (725) and Neuwerk with
Scharho¨rn (63), totalling nearly 18% of its 1933 population of 22234. Dessau
incorporated Rosslau, Jonitz and Naundorf. The latter had been excorporated
just before the 1933 census and were then reincorporated in 1935. Their respec-
tive populations according to the 1933 census stood at 12845, 1721 and 527,
which represents a growth of around 19% relative to Dessau’s 1933 population
of 78634. Landau acquired Queichsheim and Mo¨rlheim, totalling 3013 inhabi-
tants or 18% of Landau’s 1933 population (all data from the 1933 census). Suhl
(15477) acquired Heinrichs. Heinrichs’ population as of 1925 was 2895, which
would mean a growth of 18.7%. Even if Heinrichs experienced further growth
between 1925 and 1933, it is very unlikely that it would exceed the 25% thresh-
old, so I did not drop Suhl. Wittenberg incorporated Teuchen and Labetz in
1938. Both towns are not listed in the 1925 census and hence together cannot
have exceeded 4000 inhabitants in 1925. Given Wittenberg’s 1925 population
of 23457, the two towns fell considerably short of the 25% threshold in 1925,
and it is highly unlikely that they grew so fast as to exceed it in 1933, when
Wittenberg’s population stood at 24480.
Between 1910 and 1925, 25 cities exceeded the mean growth rate by more than
one standard deviation. 13 of them were dropped.
Berlin experienced a massive increase in area and population due to the Greater
Berlin Act of 1920. Gera (1910 population according to the census: 49276) ac-
quired a vast number of surrounding towns and villages. Four of them alone
(Debschwitz, Untermhaus, Pforten and Zwo¨tzen) had a combined 1910 popula-
tion of 23967, leading Gera to be dropped. Greiz was enlarged by the acquisition
of Pohlitz, Do¨lau and several smaller villages. The two former alone had a com-
bined population of 6025, enlarging Greiz’s 1910 population of 23245 by more
than 25%. Hirschberg with its 1910 population of 20564 acquired several smaller
towns and Kunnersdorf/Cunnersdorf according to Salomon and Stein (1928),
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which in 1910 had a population of 5411, making the city grow by more than
25% alone. Osternburg and Eversten were added to Oldenburg, boosting that
city’s population by more than 66% at 1910 levels. Pirna’s population in 1910
stood at 19525. Between then and 1925, several towns and villages were incorpo-
rated into it, and the incorporation of Copitz and Neundorf alone added nearly
45% of the city’s 1910 population to it. Similarly, Riesa incorporated Gro¨ba,
Oberreussen and Weida. While Oberreussen had less than 2000 inhabitants in
1910, Gro¨ba and Weida had 4471 and 2119, respectively, or 43% of Riesa’s 1910
population of 15287. Waldenburg incorporated several minor districts and vil-
lages and Altwasser, which by itself increased Waldenburg’s population by 88%
in 1910 terms. Wattenscheid was considerably enlarged after 1926. While the
Ha¨nisch-Falter database contains data for the enlarged city in 1925, the 1910
census and 1912 election results refer to the original, small city only, which was
therefore dropped. The same holds for Castrop-Rauxel, which was created in
1926 through a merger of Castrop, Rauxel and other municipalities. Bochum,
Essen and Luenen were already dropped due to their enlargements between 1925
and 1933 or 1933/39.
12 Cities were not dropped.
In the case of Ahlen, Bottrop, Datteln, Gladbeck, Herten, Marienburg, Reckling-
hausen and Schneidemu¨hl, I did not find any evidence for territorial acquisitions,
their growth seems to have been purely organic. Dortmund acquired Deusen,
Dorstfeld, Eving, Huckarde, Kemminghausen, Lindenhorst, Rahm, Wischlingen,
Brackel and Wambel, of which Deusen, Kemminghausen, Rahm and Wischlingen
had fewer than 2000 inhabitants in 1910. Even under the extreme assumption
that they had exactly 2000 inhabitants, the total growth due to the acquisi-
tion of all 10 towns would have amounted to only 23%, so Dortmund was not
dropped. Similarly, Hannover acquired Linden, but thereby growing only by
24%. Similarly, Schweinfurt incorporated Oberndorf, but this only represented
a growth of around 15% at 1910 levels. The most difficult case is Regensburg.
Its population in 1910 stood at 52624. Between then and 1925, it acquired
Stadtamhof (4369) and Steinweg (3575) as well as 5 villages that had fewer than
2000 inhabitants in 1910. If these 5 villages had a total population of more than
5212 inhabitants, Regensburg’s inorganic growth would have exceeded 25% and
I would have dropped the city. However, in the respective district of Oberpfalz,
the 1910 census gives the average population of all villages below 2000 inhabi-
tants as 395, so the 5 villages combined would have had to exceed this average
by more than a factor of 2.5 to reach 5212 inhabitants, which seems unlikely. I
therefore decided to not drop Regensburg.
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3.9 Appendix C
In this appendix, I present several additional results. In my empirical strategy,
I use several control variables detailed in section 3.3.1. Control variables are not
of interest per se for my study. Moreover, in the absence of a credible identifi-
cation strategy for them, their regression coefficients identify mere conditional
correlations without a causal interpretation. Because of this, I have omitted
them from the main regression tables. In table 3.14, however, I show the basic
fixed-effects regression results from table 3.6, including the coefficients for all
control variables. Table 3.15 does the same for the baseline IV estimates of
table 3.7.
Conditional on all the other included variables, latitude and the Jewish popu-
lation share in 1925 do not appear to be correlated with public employment.
Cities in the East experienced a relative decrease of public employment, while
the dummy for the Rhineland is actually negative. Given the military reoccu-
pation of the Rhineland after 1935, this is surprising, but on the other hand,
the Rhineland and longitude are strongly negatively correlated, so part of this
effect could potentially be captured by the longitude coefficient already. Cities
with a greater unemployment rate in 1933 experience relative increases in public
employment jobs in the ratio specifications (adminpop and adminshare), but
not in the log specification, which indicates that such cities experienced a rela-
tive population decline. Interestingly, NSDAP gau capitals experienced declines
in public employment. One explanation is that most gau capitals were already
regional or state capitals before the Nazis had come to power and thus already
had sizeable public employment shares before, such that they on average expe-
rienced less growth.
Panel A of table 3.15 shows the correlations of the control variables with the
1933 NSDAP vote share. The Jewish population share is positively correlated
with voting for the Nazis, as is being in the East and North. Being in the
Rhineland has a strong negative effect on the 1933 NSDAP vote share, which
is not surprising given the region’s Catholicism and the findings of Spenkuch
and Tillmann (2016). Gau capitals and the 1933 unemployment rate, on the
other hand, are not found to have statistically significant effects on voting for
the Nazis. The negative point estimate for the unemployment rate is in line with
Falter et al. 1985, who find a negative correlation between the unemployment
rate and the 1933 NSDAP vote share in a sample of precincts. Turning to the
IV estimates in panel B, most of the estimates are similar to those in table 3.14:
Latitude turns slightly negative, while the effect of the unemployment rate is
again apparently due to differential population changes and thus absent in the
logadmin specification. Cities in the West still are found to have experienced
growth in the public sector, whereas Gau capital cities are negatively associated
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with public employment growth. The one major change of the IV controls rela-
tive to the OLS controls is that the Rhineland coefficients are now considerably
larger in value, sometimes even positive, but generally insignificant. Again, it
seems that the public employment effect of being in the Rhineland is to a large
extent already captured by the longitude effect.
A further robustness check is motivated by figure 3.1, which shows a slight con-
centration of large public employment increases in Central Germany. Because of
this, controlling for longitude or latitude in a linear form might not be sufficient.
Table 3.16 shows results when additionally controlling for the square of longitude
and latitude (interacted with a dummy for Post-1939). If anything, allowing for
a nonlinear effect of geography strengthens my results: Point estimates increase,
the first stage becomes more powerful, and the standard errors decrease slightly.
In table 3.17, I repeat the robustness check of table 3.9 for the “Placebo check”in
table 3.8. Generally, the point estimates increase in absolute value, but their
precision either stays relatively unchanged (columns 1-3) or decreases (columns
4-6). As a result, there is still no statistically significant effect to be seen, but the
relative imprecision of the estimates makes it hard to draw any firm conclusions.
Finally, as mentioned in sections 3.3.1 and 3.4.1, the instrumental variable I use
has a somewhat unusual distribution: In 191 cities, the EA did not run or did
not receive any votes in 1912. In the remaining 55 cities, the mean vote share
was 3.12% (standard deviation 6.54). Four cities recorded particularly high EA
vote shares of more than 20%, the extreme case being Siegen with more than
37%. The spike at 0 and the presence of potentially influential variables on
the right tail of the instrument’s distribution may mask some heterogeneity in
the effect. This is further explored in table 3.18. Focussing on adminpop and
logadmin as outcome variables, I show IV results for several subsamples, and
show how the IV coefficient depends on its two constituents, the reduced form
(effect of the 1912 EA share on the outcome) and the first stage. Columns 1 and
5 show the results for the baseline of 246 cities, reproducing the main results
from table 3.7. In Columns 2 and 6, I focus on the 55 cities that had nonzero
EA vote shares in 1912. Naturally, the precision decreases when dropping 75%
of the sample, and the first stage F statistic is weakened. The size of the first
stage coefficient decreases, indicating that among the cities where the EA ran
in 1912, the translation from EA vote shares to 1933 NSDAP vote shares is
smaller. Because of this and a slight increase in the reduced form, the effect
size for these cities increases. In columns 3 and 7, I keep the cities with no EA
vote share, but drop the four cities with EA vote shares larger than 20. They
represent around 1.5% of all cities, but more than 7% of all those with values
larger than 0. Now, the reduced form decreases, while the first stage becomes
less precise, but larger in absolute value, both of which leads to smaller effect
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sizes. Finally, in columns 4 and 8, I drop both the four cities with large EA
vote shares and all the cities with no EA voting. The first stage coefficient in
this sample is very close to the baseline, but the reduced form is larger, leading
to overall larger effect sizes. Overall, the cities with zero EA votes in 1912 are
important for the precision of the estimate. However, they tend to decrease the
reduced form and increase the coefficient of the first stage, thereby dampening
the effect. The four cities with very large EA vales are quite influential in the
overall regression, increasing the reduced form and decreasing the first stage and
thus increasing overall estimates, as can be seen when comparing columns 1 and
5 to 3 and 7. Among cities with positive EA vote shares, those four cities are
more influential for the first stage, tilting its slope closer towards 0 (columns 2/6
vs. 4/8). Finally, as columns 4 and 8 show, when focussing on a very limited
sample of only cities that have positive EA shares below 20%, i.e. excluding
both extremes, precision is low, but the qualitative conclusions remain the same




Ratio to Pop. Ratio to LF Natural Log
NSDAP share 1933 · D1939 -0.007 -0.009 -0.002
(0.011) (0.025) (0.003)
Jewish pop share 1925 · D1939 -0.006 0.100 0.038
(0.090) (0.223) (0.026)
Unemployment rate 1933 · D1939 0.038*** 0.067** -0.007*
(0.014) (0.031) (0.004)
Latitude · D1939 0.004 -0.055 0.025**
(0.055) (0.120) (0.013)
Longitude · D1939 -0.107*** -0.209** -0.024***
(0.038) (0.087) (0.008)
DRhineland · D1939 -0.420* -0.924* -0.126**
(0.220) (0.483) (0.060)
D(Gau capital)· D1939 -0.507** -1.224** -0.107**
(0.208) (0.481) (0.052)
D1939 0.142 3.500 -0.710
(2.808) (6.091) (0.632)
Panel data results for 1925, 1933 and 1939, 246 cities and 738 observations. Ro-
bust standard errors, clustered at the city level, in parentheses. All regressions
also control for city fixed effects.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.14: OLS estimates
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(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: First stage Dep. variable: NSDAP vote share 1933
EA share 1912 · D1939 0.339***
(0.093)
Jewish pop share 1925 · D1939 1.595**
(0.764)
Unemployment rate 1933 · D1939 -0.127
(0.082)
Latitude · D1939 0.771**
(0.330)
Longitude · D1939 0.808***
(0.203)
DRhineland · D1939 -4.269**
(1.649)




F-stat first stage 13.21
Panel B: 2SLS estimation Public Employment
Ratio to Pop. Ratio to LF Natural Log
NSDAP share 1933 · D1939 0.098** 0.266** 0.023*
(0.049) (0.122) (0.013)
Jewish pop share 1925 · D1939 -0.193 -0.389 -0.007
(0.127) (0.312) (0.034)
Unemployment rate 1933 · D1939 0.054*** 0.109** -0.003
(0.018) (0.043) (0.005)
Latitude · D1939 -0.090 -0.300* 0.002
(0.076) (0.178) (0.020)
Longitude · D1939 -0.179*** -0.396*** -0.042***
(0.054) (0.135) (0.013)
DRhineland · D1939 0.038 0.272 -0.014
(0.357) (0.842) (0.097)
D(Gau capital)· D1939 -0.541** -1.313** -0.115**
(0.220) (0.536) (0.049)
D1939 1.033 5.829 -0.493
(3.446) (7.902) (0.814)
Panel data results for 1925, 1933 and 1939, 246 cities and 738 observations. Ro-
bust standard errors, clustered at the city level, in parentheses. All regressions
also control for city fixed effects.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1




Ratio to Pop. Ratio to LF Natural Log
NSDAP share 1933 · D1939 0.097** 0.260** 0.026**
(0.043) (0.107) (0.012)
F-stat first stage 16.03
Panel data results for 1925, 1933 and 1939, 246 cities and 738 observations.
Robust standard errors, clustered at the city level, in parentheses. All regres-
sions control for city fixed effects, an indicator for 1939 as well as interactions
of an indicator for 1939 with an indicator for being a gau capital, the Jewish
population in 1925, the unemployment rate in 1933, longitude, the square of
longitude, latitude, the square of latitude, and an indicator for being in the
Rhineland.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This thesis used three different historical settings to shed light on economic
questions. In the first chapter, we studied the causal relationship between trade
and economic growth. In order to avoid problems like reverse causality, path
dependence and confounding factors such as institutions, we made use of one of
the first major trade expansions in human history: the systematic crossing of
open seas in the Mediterranean at the time of the Phoenicians. We constructed
a measure of maritime connectedness of points along the Mediterranean coast
and argued that this measure of connectedness is a valid instrument for trade.
We then estimated a reduced form relationship between our instrument and
economic development, which we measured by way of the presence of archae-
ological sites. We found that a clear positive relationship between geographic
connectedness and local archaeologic site density after 750BC, when traversing
the open sea had become regular. We also found evidence for some importance
of sea trade already during the Bronze Age, but our results in this respect were
weaker and less consistent across specifications. Our results also highlighted
that the positive effects of connectedness for settlement density persisted during
the Hellenic and Roman periods. Further evidence for a causal effect of trade on
growth was provided by extending our strategy to the world scale and finding
a positive relationship between maritime connectedness and population density
in the year 1AD.
In the second chapter, we studied how a male-biased labour demand shock affects
female labour market involvement. Again, we made use of variation provided
by geography and history. During the first half of the 20th century, many large
oil fields were discovered in the American South and Southwest. Since the oil
extraction industry is heavily male-dominated, we treated these discoveries as
male-biased shifters of labour demand. Combining data on the location and
discovery dates of such oil fields with labour market data from the US census
allowed us to implement a difference-in-differences research design at the county
level. Doing so, we found a zero net effect of oil discoveries on female labour
force participation due to two opposing channels. Oil discoveries indeed bring
about increased demand for male labour and therefore higher male wages. This
increases the supply of “marriageable ”men in the local economy, and we accord-
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ingly found an increase in young women’s propensity to marry, which depresses
their labour supply. However, oil discoveries also increase demand for services
and thus female labour. Overall, female labour force participation therefore
remains unchanged. While previous research (e.g. Ross 2008) had shown a neg-
ative correlation between resource wealth and female labour force participation,
our results demonstrated that such a negative association can be offset by ser-
vice sector growth.
The third chapter further contributed to the literature on the value of polit-
ical connections. I analysed whether the German National Socialists, once in
power, preferentially allocated public employment jobs to cities where they had
obtained higher vote shares in 1933. I argued that in a regression of public
employment on the 1933 Nazi vote share, the latter is likely to be endogenous.
I then proposed to address this endogeneity by way of an instrumental variable
strategy, using the 1912 vote share of another antisemitic party as instrument
for the 1933 Nazi vote share. Doing so, I found a significant positive effect of
Nazi votes on public employment.
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